| | In the Article Discussion forum under "The 'Rewards of Determinism," Tibor objected to the discussion on free will and choice as hijacking the substance of his article, so I've moved the discussion here:
In Post 8, Steve wrote: "There is no sense at all in any argument that denies choice (would you choose to argue otherwise, or to ask me to choose to give you a different argument). Just as there would be no sense in an argument that denies the existence of logic or truth or morality or knowledge. All such arguments would be self-invalidating."
In Post 9, Jim replied, I would say that you either do not grasp the essence of my previous post, or are using a different definition of "choice" that is predicated on an axiom of a non-deterministic universe. If by "choice" you mean "the actions we actually take based on our minds computing the probable outcomes and consequences when faced with several physically possible courses of action, and always taking what those computations show might be the ideal course of action, however wrong a calculation in retrospect that course of action turns out to be in achieving one's goals", thus taking out the implied determinism in your arguments, then we would be in closer agreement.
But choice is a much shorter way of phrasing it, however imprecise, so we "choose" to use that phrasing. :o) What you are really referring to here Jim, is a psychologically free choice -- a choice that is not necessitated by any antecedent causes. But we often use the term "choice" to mean simply a voluntary action in the face of a recognized alternative, even though the 'choice' may have been entirely determined by one's knowledge and preferences.
An example I often use is that of a multiple-choice test in which you're certain of the right answer and have no reason not to choose it. Clearly, under those circumstances, there is no possibility of your (willfully) choosing a wrong answer. Since you want to pass the test and know the correct answer, you will necessarily choose it. In this case, the choice is not psychologically free, even though it is politically or physically free. It makes perfect sense to use the term "choice" in this way, even though it is not a choice that we would describe as psychologically free, since you could not have chosen otherwise. Even if this were the only kind of choice open to us, it would not mean that a criminal does not morally deserve punishment.
Question: When you are confronted with the choice to focus your mind as you believe you should or to evade doing so because the consequences are unpleasant, do you believe that the choice is in some sense psychologically free? If so, then you believe in free will in the classical sense of that term. But this kind of free will is still not necessary for moral responsibility. If, for example, a legislator votes to outlaw abortion, because he honestly believes that it violates the rights of the fetus, is he absolved of moral responsibility for his vote simply because he acted in good faith? Or can he can still be blamed for making abortion illegal, because he ought not to have voted that way? I'd say the latter.
In Post 10, you quoted Steve -- "You or I would be most likely to bring the issue up after someone failed to be civil - but our after-the-fact attempt to chastise them, to hold them accountable, makes no sense if the moral standard or responsibility didn't exist before they became uncivil. They were accountable for being civil before the fact; it just wasn't an issue till violated." -- and replied, Holding someone accountable pretty much implies that you are trying to bring someone around to your notions of proper behavior. True, but it doesn't only imply that, which was Steve's point. It also implies that the person "ought not" to have done what he did, independently of your attempts to bring him around to your notions of proper behavior. And if we attempt to chastise them after the fact, it is because our notions of how they should have behaved -- and their notions, at the time they acted, of proper behavior -- differ. True, but that is a highly relevant difference if you are correct and he is not. Remember, morality is objective; it's not simply a contest of opposing viewpoints. You are not simply saying, "From my subjective perspective he is wrong, but from his subjective perspective I am"; you are saying that he is in fact wrong -- that in fact he ought not to have done what he did (even if he doesn't think so) and that it is this fact which implies that he is blameworthy.
- Bill
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