Everyone is selfish, even non-Objectivists

Everything and anything one does ultimately is for their own self-interest, regardless of whether or not they are aware of Objectivism. Even self sacrifice, duty, being/remaining enslaved, being a saint, attempts at Altruism and anything close to being 'selfless' are performed to serve an interest or protect a value, regardless of how messed up the values may be or how deluded the individual is, and therefore are all self-serving to an extent. So all action is selfish. Right? Or have I somehow mutilated the meaning of selfishness and selflessness?

Looking forward to your assistance.

My understanding of Objectivism:
Objectivism merely guides one to place primary emphasis on promoting one's own life and, basically, using this as the standard of value, adjust importance placed on values and fix up life priorities.

Post 1

Saturday, September 8, 2007 - 1:57pm

So all action is selfish. Right? Or have I somehow mutilated the meaning of selfishness and selflessness?

That's the way I look at it, too. It all boils down to the self, no matter how wrong an action is. No one can think outside of themselves, or act outside of themselves, except, maybe, if they're a ghost.

Some people claim they, or others, have acted "without a thought for themselves," but that isn't even metaphysically possible.

Post 2

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 8:22am

Yes, even altruists are ultimately acting in what they believe to be their own self-interest. But when speaking of selfishness as a virtue, there is a big difference. No altruist would ever suggest that acting selfishly is virtuous.

For selfishness to be a virtue, it has to be explicit, conscious, and well-defined. For an Objectivist, this means being fully aware of not only the value of your own life, this life, but to hold that value within the context of a reality-based metaphysics and a reason-based epistemology. In other words, for selfishness to be a virtue, for it to really work for the benefit of your own life, it must be guided by reality and reason.

Altruists may behave selfishly, but there are a number of features of their form of selfishness that render it immoral and self-destructive. The most basic contradiction altruists hold is that the best way to act in one's self-interest is to act against one's self-interest. Another contradiction occurs when you point this out to them. They will deny it. Wanting no part of selfishness, they will say that their actions are not in their own self-interest. This basic dishonesty and confusion is part of what makes altruism so destructive.

Another aspect of the altruist's version of selfishness is that it is not guided by reality and reason. An after-life is almost always inherent in an altruist's metaphysics. This is where they think they'll get their reward for all their suffering. And in order to believe the contradictory premises of altruism, faith is required.

When reality and reason are rejected, selfishness is no longer a virtue.

Post 3

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 8:59am

I think the "everyone is selfish" view is flat wrong.

Selfishness, in the Randian sense, means: acting in accordance with your own best interests and well-being.

Selfishness, in the conventional sense, means: acting on behalf of your desires and wants.

These are not the same. The indulgence of desires, any desires, is not necessarily in our best interests, and does not necessarily further our well-being.

Randian selfishness says: Act to further your best interests and well-being, whether or not that clashes with your desires or caprices. If something isn't good for you, don't do it -- even if you want to.

The confusion and the error here involve equating "selfish" actions with "motivated" actions. But the mere fact that an individual feels motivated to do something does not establish that motivation as "selfish" -- not in the Randian sense. Yes, all actions are motivated; that's a truism. But not all motivations are selfish, in the sense of objectively furthering one's best interests and well-being.

That I may one day feel motivated to stop eating nutritious food, or to avoid exercise and become a couch potato, does NOT establish those choices as objectively "selfish." Similarly, that I may one day feel motivated to give away all my worldly possessions to a church, or to engage in acts of physical self-abuse (e.g., drugs), or to join a cult, does NOT establish those choices as objectively "selfish," either.

Whim-worship is not "selfish," just because the whims are your own. Objectively, the selfishness of a motive, choice, or action is not established by feelings; it is established by reason.

So, it is not correct to say that "altruists are selfish," simply because they feel motivated to sacrifice their objective well-being and best interests to others. If all actions are "selfish" simply because they're motivated (i.e., based on one's personal feelings), then there is really no distinction at all between selfishness and self-sacrifice -- all choices are equally valid -- and Rand's entire ethical enterprise is rendered meaningless.

Post 4

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 9:49am

So, Robert, you are saying that some actions can be labeled as Randian-selfish, and all other actions conventional-selfish. Therefore, with the combined connotations of Randian and conventional, all actions can be labeled as selfish?

Ayn Rand says the definition of 'selfishness' is merely, concern with one's own interest, from a dictionary and uses this definition in her philosophy.

1. Wouldn't this definition suffice to cover both Randian and Conventional meanings you posed? Granted, not all actions are for one's best interest from an outside objective view, but to the individual even drug abuse may seem like the best option at a point in time, maybe they somehow feel it is 'best' even though we may think its not.

2. Did the definition 'concern with one's own interest' really come from a dictionary or has it been modified/distorted by Rand as mentioned in other places. e.g. the definition can be longer:
'concerned Excessively or Exclusively with oneself; seeking or concentrating on one's own advantage, pleasure, or well-being Without Regard for Others'

I appreciate response received.

Post 5

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 11:06am

An addendum:

In Post 0, Tommy says, "Objectivism merely guides one to place primary emphasis on promoting one's own life and, basically, using this as the standard of value..."

Wrong.

Yes, Objectivism does put "primary emphasis on promoting one's own life"; but no -- it does not hold "one's own life...as the standard of value."

That latter position is called subjectivism.

Let me elaborate.

In a departure from philosophical tradition, Rand separates and distinguishes "standard of value" from "moral end or purpose" in ethics. The purpose of ethics is to advance "one's own life." However, the standard of evaluating what will advance "one's own life" is different. Rand calls that standard "Man's life" -- which she defines as: the terms and conditions required for a rational, human life throughout a person's lifespan. In shorthand form, you could describe the standard as: "a rational life," or "a life lived according to reason."

If this seems abstract and unimportant, it really isn't; it's profoundly important. The difference between standard and purpose is the difference between means and ends.

According to Objectivism, each individual strives to maximize his own life -- his own personal well-being and happiness. That's the moral purpose, or moral end. But the only way he can successfully achieve his well-being and happiness is to weigh his choices and actions against an objective standard -- "Man's life," or: the standard of rationality.

Summarized, Objectivism says we should live according to the moral standard of rationality, in order to achieve the moral purpose of our own life (our long-term well-being and happiness).

To make the significance clear, suppose you had just a moral purpose (your own life), but no standard (reason). Then, you would become a pragmatist or hedonist, simply doing anything, spur of the moment, that seemed to advance or enhance your "life." You'd employ any means that seemed momentarily useful to that goal. There would be no external gauge of how well you were doing that, and without that standard, you could define no moral principles. Your implicit standard would be "whatever is good for me" -- with "good" left undefined. That's the typical outlook of subjectivists, relativists, hedonists, etc.

On the other side of the coin, suppose you had just a moral standard, but no individual moral purpose. Then, your de facto purpose would simply be: "I must live up to the standard." You would not be concerned with your life, well-being, or happiness; you'd only be a "slave of duty," trying to "be moral" for its own sake, rather than for your sake. That's the typical outlook of religious moralists, cultists, and those who sacrifice themselves to some abstract cause.

Rand says: To live a happy, successful life, you need both a moral purpose/end, but also a moral standard/means. You can't focus on one to the exclusion of the other. A life without a moral standard leads to chaos; a life with only a moral standard leads to self-sacrificial fanaticism.

Rand, in short doesn't say: "Be rational for the sake of being rational." Nor does she say: "Live your own life in any manner you wish." She says: "Live your own life, according to reason, in order to succeed and be happy."

Does this clarify things?

Post 6

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 11:22am

Tommy, we cross-posted a moment ago.

The issue here is not mere semantics; it's ethical substance. We're referring to two completely contrary ways of living one's life, in reality.

Regardless of whether Rand got her definition of "selfishness" from the dictionary (which might bear on her scholarship), and regardless of whether it was prudent of her to try to apply a new and idiosyncratic definition to a familiar term, what is important here is the substance of two distinctive moral positions.

There is definitely a sense of "selfishness," or rational self-interest, intended by Rand; and there is definitely a completely different, conventional sense of "selfishness" -- what could be better described as "self-indulgence." The former view is characterized in Rand's novels by her heroes; the latter is characterized by her villains (Peter Keating and James Taggart come to mind).

However, this doesn't mean "everyone is selfish." If you accept one view or definition, it will necessarily exclude the other as being actually "selfish."

On Randian grounds, a "whim-worshipper" behaving self-indulgently, regardless of any harm it is causing himself, is not truly "selfish."

On conventional grounds, a Howard Roark, who refuses a lucrative commission because it would require him to violate his principles, is not being "selfish," either; in fact, one of the characters in the novel, operating from conventional definitions, calls Roark "fanatical and selfless."

So, in answer to the question, "Isn't everyone selfish?" -- the existence of these completely distinctive views of self-interest indicates that the answer must be no. In logic, at least one of these contradictory views of "selfishness" must be false (contrary to reality), and anyone acting on that wrong view cannot properly be called "selfish."

Post 7

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 12:38pm

A parallel discussion of this topic is taking place on the thread, "What is the Common Good," in which I quoted the following statement from Nathaniel Branden's article, "Isn't Everyone Selfishness" (The Virtue of Selfishness):

Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to "want," in some sense, to perform the action. The issue of an action's selfishness or unselfishness depends, not on whether or not one wants to perform it, but on why one wants to perform it. By what standard was the action chosen? To achieve what goal?

I think this is the essence of the distinction between selfish and unselfish actions. Obviously, by this criterion, not everyone is selfish.

Bob Bidinotto appears to be making the same point in Post #3. (Also thanks, Bob, for your excellent Post #5.)

There is, however, a distinction here that needs to clarified and one which was glossed over in Branden's article. In that article, he appears to be making two different points:

One is the point he made in the passage I quoted, namely that whether an action is selfish or unselfish is determined by the purpose for which the action is taken. Is the (primary) purpose of the action to benefit oneself or to achieve some other goal, such as the welfare of others? If it is to benefit oneself, then the action is selfish; if it is to benefit others, then the action is altruistic.

But Branden also appears to argue that what determines the selfishness of an action is not simply the standard by which the action is chosen or the goal that it is intended to achieve, but the objective consequences of the action itself. In the paragraph immediately following the one I quoted, he writes:

If a man proclaimed that he felt he would best benefit others by robbing and murdering them, men would not be willing to grant that his actions were altruistic. By the same logic and for the same reasons, it a man pursues a course of blind self-destruction, his feeling that he has something to gain by it does not establish his action as selfish.

He also states:

The selfishness or unselfishness of an action is to be determined objectively: it is not determined by the feelings of the person who acts.

It�s not clear what Branden means by �feelings� here. If he means �beliefs,� then the question is: Does a person�s belief that he has something to gain by an action establish his action as selfish, independently of whether or not the action is in his objective self-interest? For example, suppose a person believes that smoking two packs a day is in his self-interest, when in fact it is self-destructive. Does his action qualify as selfish, simply because it is intended for his own benefit? Or must it be in his objective self-interest, in order to qualify as selfish? If I read him correctly in Post #6, Bob Bidinotto holds the latter view, whereas in Post #3, he appeared to be endorsing the former.

As has already been pointed out by Tommy Phantom (Is that your real name? ;-)), Rand defines "selfishness" as "concern with one's own interests," and adds, "This concept does not include a moral evaluation . . . nor does it tell us what constitutes man's actual interests." (VOS, p. vii.) Similarly, the Dictionary of Philosophy (Dagobert D. Runes) defines ethical egoism as "The view that each individual should seek as an end only his own welfare." (My emphasis) Observe that neither of these definitions requires that a person's action achieve his own welfare in order to qualify as egoistic; only that it be taken for the sake of achieving it.

If in order for an action to qualify as egoistic, it must not only be intended to achieve one's welfare, but in fact achieve it, then if two Objectivists disagree on whether or not an action is in fact selfish, one of them must not be an advocate of the virtue of selfishness. But this cannot be correct. They are still ethical egoists, if only because they still believe that the goal of a person's action should be his self-interest.

Rand was a smoker and was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1974. Since smoking was against her objective self-interest (even though she didn't recognize it as such), did that disqualify her as an ethical egoist? Did it mean that she did not uphold the virtue of selfishness, because she believed in doing something that was against her objective self-interest? No, of course not. The fact that she recognized that the goal of a person's action should be his own interest was enough to make an ethical egoist.

So I would say that all that is required for one to qualify as an ethical egoist is that one believe that the proper goal of a person's action is the person's own welfare, not that what the person believes in doing must actually be in his objective self-interest. Obviously, by this criterion, not everyone is selfish, because not everyone holds his own interest as the ultimate goal of his action.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 9/09, 12:49pm)

Post 8

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 12:56pm

Without Qualms or Regrets?

To say that someone always does as he wishes and that he therefore always does what is best for him is to confuse choice with value, volition with morality, what is best for him with what is best for him. Of course, under normal circumstances people always do as they choose. Otherwise we say that they were coerced, or incompetent, or incontinent, or insane.

But the question facing us is not that someone has a choice, but whether that choice is directed to what is objectively in his best interest. Does Mr. Phantom believe that because he has choices, that in the mere act of choosing, by nature or definition, he always makes the best choice?

Ted Keer

Post 9

Sunday, September 9, 2007 - 12:57pm

That's a valuable clarification, Bill. My critique was against the idea of "psychological egoism" -- the subjectivist view that any personal motive is, by necessity, a "selfish" motive.

To clarify: I hold that a rationally "selfish" motive and action need not actually result in the well-being and happiness of the individual; a person is not omniscient or omnipotent, and a successful outcome cannot be guaranteed.

But it does mean that the individual must be motivated by the goal -- and have rational grounds to believe -- that his actions will objectively further his well-being and happiness. That would preclude professed altruists or "whim-worshipers" from being "selfish" in Objectivist terms, since they reject either reason or self-interest, or both.

Post 10

Monday, September 10, 2007 - 6:44am

I really do not believe that professed altruists reject reason in regard to their real motives. How they present it to the rest of the world has not necessarily anything to do with their own motives.

Now for an example lets imagine an ordinary person who insists that it is better for the future of the human race to act altruistically. I say and insist that that person has either hidden or implicit motives for doing so. A possible motive is fear for repression when not obeying that moral. Another possible motive is the expectation that ultimately "per saldo" he will be better off.

Of course we have to realize that the normal meaning of selfish has been taken captive by practicers of Newspeak: the word is used in a way that is not the normal meaning anymore. Selfishness is often equalled with the intent to hurt someone else.

In my view it is not possible for any sane human being to act against hiw own PERCEIVED self-interest. That is selfish, both ethical AND psyhological.

Post 11

Monday, September 10, 2007 - 7:47am

Jan,

What about people who believe it is their moral obligation to act against their perceived self-interest? Are you saying that it's impossible for them to practice their morality?

- Bill

Post 12

Monday, September 10, 2007 - 9:29pm

Selfishness is oft confused with greed when, to me it means self awareness .To be selfless to me would be to totally rely on others whims to decide my fate not to be confused with authority.Was there not a North American Indian tribe that had a ceremony where the braves disposed of all there worldly belongings would this be selfish or altruistic because the results of the ceremony meant the person who got rid of the most stuff also had the best reputation. A strange juxtaposition perhaps but I don't feel like getting drunk and giving everything I have earned by my hard work away. Its my belief that if one puts ones intelligence ahead of ones emotions honest feelings will win through the doxa.

Post 13

Tuesday, September 11, 2007 - 9:35am

Ted Keer says: Does Mr. Phantom believe that because he has choices, that in the mere act of choosing, by nature or definition, he always makes the best choice?

Partially, yes, because when the decision is made he believes it is the choice that will ultimately serve his interests best. However after or while the action is performed, he may realise, his logic was flawed, his instincts weren't so reliable, he did not consider all consequences, information was inaccurate, etc, so in hindsight it was not best. Therefore, whether or not an action is best also depends on when it was judged. Everyone is selfish, but not all are successful.

But now I see that there is a Randian and conventional meaning to selfishness which need to be considered when judging. Not all are Randian-selfish.

It seems to me that you can't say with certainty what type of selfishness someone else's action is just by looking at the surface and/or not knowing the consequences, unless you know the decision maker's conscious approach to decision making or the philosophy he consciously adopts.

Thanks again for all your posts.

Post 14

Tuesday, September 11, 2007 - 11:33am

Bob wrote,

That's a valuable clarification, Bill. My critique was against the idea of "psychological egoism" -- the subjectivist view that any personal motive is, by necessity, a "selfish" motive.

To clarify: I hold that a rationally "selfish" motive and action need not actually result in the well-being and happiness of the individual; a person is not omniscient or omnipotent, and a successful outcome cannot be guaranteed.
Okay, we're on the same page here.
But it does mean that the individual must be motivated by the goal -- and have rational grounds to believe -- that his actions will objectively further his well-being and happiness. That would preclude professed altruists or "whim-worshipers" from being "selfish" in Objectivist terms, since they reject either reason or self-interest, or both.

So, you're saying that more is required than simply an egoistic motivation for a person to be an ethical egoist. Not only must he be motivated by a self-interested goal, but he must also be rational in the pursuit of that goal; he cannot be a whim-worshipper. This would tie in with what Branden is saying when he writes, "The selfishness or unselfishness of an action is to be determined objectively: it is not determined by the feelings of the person who acts."

The problem is, what exactly is a "whim-worshipper"? And what does it mean to act "on one's feelings"? Is a person who continues to smoke even though his doctor says that he is putting his health at risk a whim-worshipper and therefore not an ethical egoist? Is a person who is overweight but chooses not to follow his doctor's advice and go on a diet not an ethical egoist, even though he views the diet as more trouble than its worth?

Does the Spanish proverb, "God said, 'Take what you want, but pay for it'?" apply here? If the smoker and the non-dieter are willing to take their chances and pay the price for their unhealthy lifestyles, cannot their actions still qualify as selfish? Can't they still be considered egoists? And if not, what moral theory would they be practicing? It certainly isn't altruism, but is it a version of self-sacrifice?

The definition I quoted from the Dictionary of Philosophy defines ethical egoism: as "The view that each individual should seek as an end only his own welfare." The question is: Are the smoker and non-dieter not seeking their own welfare, if they consider following their doctor's advice more trouble than it's worth? Well, if they consider following his advice more trouble than its worth, then they're still seeking their own welfare, (i.e., their own benefit or happiness); they're just not doing it in a way that their doctor thinks will yield them the desired results.

So, the question is: what morality should they view themselves as practicing? Since they believe they're pursuing their own interest, even though their doctor disagrees that what they doing is in their best interest, can't they view themselves as egoists, as advocates of selfishness, assuming they believe in maximizing their own happiness as an end, and think (however wrongly) that what they're doing will achieve it? Their doctor can say that what they're doing is not in their best interest, but if they disagree, does that mean that they're whim-worshippers and therefore not genuine egoists?

- Bill

Post 15

Tuesday, September 11, 2007 - 11:43am

Mr. Phantom, concepts are tools. Wouldn't it be more usefully mentally to use the term volition to cover what you have been calling "conventionally selfish" and to say that everyone does as he chooses rather than to say that everyone is selfish - meaning that everyone actually chooses what is in his own objective self-interest?

The notion that "everyone is selfish" is one that those preaching altruism, religious asceticism, and suicide bombing could eagerly endorse - but the moral consequences of their teachings seem to imply that not everything that one chooses to do is really in the interest of one's life on earth - which is the only self we really know to exist. Truly happy people simply do not become suicide bombers - there is always a will to self-destruction in these people, whether or not they delude themselves into believing that they will gain some reward in the afterlife. Or simply attend an AA meeting and ask those people if their actions have always been in their self interest, and if at some level they were aware that it was not the case?

People always have priorities, whether they are deliberately chosen or accepted by default. These priorities may or may not be self-destructive or self-enriching in the sense that they will lead to flourishing happiness. That they choose and act on their priorities shows that they have choices - volition - but not that those choices are the best for their own lives - in their actual self interest.

Ted Keer

Post 16

Tuesday, September 11, 2007 - 4:57pm

Bill, my short answer is that any notion of "selfishness" that clashes in fact with what furthers an individual's long-term well-being cannot be a valid conception of "ethical egoism." Rand's was a philosophy of rational self-interest; she did not define "self-interest" as: anything that happens to interest me.

Severing the concept of self-interest from the objective requirements of man's long-term well-being strikes me as a subjectivist conception of egoism, not rational egoism.

Post 17

Wednesday, September 12, 2007 - 10:25am

Being selfish, for an Objectivist, means to be rationally self-interested. Being selfish, for everyone else, means to get what one wants regardless of consequence. One definition focuses on rational decision making to ensure one's life, but the other definition is base hedonism at its worse.

-- Brede
(Edited by Bridget Armozel on 9/12, 10:25am)

Post 18

Wednesday, September 12, 2007 - 11:10am

Bill, my short answer is that any notion of "selfishness" that clashes in fact with what furthers an individual's long-term well-being cannot be a valid conception of "ethical egoism." Rand's was a philosophy of rational self-interest; she did not define "self-interest" as: anything that happens to interest me.

Severing the concept of self-interest from the objective requirements of man's long-term well-being strikes me as a subjectivist conception of egoism, not rational egoism.

I guess the key concept that needs to be addressed here is "long-term well-being." What exactly does it mean? There are always trade-offs in life -- giving up something now in order to get something in the future, or giving up something in the future in order to have something now. Does "long-term well-being" simply mean satisfaction in the future even if at the expense of present satisfaction? Or does it mean maximum satisfaction -- maximum utility -- over the course of one's life? And if it means the latter, which I think is the sense that you meant it, then long-term well-being may not be an easy thing to calculate; it may involve a highly subjective weighing of the costs and benefits.

For example, suppose that you are a test pilot, like Chuck Yeager, and love what you're doing, even though it's incredibly risky. If you give up that profession for one that is much safer, you are maximizing your chances of survival over the long term, but you are also giving up much of what makes your life worth living. Does "long-term well-being" dictate that you surrender your profession for one that is far less risky, even though it gives you far less satisfaction?

- Bill

Post 19

Thursday, September 13, 2007 - 9:38pm