RoR: Forum

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Sunday, January 22, 2012 - 2:54pm

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I have previously differentiated ethics from morality. I understand the linguistic ambiguities: we use the words "ethics" and "morality" interchangeable in English. My point is based on Ayn Rand's observation that alone on an island, Robinson Crusoe would need morality (desperately). Ethics are (is) social behavior. Ethical choice rests on morality, but ethics can be subjective. My evidence comes from the many Professional Ethics statements from scientific, academic and other occupations. The Hippocratic Oath simply does not apply to Geographers. And so, too, with virtues.

Any action might be a virtue and still be wrong for the context. "Honesty is the best policy" contradicts the known fact that no dress ever made any woman look fat.

In the recent "Good-bye" thread, I posted this table based on Jane Jacobs's Systems of Survival. She arrayed these differently. I juxtaposed them here. Note that while I personally consider the Trader Syndrome "better" than the Guardian, that side still consists mostly of virtues such as honor, integrity, and courage.

Below is a table from the original essay of "Bourgeois Virtue" (1994) now in the bibliography of Deirdre McCloskey author of the book by that name, and a second volume, Bourgeois Dignity (third on the way).

As McCloskey said in 1994, the purpose is not to elevate one list over the others, but to recognize that we of the very broad "middle class" are now the vast majority and deserve to recognize the virtues we practice.

In the "Good-bye" topic, I suggested that the texture and richness of engagement here was lost when a Guardian mode of enforcement was used to keep the commons green. Steve Wolfer objected. I suggest now, as a shading of that Guardian mode, we look at the Aristocratic ethics of Achilles. Are these not many of the primary virtues of Objectivism? Granted that we honor enterprise, integrity, etc, as practitioners and theoreticians of capitalism. Still, in daily life, as evidenced in our interactions here, do we not more often act like Homeric Heroes than merchants in a coffeehouse? Note that being relegated to Dissent is called "moderation" rather than "thrift." The moderators are not thrift-seekers hoping to minimize our losses and maximize our gains.

My intention is not to elevate or demote specific virtues out of context, but only to show how in full consideration of context, other virtues might have better outcomes.

The bottom line is that objective morality determines ethical action and the context of that action delineates the most appropriate virtues.

(Edited by Michael E. Marotta on 1/22, 2:59pm)

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Monday, January 23, 2012 - 10:19pm

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Mike,

First of all, I see ethics as the science of morality -- not something extra or special (so I disagree). Also, Jonathan Haidt is a psychologist carrying the metaphorical torch of Jane Jacobs:

Most traditional societies care about a lot more than harm/care and fairness/justice. Why do so many societies care deeply and morally about menstruation, food taboos, sexuality, and respect for elders and the Gods? You can't just dismiss this stuff as social convention. If you want to describe human morality, rather than the morality of educated Western academics, you've got to include the Durkheimian view that morality is in large part about binding people together.

From a review of the anthropological and evolutionary literatures, Craig Joseph (at Northwestern University) and I concluded that there were three best candidates for being additional psychological foundations of morality, beyond harm/care and fairness/justice. These three we label as ingroup/loyalty (which may have evolved from the long history of cross-group or sub-group competition, related to what Joe Henrich calls "coalitional psychology"); authority/respect (which may have evolved from the long history of primate hierarchy, modified by cultural limitations on power and bullying, as documented by Christopher Boehm), and purity/sanctity, which may be a much more recent system, growing out of the uniquely human emotion of disgust, which seems to give people feelings that some ways of living and acting are higher, more noble, and less carnal than others.

As you can see, Haidt focuses on the "fact" that it is the religious folks -- i.e., the Guardians -- who have a monopoly on most of the so-called morality described (loyalty, authority, respect, purity, sanctity). A point that you also make here. Also, he focuses, like you do, on how 'pragmatic' times call for pragmatic measures -- rather than in-group/out-group animosity. My main objection to this however, is that it is merely claimed -- and left unestablished -- that we live in pragmatic times.

What he needs to do, and what you (IMO) need to do, is to discover a way to establish that with someone who hasn't pre-adopted pragmatism as a correct view for mankind.

Ed

Virtues, Ethics, and Morality