| | True about things of quantity being intrinsic, but what Objectivism points out is that ideas, concepts, and thoughts are not intrinsic. It's a more balanced view of Nature in a way that accepts the mind without falling for the fallacy of Idealism, or the belief that the mind is some how superior to Nature itself. Essentially, Objectivism on this view is a Naturalistic philosophy since Rand clearly was influenced by Naturalists such as Aristotle and company. But her integration of the independent threads of empiricists, naturalists, and some rationalists isn't mere accident since it seems to me, some scientists follows to the same conclusion about Nature and the mind. Basically, Objectivism says Nature may be intrinsic but our ideas about it or ourselves are not. This doesn't lead to the existential drivel that is often taught as 'factual' in American or French philosophy circles, but rather this often is the basis of modern science, epistemology, and metaphysics. Because of this balanced view of ideas being not apriori, it leaves open the possibility of discovering which ideas follow from what is observed either as a quantity or action, and which ideas do not.
Rights do not follow as intrinsic since rights are in themselves references to actions. Actions in this regard, when not exercised do not need rights to be assured. Often actions are done in societies that are deemed wrong, such as certain sexual practices among consenting adults or individuals expressing viewpoints that are deemed punishable by death. Rights in such situations are merely meant to say, "Hey, in this place and in this time, these things that do not do harm are accepted as open to practice." But from that view, one cannot derive that rights sanction the action or actions in question either. It merely asserts that such actions are open to use freely without legal intervention. Ultimately, that leaves open the possibility of things that even Objectivists find abhorent [I can name a few, but who cares? ;)], yet to Objectivists it is more abhorent to restrict the free exercise of a non-harming action, or more specifically a non-harming action that does not involve non-consenting individuals. In that view, rights express the freedom to define one's self and find value to it. In short, rights are moral ought-bes, but not will-bes, or ARE-bes [mmm...Arbies...Oh sorry!]. Thus, it does not follow to exclaim, "Rights must be intrinsic for one have them" because if that were so, then the fact that humans do not intrinsically have ideas then one could not have ideas, which is often the argument many Natural Law theorists purport in many gordian-knot like ways.
And to claim that Galt's speech infers an intrinsicism to rights is quite wrong when compared to d’Anconia's points about morality being a free choice. In that view, it logically follows that rights do ensure human life, but human life is ensured not by the mere existence of rights, but what rights allow humans to do. Imagine a time where it was illegal to cut open the human body, living or dead, for any reason and that the punishment for it was death? In the time of DaVinci this was the norm for the majority of European governments and localities. For DaVinci had to work in secret on the corpses of individuals to figure out how the human body operated from motor function to the circulatory system. Unfortunately, his results had to be equally secret, thus his contemporaries of that time could not benefit from his knowledge no matter what since it would be considered abhorent and evil. But imagine if in DaVinci's time such laws were removed and a promotion of individual liberty was allowed? Imagine the scholars of science in DaVinci's time not under constant threat of death and inprisonment? Such a freedom or liberty wouldn't just benefit the scientists of DaVinci's time, but it would benefit society as a whole since individuals left to their own devices to reason issues out without fear of force are often capable to resolve problems, improve their life, and the world in general. Rights in such a case are apparent since it assumes individuals are capable to think and take responsibility for their own mistakes on an individual basis. In such a view, Galt's speech becomes clear, in so much that his speech is about rights being the best means to a moral society and that such a moral society is far better than its opposite form of a 'permission society' where an individual must ask permission for every act, especially those acts which happen among consenting adults that include no others that did not consent. It concludes that such an anti-permission society, an open society produces the best good since good is viewed to be a benefit to individuals, and it will occur more so since individuals will be more free to do so.
If that makes any sense...
-- Bridget
(Edited by Bridget Armozel
on 3/01, 10:42pm)
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