| | Mike,
All I meant was that for any retaliation to work, the individual under penalty must perceive themself as a member of the community or else this cannot be called a "defection." But in studies like these, defection in any given two-party trade agreement (two-party value exchange) is always an individual act. Here is an imaginary example:
Sally offers Bob an apple for his orange. Bob agrees and proceeds to give his orange to Sally, expecting to receive the apple in return. Sally takes the orange, refuses to give Bob the apple, and then flees.
In the case above, there was a lack of "mutually beneficial cooperation" between the 2 interacting agents. This is because one of them -- Sally -- acted as a defector. Now, if Sally tries to live among a whole lot of people like Bob -- people committed to "mutually beneficial cooperation" -- and she continues to act as she did, then she would be a "free-rider."
So you start with some kind of a defection, some kind of fraud, and then, extended through time, someone who attempts to perpetuate the fraud earns herself the moniker: free-rider. On this view, free-riding is simply the sum of several, subsequent defections. It takes a defection to step outside of what is called "mutually beneficial cooperation" (consenting to trade your time, energy, creativity, etc. for someone else's time, energy, creativity, etc.), and if you run a bunch of such defections up in a row, you are then attempting to be a free-rider.
On those terms, a free-rider would be defined simply as a habitual defector. Now, if Sally didn't perceive herself as a member of Bob's community, that doesn't make her action something other than a defection (all broken agreements are defections), And if Sally repeated this behavior with several members of Bob's community -- always trying to free-ride -- it wouldn't matter where she came from. In fact, the whole point of studies like this is to see which kinds of characters can invade and populate different groups. Research questions might be: Is there any strategy that works in all groups? Is there natural selection against punishing defection, or is there natural selection pressure for punishing defection? Are there strategies that, when followed by most members, make a population go extinct really fast? Are there strategies that are so robust that they are impossible to invade and dominate? Cool stuff like that.
Whether the punishment fits the crime or not, if it does not fit the perpetrator, it is not punishment, it is warfare. But when I talk about punishment that fits the perpetrator, I'm referring to the intended reform of the perpetrator. Someone somewhere gets themselves into the position of being able to know which services that society should provide for a strong boost in well-being of the perpetrator -- a boost strong enough that they give up their perpetrating ways -- and then they "administer" the needed things to the perpetrator. However, the pithy way that you word it could be interpreted to mean that the perpetrator has to willfully agree to the punishment, or else it means war.
That doesn't sound right, though. So is there a better interpretation of what you said?
The purpose of punishing a defector is to bring them back into the fold. My retort is that that is rationalistic a priori reasoning (or it is just Begging the Question). I would argue that it is also altruistic. Note how the effort you expend on the perpetrator will increase with their decrease in morality -- people who are so bad that we need to spend a lot of time and money reforming them.
Otherwise, all you have is warfare: violence against someone not in your group. That "extremely-parochial" view is not necessarily true for humans, though it is true for many animals of differing species. In contrast to animals of differing species, humans have a harmony of interests which can supercede this slippery-slope slide into tribal warfare that you mention. Arguing that something is not in the immediate, personal, short-sighted, narrow-minded "interest" of the perpetrator -- i.e., that he claims he shouldn't be punished because he just simply doesn't feel like being punished for what he did -- doesn't dent the actually harmony of interest. Arguing that, because he disagrees, there must be war, is not a reason to throw out the concept of a harmony of interests. Admittedly, that is an ungenerous perspective regarding what you are saying -- and more feedback from you might fix a potential straw-man on my part, which finishes with:
But that kind of thinking would require every human everywhere to agree with every human everywhere -- in order for there to be a harmony of interests; which is absurd.
Removing yourself (shunning the defector) is the first response. I agree.
As for your peculiar language, are you claiming that the behavior of trading is inherited and mutually exclusive to the behaviors of defecting and also of punishing defectors? First let's look at what the authors assumed, and then I'll add my 2 cents. The authors assumed that being a punisher or not was "genetic" (not "chosen"). They did this in order to track the fitness of punishing in an evolutionary sense. However, with regard to cooperating or defecting, they left that open as a choice-point steered by the level of expected punishment. While this approximates reality, it doesn't perfectly correspond to reality. In reality, some people will not defect against others even if there is no possibility of (external) punishment. This is because, for humans, there is often a psychological "casualty" taken upon ourselves when we betray others. Otherwise, I agree with how the researchers ran the study.
the unconditional trader would be a primary defector. The basic assumption of any group is to exclude outsiders - else it is not a group - but the trader necessarily is open to aliens. I would challenge that one part about a group having to remain it's original size by always excluding outsiders -- rather than, say, growing -- in order to be called a group. It seems too rationalistic.
I dismiss it because it is religious, based on faith contrary to fact, and the more it fails, the greater its claim to evidence. And the great irony of that, is that it was said without evidence.
:-)
You fallaciously refer to Ayn Rand's views on this, not as a citation of authorty but as an appeal to authority. Mike, but you set-up your line of reasoning by saying "self-identified Objectivists ...", which insinuates that perhaps it is not truly Objectivist to take the retributive/retaliatory view of justice or of punishment. My argument was that it is and I mentioned it was Rand's view ... and you call that an appeal to authority? ...
--------------------------------------------- Jim: Selfishness and altruism are opposites.
Bob: Hmf! Many self-identified Objectivists still have the old and stale "beatnik" paradigm that altruism cannot be selfish.
Jim: But it's not "beatnik" -- it's what Rand herself said.
Bob: That's an Appeal to Authority fallacy! ---------------------------------------------
:-)
Consider that you are offering something called "altruistic punishment" i.e., carrying out a vengeful act that brings you no gain. You're missing the point of this study (which shows that there is a net gain from punishment) and using the imperfect terminology of game theory researchers and then placing it on me. I don't agree with the terminology, have said so any number of times, and have even penned a mediocre-quality article on the subject. So cut me some slack please. This business of taking an idea, however bad, and then giving it the kind of respect that you sometimes do, is frustrating to me. The punishment in this study was not "a vengeful act that brings you no gain", so I don't know where you are coming from. It's almost like you want to argue about floating abstractions instead of tying the debate down to what actually happened here (and why what it is that happened might be something important for humans to know/learn about).
If you walk out of a store because the clerk is rude, rather than making a purchase which would be to your advantage, you have incurred a cost of punishment. And we do these things all time, we made personal choices to make ourselves happy regardless of the economic gain or loss. I don't have any kind of a snappy comeback for this gem. Rather, it seems like some awful good insight on your part, and something that I am not sure that I have ever thought about before. I gotta' give this more thought ...
That fact points to a basic fallacy even in Austrian economics. If Menger or perhaps von Mises was here, I'm sure he'd look you in the eye and say to you: "Mister, them's fightin' words!"
:-)
If it was purely and truly functional and only functional and nothing more, it would look different and cost less ... and no one would buy it. These kinds of considerations knock the foundation from the academic collectivists who posit the meaningless scenarios about non-existent people. Okay, okay, so you don't like some of the people engaging in this kind of research. I agree with you. I don't like some of them either. For all the skill they possess in being able to focus a microscope or titrate a solution, they often have picked up -- via social metaphysics -- some pretty stupid and harmful ideas. But forget about them for a moment and look what they are producing. Surely, not all models are fruitless. What about my Sally/Bob model of coordinated trade above? That wasn't meaningless, was it?
Didn't it place the social situation into a neat and clean abstract form that could be studied and improved upon (to make it even more applicable, or even more informing of, the problem of living a real life on earth)?
A change in paradigm would bring justice out of the political realm and into the commercial mode. An interesting point to ponder ...
Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 11/28, 7:33pm)
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