Question about matter and consciousness

In Ayn Rand Answers, in the section on Free Will (p. 151), Rand says that it's a mistake to hold that that reality must be either material or spiritual -- either all matter or all consciousness -- because to do so commits the fallacy of "rewriting reality." Since it is obvious that consciousness exists, it is obvious that reality consists of both matter and consciousness.

My question is this: Why can't you say that reality is entirely material, with consciousness simply being an attribute of matter -- a characteristic of a material body. We don't attempt to divide reality into matter and color, or matter and size, or matter and texture, or matter and action, because these are all properties of matter -- properties of material entities. Why then should we divide reality into matter and consciousness? Isn't consciousness also a property of material entities? I've always thought that this was the Objectivist position on consciousness anyway -- that consciousness was viewed as simply an attribute of a material organism. Yet, it seems that, in this context at least, Rand considers consciousness to exist in contradistinction to matter, in a way that she would not consider action or some other attribute to exist in contradistinction to matter, which suggests that she does not regard consciousness as simply a property of a material organism, but as having some unique metaphysical status.

Any thoughts on this?

- Bill

Post 1

Thursday, March 9, 2006 - 10:30pm

Honestly, I think it is because she would then merely be labeled as a card-carrying Materialist - or, accused of propagating "disguised materialism", which Objectivism is already oftenly accused of being. Peikoff refutes that attack in his book, but some still insist that Objectivism is really a disguised materialism.

Of course, the materialist and idealist dichotomy is a rather sophomoric one. I would classify myself as a realist - which means that I recognize the metaphysical objectivity of matter as well as the existence of nonmaterial entities, e.g., consciousness. Thus, I rest upon the more central, balanced real-estate of the aforementioned spectrum - and I think I can say the same for Objectivism.

The ultimate refutation in rebuttal to the oft-repeated attack that Oism is but mere "disguised materialism" is the question: "But how are we actual materialists when we recognize the efficacy of consciousness?"

Post 2

Friday, March 10, 2006 - 12:58am

Bill:

If one says that "reality is entirely material", then that implies that only material is 'real', ergo, what is regarded as non-material is not 'real', hence, not even attributes are 'real'.

But, we know that attributes are, correct?

LLAP
J:D

Post 3

Friday, March 10, 2006 - 10:10am

A little --approximately 100 pages--, yet ambitious, book on the subject of matter, consciousness, and immateriality:

The Dimensional Structure of Consciousness: A Physical Basis for Immaterialism, by Samuel Avery.

Today I arrived at the 30th page and am finding it interesting.

---

Excerpted paragraphs from amazon.com (Chapter I: Introduction):

"All previous attempts at immaterialism have suffered from the problem of the solipsism. If everything is consciousness, whose consciousness is it? If light is visual consciousness, is it in me or in you, or in both of us? Why do we see the same things? As far as I am aware, no immaterialist theory, before or since modern physics, has adequately addressed this problem. In this [immaterialist] theory, I attempt to explain the apparent existence of separate consciousness "in" you and me and other observers in terms of the same dimensional structure of consciousness used to explain the apparent existence of matter. The strength of this theory is, I believe, its consistency over broad areas of application.

"The dimensional structure of consciousness is fundament to our everyday experience, yet has remained entirely unnoticed until the twentieth century. This is because human experience has been restricted to a range within which the concept of matter works quite well. We did not begin to explore the world of the very fast, the very small, the very massive, and the very distant until after 1900. There has been no need until now to notice the more subtle relation between consciousness and dimensions. Even now, this relation need not be noticed if we are willing to "shoehorn" what Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg, and others have said into traditional materialist categories.

"A major problem in expressing an idea such as this is the gap that exists between physicists and philosophers. It has been my experience that they do not listen well to one another, and often resent tampering across departmental lines. In speaking to the wide range of lay people who stand between them, I am unlikely to please either. But the gap is an unnatural one in the sense that it exists not in nature but in our attempts to understand nature. Quarks, neutrinos, and uncertainty principles have no regard for the departmental assignments under which they man fall."

Post 4

Friday, March 10, 2006 - 10:17am

If one says that "reality is entirely material", then that implies that only material is 'real', ergo, what is regarded as non-material is not 'real', hence, not even attributes are 'real'.

But, we know that attributes are, correct?

Yes, but the point is that all attributes are themselves material, because they are attributes of material entities. A material entity - and all entities are material - just is its attributes. Take away the attributes and you take away the entity. So, length is a material attribute, because it is an attribute of a material entity; so is size, shape, color, texture, motion or any other attribute, including consciousness. Now I have some reservations about this argument, but I wanted to see what others had to say.

My reservations are that Rand may regard matter as itself an attribute, so that the other qualities I mentioned, such as size, shape and color, are not considered attributes of matter, but attributes of entities, in which case, both matter and consciousness could be viewed as attributes as well, and therefore as having equal existential status, not as two substances, but as two attributes. In that case, the only "substance" - the only thing that "possesses" the attributes - would be entities, not matter, since matter would itself be an attribute. So, in that case, consciousness would be one thing, matter another, but both would depend on the existence of entities in which they would inhere as attributes.

- Bill

Post 5

Friday, March 10, 2006 - 10:18am

I would say Rand's proposition is prefaced on the concept of Naturalism, in that Nature is what it is without pre-existent preference or determinants. In that view, matter and mind can both equally exist, and even one can depend on the other, as Rand believed as well with regard to the mind requiring a material entity to inhabit for it to operate.

Whether or not this view can be completely substantiated in itself is probably not as important as what it implies for other things which can be substantiated such as physics, biology, and so on.

[joe-cartoon-hick-voice]In short, give it up for Naturalism![/joe-cartoon-hick-voice] ^^;

-- Bridget

Post 6

Friday, March 17, 2006 - 7:52pm

Whether or not this view can be completely substantiated in itself is probably not as important as what it implies for other things which can be substantiated such as physics, biology, and so on.

I don't really see the mind as inhabiting the brain per se, I see the mind as resulting from what the brain consists of. Biologically, the brain itself as a material/natural object located within the skull. It consists of the multilayered interconnections of *100 billion neurons* (estimate), which (IMO) give rise to a complex, nonlinear, adaptive, dynamical property called consciousness (consciousness in the general sense). However, I'm probably a weird neuro person since I combine complexity science with neuroscience. For visuals into how I see the brain's make-up in my head, this page of images is great.

Post 7

Saturday, March 18, 2006 - 8:55am

Verrrrry Intresting, Jenna........;-)

Post 8

Saturday, March 18, 2006 - 12:42pm

Jenna:

Eh-h-h-h, '...give rise to...' is a phrasing that results in the tricky evolutionary/developmental/physicalist interpretation prob, is it not? Indeed, such phrasing raises questions about the whole framework being 'reductionistic', (Reductionism being a set of 'top-down' explanations for what are supposedly the basic elements causing 'bottom-up' complexity levels), no?

The 'brain' images are...fascinating. Now, if one can just find a way to find some mind (not to be confused with mere brain-'activity') images...

LLAP
J:D

Post 9

Saturday, March 18, 2006 - 1:26pm

the tricky evolutionary/developmental/physicalist interpretation prob, is it not? Indeed, such phrasing raises questions about the whole framework being 'reductionistic', (Reductionism being a set of 'top-down' explanations for what are supposedly the basic elements causing 'bottom-up' complexity levels), no?

This is where I can integrate and truthfully say that I'm not a reductionist OR a holistic type-- I'm both, and neither. I've integrated them, I can see both at the same time. I understand and appreciate the framework (the brain, neuron connections) as well as the stuff that "fills it out" (experience, change, physiology, time, environment, space, etc.) That is what those images mean-- you can see particulars for themselves, as well as place them within the greater context of time and space, as well as in relation to other particulars or interconnected networks. I can see bottom up as well as top down, and at various levels in between. I call it "zooming in and out" conceptually.

I see images like this in my mind for all sorts of things. For example, the framework of an organizational structure (basic functions, conception, guidelines) in business is "filled out" by the individuals involved, their ideas, their actions, their movements, their connections. I'm really not sure how to express the 3-D view in my head onto an at most 2-D way (writing, artwork, explanation). Still trying to figure it out, while explaining that -isms aren't really a relevant part of my vocabulary. :)

On that visuals page you can see how each picture is analogous to others, but the information can be: words, flight frequencies, internet user information, neuron connections, political inclinations, etc. That's what I find fascinating-- and that's what complexity science deals with.

Here's a post I did to try to explain visually...

Post 10

Sunday, March 19, 2006 - 10:15pm

"My question is this: Why can't you say that reality is entirely material, with consciousness simply being an attribute of matter -- a characteristic of a material body."

I'm not sure whether here you are saying anything different to what Rand would say.

One wonders about this thing consciousness. One wonders why it even exists at all. Maybe its an effect to do with processing of information in this way:

You have data coming in from the senses and you have all sorts of computation going on in parallel. Then you have it being fed through in a linear way. But the linear processor is somewhat aware but not totally aware of the parallel processing. Maybe it is this combination that sets up this rather hard to explain phenomenon of consciousness.

Post 11

Monday, March 20, 2006 - 12:07am

I appreciate most what Bill has had to say on this. I'd like to add my own perspective, which I think is similar to his...

What we call "matter" never occurs apart from some entity, however nondescript the shape or tiny the size. So, it makes the most sense to regard matter not as a kind of thing or entity that does things (as we might say "the causal efficacy of matter"), but as a (complex) attribute of an entity, by virtue of which the entity can (i.e., has the capacity to) do certain things. In other words, in general, matter is the capacity of an entity to act in some way.

This is the original Aristotelian sense of the term "matter" and "material," and it is less misleading than the modern materialist notion that turns matter into an entity, rather than an attribute/capacity of entities. We usually use the terms referring strictly to physical attributes/capacities, but Aristotle used it more generally.

And, so far as we know, there are no entities that are not also material in their attributes/capacities. So, it makes sense to refer to all entities as "material entities." (There are no other kind, except metaphorically, as we might refer to an idea -- an action and stored content in the brain -- as an "immaterial entity.")

Since life is based on the structure and function of the DNA molecule, "life" too never occurs apart from some entity, viz., a material entity. Life is a (complex) attribute of a material entity, by virtue of which it can do certain things. So, life is a form of matter (in the general sense); i.e., the attribute life is a special category of the attribute matter.

Similarly, since consciousness (as we have so far discovered it) is based on the structure and function of nerve cells, "consciousness" too never occurs apart from some entity, viz., a living entity. Consciousness is a (complex) attribute of a living entity, by virtue of which it can do certain things. So, consciousness is a form of life; i.e., the attribute consciousness is a special category of the attribute life.

Thus (to fill out the syllogism), consciousness, like life, is based on the structure and function of the DNA molecule, so "consciousness" too never occurs apart from a material entity. Consciousness is a (complex) attribute of a material entity, by virtue of which it can do certain things. So, consciousness is a form of matter (in the general sense); i.e., the attribute consciousness is a special category of the attribute matter.

This does not "reduce" consciousness to matter, or conscious entities to material entities, any more than an analysis of water as being composed of oxygen and hydrogen atoms, which are in turn composed of certain numbers of electrons, protons, and neutrons reduces water to subatomic particles. The functions and capacities (attributes/actions) are hierarchical and developed that way, whether through strictly chemical or biological or psychological processes. And no level of the hierarchy is "less real" or "more real" than the others.

Yet, just as we cannot say that matter has "causal efficacy," nor can we say that consciousness has "causal efficacy." Efficacy is power or capacity, and what has power or capacity are entities. The power/capacity that entities have are their attributes, so rather than saying that matter or consciousness have causal efficacy (which suggests a Cartesian world of two substances duking it out through some mysterious form of causal interaction), we should be saying that matter and consciousness are the causal efficacies (powers) of certain entities to do certain things, by virtue of those powers/attributes.

Naturally this has various implications for the mind-body problem (which is only a problem if you view consciousness and matter as different kinds of stuff somehow interacting) and ultimately the problem of free will. But I'll stop at this point, in case people want to explore this point a bit before developing it further.

REB

Post 12

Monday, March 20, 2006 - 5:30am

Thus (to fill out the syllogism), consciousness, like life, is based on the structure and function of the DNA molecule, so "consciousness" too never occurs apart from a material entity. Consciousness is a (complex) attribute of a material entity, by virtue of which it can do certain things. So, consciousness is a form of matter (in the general sense); i.e., the attribute consciousness is a special category of the attribute matter.

This does not "reduce" consciousness to matter, or conscious entities to material entities, any more than an analysis of water as being composed of oxygen and hydrogen atoms, which are in turn composed of certain numbers of electrons, protons, and neutrons reduces water to subatomic particles. The functions and capacities (attributes/actions) are hierarchical and developed that way, whether through strictly chemical or biological or psychological processes. And no level of the hierarchy is "less real" or "more real" than the others.

Nor does this mean that - as some claim - at conception, there is consciousness, but rather when the 'system' is 'turned on', it begins to operate....

Post 13

Monday, March 20, 2006 - 4:21pm

I completely agree, Robert.

REB

Post 14

Monday, March 20, 2006 - 4:40pm