Philosophy of Time Needed for Objectivist Causation?

Jordan,

Thanks for the helpful explanation of McTaggart.

I don't yet see how The Growing Universe Theory (Board's and Tooley's theory) appropriately resolves McTaggart's A-series contentions. Saying there are no future objects poses additional problems as well. If there are no future objects, then it's unclear what we are talking about when we refer to, say, Earth in the year 2500.

Well, we're talking about our imaginings, that's all. We imagine a future and then talk about it. Something in your imagination doesn't have to exist or be real in an extra-mental sense -- even while it's a real imagining performed by your mind. That future, one could say, exists -- as an imagination -- inside your mind (only). But real existence is precisely that kind of existence which can be located outside of your mind. The future can't.

Moreover, it's unclear how to assign truth values to propositions dealing with the future and similarly unclear how to compare future to present and past.

Yup. That's similar to -- if not, exactly -- the epistemological issue that Aristotle had with the "sea battle" analogy.

Personally, at the moment I find the C-series and Eternalism most persuasive.

Do you have any links which more-fully explain these two things? I'd like to be able to think about them. Getting more familiar with them would be required for that.

Thanks.

Ed

Post 41

Wednesday, April 22, 2009 - 10:35am

You're referring to a potential future - it not exist yet but still follows according to some eternally known identity...

Post 42

Wednesday, April 22, 2009 - 11:34am

Hi Ed.

Here's a link to Eternalism, and here's one on�the C-series.�They aren't terribly thorough pages, but they'll do in a pinch.

Off the top of my head, here's a response to your notion of�future-as-imaginings. First, it doesn't jive with a 4-D world, which is what Eternalism, the C-series, and relativity are all about. Second, Aristotle's sea battle is a little different. Aristotle assumed a truth value was assignable to a future event. But if we reject the existence of future events, then the question is whether they can be assigned any truth value at all. Put�basically, can non-existent events have truth-values? Third, presumably there's a difference between fiction and future, but how do we discern the two if both are just imaginings. I'll need to think about your notion of future-as-imaginings a bit more. I think it deserves more of a rebuttal than what I've just provided.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 4/22, 10:32pm)

Post 43

Wednesday, April 22, 2009 - 12:19pm

Ed,

What of the half-life characteristic of all the U-238 in the earth today or the life expectancy of all the one-year-old robins on the planet today? Certain percentages of these are expected to really be around for another year. The year coming round beyond today is real. We know a truth about existence in affirming that reality. And we know a truth about existence in affirming the expected percentages of the U-238 and one-year-old robins that will endure to a year from now.

Richard Sorabji suggests in Time, Creation, and the Continuum that where one is inclined to say that the past or the future are unreal or do not exist, it would be better to say simply that they are absent. The present can be said to be present as when a student calls �present� in a class, and the future is absent as an absent student.

Absence is common to past and future. I wonder if their difference could be coherently indicated by saying that the past (like the present) is an actuality, but the future is a potentiality. Then we have the sectors of time: absent actuality, present actuality, absent potentiality.

Before going surely that way, I personally would have to integrate those characterizations with the temporal-ordering character of spatially separated events in special relativity and with the teachings about past and future light cones of events according to special relativity (and the SR constraints on causality).

There is an important book I have not seen in which it is argued that the present and past are real, but that the future is unreal. The author is Michael Tooley, and the book�s title is Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford 1997). Professor Tooley constructs two arguments for the conclusion that the future is unreal. One concerns the nature of truthmakers for counterfactuals and the other concerns the temporal directionality of causation. The latter argument, especially, needs to be studied against Rand�s conception of causality to answer Jordan�s general question.

(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 4/23, 6:53am)

Post 44

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 10:11am

Jordan,

I think eternalism and C-series -- and much of this talk of time -- are merely mistakes built on mistakes. In order to fix wrong views, more wrong views are introduced. An example would be having slaves, and then coming up with a rationalization for slaves -- rather than saying slavery is just wrong and be done with it.

What these professional philosophers are doing is reifying time -- trying to make it an existent in it's own right (so that they can talk about it objectively). But there's inherent subjectivity in human talk of time. Time means something to us, and there's no way to get around that -- it'd be like trying to separate valuing from life. It's my opinion that rather than coming up with something good, most professional philosophers like to go back in history, take somebody else's error, and try to refine it and make it come out right. They are second-handers that way.

The alternative to focusing on error is to focus on the truth (and judge the error in relation to how much it misses the truth).

Ed

Post 45

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 10:25am

Stephen,

What of the half-life characteristic of all the U-238 in the earth today or the life expectancy of all the one-year-old robins on the planet today? Certain percentages of these are expected to really be around for another year. The year coming round beyond today is real.

But according to the Parmenidean thinking of McTaggart, uranium-238 is eternal (the halves keep on halving and halving). Alternatively, the estimation of the life expectancy of all the one-year-old robins is just that, an estimation made in order to approximate -- rather than to dictate -- reality. As an estimation made with the best knowledge and skill that we have at the time, it is either:

1) eternal -- because it was that one, best estimate we could come up with at the time (and will stand, forever, as the best 2009 estimate)

2) approximate -- because it isn't an actuality (something independently real), but a mind's method of dealing with one -- i.e., a computation that, like imaginary numbers, does not have to have real, extra-mental existence in order to be useful to us

Ed

Post 46

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 12:36pm

Ed,

In #39 you quoted various portions of my #36 and responded to them. One portion was my remark:

�That some future things are real and already fully determinate is enough to count the futurity of future things as real. Existence will exist tomorrow.�

You responded in part:

�The �existence� analogy is weak, because existence is eternal (it exists �outside of time�). A better analogy would include an object (even an object of thought) that is not eternal. I can�t think of anything like that, however. If you can think of something not eternal but having �futurity�---please offer it up for discussion.�

That I did in #43:

�Ed, what of the half-life characteristic of all the U-238 in the earth today . . . ? [A] certain percentage . . . is expected to really be around for another year. The year coming round beyond today is real. We know a truth about existence in affirming that reality. And we know a truth about existence in affirming the expected percentages of the U-238 . . . .�

Have I supplied an example of the sort you asked for?

(I have not studied the McTaggart paper and don�t expect to be able to for some months. I am just conversing with you about what you and I think and what Rand wrote.)

Do you still think that the future is not an existent?

Why do you think �existence exists� speaks of anything but concretes in time? It seems to me that existence in that axiom refers to any and all concrete existents there might be.

Post 47

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 1:34pm

Stephen,

The main issue I have is with using McTaggart's thought. If McTaggart was in error, then it's possible that his thought is entirely useless (to us). If the future isn't real, then the rest of the philosophy of time debate is a storm in a teacup.

In response to post 46, I don't think the supplied examples -- U-238 and live robin life expectancy -- meet my requested criteria. The hazy concept is futurity, which I think of as 'existence inside of a future' or 'existence in the future.' In order to evaluate the concept of futurity, I've been using other concepts:

--eternal vs. temporal
--approximate vs. determinate
--extra-mental existence vs. imagination

... which are more clear (to me, at least).

The U-238 (even with its half-life) is either:

1) eternal (where the halves keep halving)

... or it's:

2) relational, where at earlier time-points there was more U-238, and at later time-points there was less U-238.

[In place of "later" one might use "future"; but only "future" in relation to the past (earlier) time-point -- not "future" in relation to "now"].

The live robin life expectancy is best conceived as simply a mind's expectation (a computation), so I'd reject that example on the grounds of being based in consciousness -- rather than being based in existence. The word "expectancy" makes "life expectancy" related to expectations of facts, rather than the facts themselves. Perhaps this is just semantic confusion on our parts.

I'll say more later ...

Ed

Post 48

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 4:39pm

Stephen,

Do you still think that the future is not an existent?

I think that the future is an existent, but only in the same sense that a math formula, an architect's building plan, or a unicorn is an existent -- it is something conceivable to a human mind.

Just like math formulas, construction plans, and funny-looking horses, we can "see" the future not as we look out to reality (because the future is nowhere to be found), but as we look inward and perform mental functions. We can, with certainty, predict things about the future -- just like we can, with certainty, predict the outcome of a math equation -- but that doesn't give foreseeable math outcomes or foreseeable futures any special existence (existence entirely independent of a mind).

Why do you think �existence exists� speaks of anything but concretes in time? It seems to me that existence in that axiom refers to any and all concrete existents there might be.

Interesting point. It'll require more thinking in order for me to answer ...

Ed

Post 49

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 6:11pm

Hi Stephen,

Some philosophers go for "existing" versus "actual" and conclude that past, present, and future all exist, but only the present is actual.

Jordan

Post 50

Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 11:57pm

Stephen,

In keeping with Jordan's suggested language, I'd say that the future has no (0%) actuality, but that it has full (100%) potentiality. It has a potential existence. The present -- and I'd say even the past! -- has an actual existence. I'm viewing existence as a temporal expression of identity, such that to exist means to exist (for a time) as a certain kind of thing.

Something's existence is something's temporal expression of its identity. On this view, the future hasn't had enough (any) time to express its identity, which makes it less than fully real. I'm also of the mind that Rand would think this same way about it -- with her vehement integration of existence with identity. That said, I'm open to criticism on my view (and on my guess of Rand's view).

Ed

Post 51

Sunday, April 26, 2009 - 2:41am

If ye saying it has potential existence, then it doesn't actually exist - so where is it coming from? it is being created out of the present/past?? but the universe is the sum of that which exists, so how can something else, the future, come into existence?

Post 52

Sunday, April 26, 2009 - 4:09am

Robert, you asked where potential existence is coming from. As Leibniz would often say �the present is pregnant with the future� and, in �Induction on Identity,� I introduced the principle of substantive propagation, which says that the ways things will be are grown out of the ways things are.

So, yes, existence is being created (propagated, I would say) as actual by past and present actual existence. You asked, the universe being the sum of that which exists, how can something else, the future, come into existence? The future is already part of existence, but with less determination of its identities, less than the full actuality of past and present. The passage of some of the potentials of the future into actualities and others into nothingness is simply change within existence as a whole.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Here is the entry for Time in the Subject Index for Objectivity.

Time V1N6 38�39, V2N3 50, 63, V2N4 185�86, V2N6 152, 154�62, 184�85

Causal Inertness of Time V1N3 39

Time as Complement of Energy V1N3 39, V1N4 79, V2N6 171

Time and Consciousness V1N1 11, V1N2 10�11, V1N3 19�20, 64, V1N4 24,
V2N1 111, 118, V2N2 88�89, V2N4 155, V2N6 12�18, 184�85

Contingency in Future Time V1N3 35, 37�39, 86�87, V1N4 26�28, V1N5 74�75,
V2N2 82, 114�16, V2N4 23�24, 186�87, V2N5 155�56

Discrete Time V1N3 18�20, 48

Development of Concept of Time V2N2 82�85, V2N6 109

Time and Existence V2N3 50, 61

Finitude of Future Time V1N3 37�38, V1N5 4, 17�18

Fixity of Past Time V1N3 33, 82, V2N5 159

Time as Form of Intuition V2N4 103, V2N5 13�14, 16�18, V2N6 162�63

Homogeneity of Time V1N3 39, V1N6 38, V2N3 62

Time and Identity V1N3 8, 18�20, 33, 43, 47�49, V1N4 65�66, V1N5 7�8, V2N6 45, 185

Time and Life V1N3 19, V1N5 25, V1N6 146�47

Time Preference V1N5 10�12, V2N2 56

Time and Succession V2N2 77, 82�85, V2N3 52, V2N5 23

Time and Tensed Beliefs V1N1 24, V1N4 6, 66

(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 4/26, 5:05am)

Post 53

Sunday, April 26, 2009 - 5:30am

Propagated is a good term... have to remember that one...;-)
[because, true, created implies intelligence, and there is, of course, no intelligence outside of the universe - intelligence being the ability to see the order within the universe]

Post 54

Sunday, April 26, 2009 - 9:58am

Hi Ed,

Per your post 44 -- McTaggart might well be wrong, but I think the way he framed the issues -- with his A- and B-series, tenses and relations -- is fair. I could be convinced otherwise. I don't think time is being reified here. When McTaggart and others speak about "the future," they are always talking about future objects.

To all,

I want to elaborate on my nomenclature just a little. In this context, I take "existential" to mean having existential parts or quantities (or having identity, as Quine and Rand would say). By this view, it might seem counter-intuitive, but you have the same existential status as unicorns and the United States president in the year 2035, since you guys all have existential parts and quantities (or identities). But not to worry, you guys are actually different. "Actual" is slightly trickier to define than "existential." It's something along the lines of being in an accessible world. In the world we are in, unicorns and President 2035 are inaccessible; they are non-actual.

Per this nomenclature, it's a mistake to ask, "where does the future come from?" because that entails the question, "where does existence come from?" Existence just is. Any future objects, like the rest of existents, just are. They aren't created or propagated from anything. (This is not to say that if they are actual that they are spontanteously so.)

Jordan

Post 55

Sunday, April 26, 2009 - 10:51pm

Jordan,

Per your post 44 -- McTaggart might well be wrong, but I think the way he framed the issues -- with his A- and B-series, tenses and relations -- is fair. I could be convinced otherwise.

I disagree with how he framed the issues. He framed the categories past, present, and future as non-relational. But there isn't anything like a present not related to -- indeed, not dependent for its very identity on -- the past. The same can be said for the future. There won't (ever) be anything like a future not related to the present or the past.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/26, 10:52pm)

Post 56

Monday, April 27, 2009 - 4:11am

Of course - because that is contingent with Identity, and Causality, which is Identity in action...

Post 57

Monday, April 27, 2009 - 7:51am

Ed, you wrote in #48

�I think that the future is an existent, but only in the same sense that a math formula, an architect's building plan, or a unicorn is an existent -- it is something conceivable to a human mind.

�Just like math formulas, construction plans, and funny-looking horses, we can "see" the future not as we look out to reality (because the future is nowhere to be found), but as we look inward and perform mental functions. We can, with certainty, predict things about the future -- just like we can, with certainty, predict the outcome of a math equation -- but that doesn't give foreseeable math outcomes or foreseeable futures any special existence (existence entirely independent of a mind).�

Do you think that all relations are abstract? Do you think that all relations require consciousness in order for the relations to hold? (Sorry if you�ve addressed this before and I�m not remembering.) Leibniz said Yes, and in a different way so did Kant.

I have held for a long time that the membership relation of concepts and sets is only an abstract relation, not a concrete relation. But I hold that there are also relations that are concrete. There are concrete relations that are perceived and concrete relations that are discerned by abstract thought. Perceived relations would include some relations of proximity, containment, and similarity. Some other similarities, such as that between a water circuit and an electrical circuit, are accessible only by abstraction. (Further, 2nd paragraph, 5th paragraph, and Note 37.)

The fact that the temporal relation that is the future must be known through abstraction (except for the sense of the future-front of experience), does not mean that the relation itself is not a concrete one existing independently of consciousness.

Temporal successions and the ranks of temporal durations exist independently of our having devised measurement instruments (with ratio scales) for them.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

For the entry Relations in the Subject Index of Objectivity, we have:

Relations V1N4 64�65, V2N2 132, V2N4 229�30

Containment Relations V1N2 10, V1N3 71, V1N4 58�59, V2N4 102, 112, 229�30

Relations and Dynamical States V1N4 69, 71�73, 77�79, V2N1 32�33, 44

Essential Relations V1N1 16�18, 27�28, 31�38, V1N4 18�19, V1N5 112, V2N5 124�26, 140�41, V2N6 44�46, 52�55, 64, 69�70, 74, 116

External v. Internal Relations V1N4 19, 67, 71�73, 77�78, V1N5 114, 116�17, V2N3 71�72, V2N5 2�4, 8, V2N6 185

Hierarchical Relations V2N2 133

Logical Relations V1N1 24, 30�31, V1N2 6, 9, 17, 21, 40, V1N3 34, 40�41, 44�46, V1N4 14�15, 20�23, 45, 63, V1N5 104, V1N6 77, V2N1 15�17, 134, V2N2 6�7, V2N3 81, V2N4 14, 82, 227�28, V2N6 74�75, 90, 96�97, 106, 114, 184�85

Mathematical Relations V1N1 6�7, 14�15, 33�34, V1N2 2�7, 9�10, 12�13, 29�30, 41, 98�100, 101�2, V1N3 17, 46�47, 101�10, V1N4 11, 16�17, 28, V1N6 61�63, 77, 178�79, V2N1 2�11, 21�26, 33�39, V2N2 1�2, 107�9, 119, 125, V2N3 79, 81, V2N4 103�7, 109�12, 170, 227, V2N6 133�34, 152�53, 172�74, 186

Means-Ends Relations V1N2 39, V1N6 149, V2N2 46, V2N3 10, 15, 17�18, 21, 33, 101, V2N5 97, 100, 119, 123, 137�40

Membership Relations V1N1 24�25, 29, V1N2 43�44, 102, V1N3 43�44, 71, V1N6 62�64, V2N4 112, V2N6 44, 49�50, 54�55, 57�58, 64, 66, 68�69, 74�77, 83�84, 88�89, 90�91, 106

Ontology of Relations V1N4 9, 14�16, 20�21, V2N3 18, 40�41, 63�65, 69, V2N4 229�32, V2N6 48�51

Part-Whole Relations V1N1 30, V1N3 7�8, V1N5 74, 111�12, V1N6 180, 185, V2N2 132, 135, V2N3 18, V2N4 229�30 V2N5 12, V2N6 113, 126

Physical Relations V1N1 5, 11, 14�15, 28, 37�38, V1N2 12�13, 29�30, 98�100, V1N3 9�12, 28�30, 35, 39�40, 47�49, 71, 89, V1N4 15, 20�21, 66�78, V1N5 13�18, 71�76, V1N6 63, V2N1 27�28, 31�45, V2N2 26�27, 107�9, 113�26, V2N3 61�63, 68�70, 79�82, V2N4 102�7, 231, V2N5 18�21, V2N6 5, 131�86

Post 58

Monday, April 27, 2009 - 4:06pm

Hi Ed,

I'd like to clarify McTaggart's view here. He readily accepts that past, present, and future are all relative to whatever point in time you're at. They all change relative to you: what was once your future became your present became your past. But their relations to each other don't change: A future is always "ahead of" a present is always "ahead of" a past. That's why he calls this, his A-series, non-relational. I think you might agree with this construction.

Jordan

Post 59

Monday, April 27, 2009 - 4:53pm