| | Hi Tim,
That was quite the mouthful! Rand was often a bit too informal with her word usage, which indeed can lead to much confusion. But I think that in keeping context, we can navigate her text somewhat reasonably. The following is my interpretation of Rand's ontology. If I need to cite sources, let me know.
First, Rand, like Aristotle, accepted metaphysical plurality. To be is to be something, a one, a particular. She calls each particular an "entity" and accepts that entities exist regardless of whether we are or can be aware of them.
Second, each "entity" has a particular nature, which is composed of all of its integrated attributes. Attributes -- e.g., color, shape, size, temperature, velocity -- cannot be metaphysically separated from the entity of which they comprise. They cannot exist ontologically on their own; however, they can be epistemologically separated. That is, we can focus on a specific attribute, and by doing so, mentally separate it from the rest. Rand calls such a focusible and mentally separable attribute an "existent," which can also include the entity as a whole. There are at least as many "existents" as there are focusible and mentally separable attributes. To your consternation, Rand switches back and forth between "existent" and "entity", forcing us to figure out her intended context. The two concepts overlap so much, and she rarely needed to distinguish them, that the issue of their difference seldom popped up.
Third, an entity's attributes -- e.g., color, sound, texture, weight, height, pressure, etc. -- do have different values along different dimensions. And we detect these attributes only because our sense-perception is attuned to them, even though they would exist even if we failed to detect them. That said, I think it's weird to call these attributes "boundaries." But that aside, no single attribute makes the entity. Only the integrated bunch of them comprise the entity. And to reiterate the previous point, these attributes, these values along different dimensions -- these "boundaries" if you like -- do not and cannot exist apart from the entities which they comprise.
Fourth, whatever is comprised of a cluster of integrated attributes is an entity. This includes the earth, chairs, atoms. Some entities might even contain other entities and share parts of one another's attributes, but so long as each is comprised of an integrated cluster of attributes, it maintains equal ontological footing with whatever else that can claim the same.
Fifth, the concept "unit" strays from a discussion of ontology, but since you mentioned it, a "unit" is just an existent that can be viewed as a member of a set of existents that share a specific feature. For existence, you see a pine tree -- an existent (and an entity, by the way) -- then a maple tree -- then a juniper -- then an oak. Each of these trees assumed "unit-hood" only once it had been viewed as a member of a particular set -- "trees" -- in which the members share a specific feature -- say, a trunk.
That's it for now.
Jordan
(Edited by Jordan on 9/01, 9:45pm)
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