Ayn Rand, and "honest" misinterpretation?

Bill: “You don't have to possess the same extraordinary talents as a John Galt in order to live an ideal life, according to Objectivism. Are you disputing this?”

Of course I’m not disputing it. As I said, John Galt is an example, a symbolic representation of the ideal man, nothing more. I’m sure we both agree on this.

“Neither one "represents the nature of man." You are being what Rand would call "concrete-bound. The nature of man is an abstraction that applies to all individual human beings.”

I was speaking in shorthand. Let’s say they exemplify the abstraction “the nature of man”. The main point is that the abstraction must be grounded in really existing men, otherwise it becomes what Rand calls a “floating concept”. And if real-world objects do not exemplify abstractions, you’d have to give away ostensive definitions, although Rand is quite keen on these.

“In any case, when you say that "is" statements presuppose the "ought" statements they are trying to establish, you are saying in effect that they imply them.”

Technically, not exactly, but we’ll leave that aside, since my main point is that any such implication is logically suspect. This is because “is” or factual statements are of a different class to “ought” or evaluative statements. Factual statements are about what is the case, whereas evaluative statements are about what we think ought to be the case. The first does not logically imply the second. Only an evaluative premise can be used to form an evaluative conclusion.

In practice, those who attempt to derive evaluative conclusions from factual premises invariably smuggle their values into the premise of the argument, often by equivocating over, or conflating, the terms used. “Man’s life” is a good example of this, since it can mean either “the lives of all men” or “the life proper to man”, depending on whether one wants to emphasise survival or flourishing.

As for a little dig, I’m fine with that. In fact, my reply was pretty much in the same spirit.

Brendan

Post 21

Monday, December 19, 2005 - 11:12am

I wrote, “Neither one "represents the nature of man." You are being what Rand would call "concrete-bound. The nature of man is an abstraction that applies to all individual human beings.” Brendan replied,

I was speaking in shorthand. Let’s say they exemplify the abstraction “the nature of man”.

But they don't "exemplify" the nature of man. A single human being is not an example of the nature of man. Abstractions are not archetypes, unless your a Platonist.

The main point is that the abstraction must be grounded in really existing men, otherwise it becomes what Rand calls a “floating concept”. And if real-world objects do not exemplify abstractions, you’d have to give away ostensive definitions, although Rand is quite keen on these.

Yes, the abstraction must be grounded in really existing human beings, but the abstraction 'the nature of man' isn't represented by a single human being. You need two or more instances of something to form an abstraction. The abstraction pertains to the similarity of these instances (as against a background of difference). See Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology for an explanation of her theory of concepts.

I wrote, “In any case, when you say that "is" statements presuppose the "ought" statements they are trying to establish, you are saying in effect that they imply them.”

Technically, not exactly, but we’ll leave that aside, since my main point is that any such implication is logically suspect. This is because “is” or factual statements are of a different class to “ought” or evaluative statements. Factual statements are about what is the case, whereas evaluative statements are about what we think ought to be the case. The first does not logically imply the second. Only an evaluative premise can be used to form an evaluative conclusion.

Straight out of Hume, and just as mistaken. What does it mean to say that one "ought" to do something? It means that if one does it, one will achieve a value, which is why Kant's categorical oughts make no sense. If you tell me that I ought to do X, it is appropriate for me to ask you why? A satisfactory answer would consist of telling me that if I do it, I will achieve something that I value; I will achieve Y. So, in essence, every prescriptive statement is a kind of descriptive statement. To say that one ought to do X in order to achieve Y (a prescriptive statement) is simply another way of saying that X is a means to Y (a descriptive statement). "Ought" and "is" statements are not two separate classes of propositions. The former is subsumed under the latter. See Rand's essay, "Causality versus Duty" in Philosophy: Who Needs It. See also Dr. Peikoff's lectures on The History of Western Philosophy (available from the Ayn Rand Bookstore), in which he argues that every meaningful statement is necessarily factual. As I say, you need to familiarize yourself with the rich tapestry that is Objectivism. Since you haven't studied it in sufficient depth, you are vastly underestimating the power and revolutionary importance of this philosophy.

In practice, those who attempt to derive evaluative conclusions from factual premises invariably smuggle their values into the premise of the argument, often by equivocating over, or conflating, the terms used. “Man’s life” is a good example of this, since it can mean either “the lives of all men” or “the life proper to man”, depending on whether one wants to emphasise survival or flourishing.

This is a false dichotomy. According to Rand, the best way to further one's survival is to flourish. "The life proper to man" is her standard of value, meaning that there is a certain kind of life appropriate to the nature of a human being, which if followed will together promote one's survival and further one's happiness. This issue has already been discussed in another thread under the title "Survival versus Flourishing" in the General Forum. You have to go back a ways to find it though.

As for a little dig, I’m fine with that. In fact, my reply was pretty much in the same spirit.

Fair enough.

- Bill

Post 22

Tuesday, December 20, 2005 - 3:42pm

Excellent responses, Bill. Brendan's a tough nut, though.

Ed
[looks down at old battle scars that he got from the oft-offensive Brendanator]

Post 23

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 1:51am

Bill: “A single human being is not an example of the nature of man.”

When discussing the formation of the concept table Rand has this to say: “Tables, for instance, are first differentiated from chairs, beds and other objects by means of the characteristic of shape, which is an attribute possessed by all the objects involved.”

Since all the objects involved in forming the concept possess the same attribute, just in different degrees, there’s no reason why one man could not be an example of the abstraction “nature of man”.

“What does it mean to say that one "ought" to do something? It means that if one does it, one will achieve a value…”

So, if by slipping Uncle Fred some arsenic in his tea I will inherit his millions now rather than later, I ought to do so. I don’t bring up this example to argue that the Objectivist ethics might lead to immorality, but to show that a set of descriptive statements are insufficient to lead to a prescriptive conclusion.

“’The life proper to man’…meaning that there is a certain kind of life appropriate to the nature of a human being…”

There are very many different kinds of life. Why is only a “certain kind” appropriate to the nature of a human being? And what is that nature? Taking, for sake of argument, the claim that man is defined by his rationality, we would have this type of argument: man is by nature a rational being; therefore he ought to be rational.

As it is, the conclusion simply doesn’t follow. What is missing is the notion of rationality as desirable. If we add that in, we get: man is by nature a rational being; it is good to be rational; therefore he ought to be rational. But of course, “it is good to be rational” is a prescriptive statement. The “ought” is buried in the premises.

You might throw some more light on your arguments by using a concrete example illustrating your claims. But I suppose that might be difficult, since you dismiss the relvance of specific examples.

Brendan

Post 24

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 11:12am

The Brendanator wrote to Bill Dwyer: "You might throw some more light on your arguments by using a concrete example illustrating your claims. But I suppose that might be difficult, since you dismiss the relvance of specific examples."

Ummm....could you please give a specific (or concrete; take your pick) example of where Bill has dismissed the relvance [sic] of specific examples? :-) I don't think he's as concrete-bound as you are suggesting.

REB

Post 25

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 11:24am

Brendan:

“’The life proper to man’…meaning that there is a certain kind of life appropriate to the nature of a human being…”

There are very many different kinds of life. Why is only a “certain kind” appropriate to the nature of a human being? And what is that nature? Taking, for sake of argument, the claim that man is defined by his rationality, we would have this type of argument: man is by nature a rational being; therefore he ought to be rational.

As it is, the conclusion simply doesn’t follow. What is missing is the notion of rationality as desirable. If we add that in, we get: man is by nature a rational being; it is good to be rational; therefore he ought to be rational. But of course, “it is good to be rational” is a prescriptive statement. The “ought” is buried in the premises

Exactly. There is for example no factual reason to suppose that a parasitic way of life is not appropriate to the nature of a human being. Such a parasitism is an evolutionary stable strategy, and it comes therefore as no surprise that it is widely practised in our society. Now probably all of us here think that this is not a desirable strategy, but it is a non sequitur to conclude that it therefore is not a rational strategy. With "rational" I mean here that such a person uses his rational faculty to achieve his values. I think I differ here from Brendan who seems to accept the notion that "being rational" implies the Objectivist strategy of leading a productive life as an independent egoist (I'll call it the "Objectivist strategy"). At a certain point this Objectivist strategy is smuggled into the Objectivist argument to get from "is" to "ought", by stating that the value that should be gained is "life qua man". Implicit in that argument is that "life qua man" is life according to the Objectivist strategy, but there is no factual basis for that statement, and that is the fatal flaw in the from "is" to "ought" argument, and it is in fact a rationalization.

Post 26

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 4:06pm

I wrote, "A single human being is not an example of the nature of man.” Brendan replied,

When discussing the formation of the concept table Rand has this to say: “Tables, for instance, are first differentiated from chairs, beds and other objects by means of the characteristic of shape, which is an attribute possessed by all the objects involved.”

Since all the objects involved in forming the concept possess the same attribute, just in different degrees, there’s no reason why one man could not be an example of the abstraction “nature of man”.

Here's the problem I have with what you're saying: A coffee table can be an example of a table, and Frank O'Connor, an example of a man; but a coffee table cannot be an example of the nature of a table, nor Frank O'Connor an example of the nature of man. The nature of man refers to his essential defining characteristic--to his rational capacity, just as the nature of a table refers to the essential defining characteristic of a table, which is its functional capacity, viz., the support of other objects.

I wrote, “What does it mean to say that one "ought" to do something? It means that if one does it, one will achieve a value…” Brendan replied,

So, if by slipping Uncle Fred some arsenic in his tea I will inherit his millions now rather than later, I ought to do so. I don’t bring up this example to argue that the Objectivist ethics might lead to immorality, but to show that a set of descriptive statements are insufficient to lead to a prescriptive conclusion.

This won't work, Brendan. Nice try, though! :-) Slipping Uncle Fred some arsenic violates his rights, and rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival. If people are to live together in peace, harmony and prosperity (which they should if they want to be happy), then they must follow certain principles of social conduct, not the least of which is respect for the rights of others. They cannot rationally violate these principles in the name of expediency if they want their own rights to be recognized and respected.

I wrote, “’The life proper to man’…meaning that there is a certain kind of life appropriate to the nature of a human being…” Brendan replied,

There are very many different kinds of life. Why is only a “certain kind” appropriate to the nature of a human being? And what is that nature?

Brendan, you can't be serious! (I know--"argument from intimidation" welling up, so I won't go there! ;-)) Seriously, we already discussed this, didn't we? Remember the examples I gave: A fish cannot live out of water, nor can a man live like an animal, if he is to live successfully, etc. He has to live as his "nature" requires, if he is to survive and prosper. By "appropriate," Rand means conducive to one's survival and happiness. Unlike the lower animals, man has to produce the values that his life requires, which means that he requires a social system that best accommodates that goal--laissez-faire capitalism. You continue,

Taking, for sake of argument, the claim that man is defined by his rationality, we would have this type of argument: man is by nature a rational being; therefore he ought to be rational.

No, that's not the argument. Good grief! This is not simply a deductive or definitional argument. Man "ought" to be rational, because it is through the use of reason that he best achieves his values.

As it is, the conclusion simply doesn’t follow. What is missing is the notion of rationality as desirable. If we add that in, we get: man is by nature a rational being; it is good to be rational; therefore he ought to be rational. But of course, “it is good to be rational” is a prescriptive statement. The “ought” is buried in the premises."

By now, you should see where your error lies. This kind of deductive or "rationalistic" approach is not what Objectivism considers a proper method of doing philosophy. Nowhere does Rand argue this way. According to Objectivism, rationality is desirable only because it is a means to an end--the end being the achievement of one's values. It is not an end in itself, nor something that one "ought" categorically to practice, because it is "part of one's nature" as a rational being. Modern philosophy is so mired in this kind of thinking that it can't seem to extricate itself from the idea that certain things are just right period, independently of any goals or values to which they lead. This is Kant's legacy--his categorical imperatives coming home to roost.

You might throw some more light on your arguments by using a concrete example illustrating your claims. But I suppose that might be difficult, since you dismiss the relevance of specific examples.

Now who's being snide?! You have a rather short memory, don't you, for in my previous post, I gave you some concrete examples explaining what Rand meant by the kind of life appropriate to the nature of a human being. Yet, you blithely dismissed these and proceeded to argue as if I had never mentioned them. Ah well, we all have our priorities, I suppose.

- Bill

Post 27

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 4:20pm

Bill to Brendanator:

You have a rather short memory, don't you, for in my previous post, I gave you some concrete examples explaining what Rand meant by the kind of life appropriate to the nature of a human being. Yet, you blithely dismissed these and proceeded to argue as if I had never mentioned them.

Ed to Bill:
You ain't seen nuthin' yet, Bill! No, you're just getting a taste here. Get used to it. Hell, I don't call him the Brendanator for nuthin'!

Movie scene:
"He will come after you and he will ... not ... stop ... EVER ..."

Ed

Post 28

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 4:51pm

Ahah - "Westworld" revisited...

Post 29

Wednesday, December 21, 2005 - 9:01pm

Bill to Ed: Oh, oh! Now you've really got me worried! Do I need an intellectual bodyguard? Maybe I could get a restraining order... Does he respect the Marques of Randsbury Rules (No hitting below the cerebellum)?

Bill (the parried quarry)

Post 30

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 6:02pm

Bill,

Do I need an intellectual bodyguard?

No Bill, of course not. :-)

I'm guessing that your IQ is somewhere between 130 and 190 (mine is 129 by the way; 11 points from genius). I'm also guessing that you've had over a decade -- perhaps over 2 decades -- of intimate exposure to Objectivism (I've had almost half of one decade). In sum then, there a few folks on this planet needing an intellectual bodyguard less than you do -- but you already knew that, I'm sure.

Ed
[IQ (mentioned above) measured via $4 Mensa home test -- available at Barnes & Noble]

Post 31

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 11:17pm

Ed: “Brendan's a tough nut, though. [looks down at old battle scars that he got from the oft-offensive Brendanator]”

You got me all wrong, Ed. I’m just a big marshmallow inside. As for those scars, I’m flattered, but really, most of them were self-inflicted.

Roger: “Ummm....could you please give a specific (or concrete; take your pick) example of where Bill has dismissed the relvance [sic] of specific examples? :-)…”

I was just twigging him about his claim that a single human being is not an example of the nature of man. Not really serious.

Calopterex: “I think I differ here from Brendan who seems to accept the notion that "being rational" implies the Objectivist strategy of leading a productive life as an independent egoist...”

Well, I’m accepting it for the sake of argument, since it’s a whole other issue. Otherwise your comments about parasitism and values are exactly right, as is this: “Implicit in that argument is that "life qua man" is life according to the Objectivist strategy, but there is no factual basis for that statement….”

Brendan

Post 32

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 11:23pm

Bill: “The nature of man refers to his essential defining characteristic--to his rational capacity, just as the nature of a table refers to the essential defining characteristic of a table, which is its functional capacity, viz., the support of other objects.”

As I understand the Objectivist epistemology, the definition describes the nature of the concept, and the concept means all its referents. If so, “essential defining characteristic” is an epistemological convenience, but the actual characteristic is found in all actual instances of the concept.

That is why Rand says that the defining characteristic “is an attribute possessed by all the objects involved…”, just in different degree. But that attribute cannot be “metaphysically” divorced from the whole man.

In that case, the term “nature” is redundant. To say that the nature of man refers to his rational capacity is simply to say that man is a rational being. Any claimed distinction between the “nature of man” and “man” is spurious.

As an aside, it’s interesting that you regard the essential characteristic of a table as its function and not – as Rand says -- its shape. I’m not an advocate of essentialism, but I’m with you on this one to the extent that the function of a table is at least as fundamental as its shape. But function is not an obviously perceptual quality, and Rand claims that table is a “first-level” concept, one that is closest to the perceptual level. Just another conundrum, I guess.

“He has to live as his "nature" requires, if he is to survive and prosper.”

Perhaps so, but the devil is always in the details. A fact can imply many possibilities, and many different types of life can be considered successful, not just the “certain kind” that Rand has in mind. Martin Luther King, for example, wouldn’t fit the stereotype of a Randian hero, but I think his life would be considered a success.

“According to Objectivism, rationality is desirable only because it is a means to an end--the end being the achievement of one's values.”

Then we’re agreed that there is a buried premise regarding the desirability of rationality. In which case, one ought to be rational. The fact that Rand’s ethical propositions are conditional, or the fact that she does philosophy in her own unique way, does not absolve her of the requirement for consistency of premises. It’s true that Rand’s method displays little familiarity with formal logic as a whole. Shame, really. Syllogisms are an excellent way of checking the validity and soundness of arguments.

Well, this has all been very entertaining, but unlike you chaps freezing your butts off in the northern hemisphere, in these parts we’re enjoying the golden weather. So it’s off to summer camp for me. Nice talking to you Bill. Happy Festive Season!

Brendan

Post 33

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 12:01pm

Ed: “Brendan's a tough nut, though. [looks down at old battle scars that he got from the oft-offensive Brendanator]”
Brendan: "You got me all wrong, Ed. I’m just a big marshmallow inside. As for those scars, I’m flattered, but really, most of them were self-inflicted."

"Self-inflicted"?? Ooh! Ed pays Brendan a compliment, and Brendan says, I don't deserve the compliment, because any wounds you sustained were due to your own incompetence and neglect--thereby proving that Ed was right, after all. ;-) By the way, Brendan, if you're a marshmallow, does that mean that you don't object to being roasted?

Ed writes,

I'm guessing that your IQ is somewhere between 130 and 190 (mine is 129 by the way; 11 points from genius). I'm also guessing that you've had over a decade -- perhaps over 2 decades -- of intimate exposure to Objectivism (I've had almost half of one decade). In sum then, there a few folks on this planet needing an intellectual bodyguard less than you do -- but you already knew that, I'm sure.

How does 115 sound? I couldn't get into MENSA if my life depended on it! Speaking of IQs, did you know that baseball legend, Reggie Jackson ("Mr. October"), has an IQ of 160? And he's a professional athlete. See, you can't judge a person's IQ by his interests or his talents. :-)

- Bill

Post 34

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 3:17pm

Okay, Mr. Brendenator, I'm girded for battle. Gimme your best shot!

I wrote, “The nature of man refers to his essential defining characteristic--to his rational capacity, just as the nature of a table refers to the essential defining characteristic of a table, which is its functional capacity, viz., the support of other objects.”

Brendan replied,

As I understand the Objectivist epistemology, the definition describes the nature of the concept, and the concept means all its referents. If so, “essential defining characteristic” is an epistemological convenience, but the actual characteristic is found in all actual instances of the concept.

That is why Rand says that the defining characteristic “is an attribute possessed by all the objects involved…”, just in different degree. But that attribute cannot be “metaphysically” divorced from the whole man.

In that case, the term “nature” is redundant. To say that the nature of man refers to his rational capacity is simply to say that man is a rational being. Any claimed distinction between the “nature of man” and “man” is spurious.

I don't think you can say that! Man is a rational animal--a certain kind of living organism with many characteristics other than rationality and animality; the nature of man refers to the essence of the concept of 'man.' "Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distinguishes these units from all other existents within the field of man's knowledge. Thus, the essence of a concept is determined contextually and may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge." (Rand, ITOE, p. 52) According to Objectivism, a concept is not synonymous with its essence. A concept is one thing; its essence, another.

As an aside, it’s interesting that you regard the essential characteristic of a table as its function and not – as Rand says -- its shape. I’m not an advocate of essentialism, but I’m with you on this one to the extent that the function of a table is at least as fundamental as its shape.

Right, it's shape may be sufficient, provided that there are no art objects that look like a table but are not intended to support other smaller objects; otherwise, it may be necessary to consider its function.

But function is not an obviously perceptual quality, and Rand claims that table is a “first-level” concept, one that is closest to the perceptual level.

Right, because, unlike furniture, you can grasp what a table is perceptually. Furniture requires other preformed concepts, e.g., tables, chairs, sofas, etc., which is why you wouldn't say, "I have a furniture," but you would say, "I have a table." Instead, you'd say, "I have a piece of furniture," whereas you wouldn't say, "I have a piece of table."

I wrote, “He has to live as his 'nature' requires, if he is to survive and prosper.” Brendan replied,

Perhaps so, but the devil is always in the details. A fact can imply many possibilities, and many different types of life can be considered successful, not just the “certain kind” that Rand has in mind. Martin Luther King, for example, wouldn’t fit the stereotype of a Randian hero, but I think his life would be considered a success.

I don't know that she wouldn't have considered him a hero. She considered Muhammed Ali one of her heros. Of course, a person can succeed in achieving fame or material success without exemplifying the Objectivist virtues. To say, as Rand would, that in order to survive and prosper, man must live as his nature requires is to say that he must use a process of reason and thought in order to produce the values that his life requires. That doesn't mean that a person can't live as a parasite off the production of others, but it does mean that if he is not productive, then he must rely on someone who is.

I wrote, “According to Objectivism, rationality is desirable only because it is a means to an end--the end being the achievement of one's values.” Brendan replied,

Then we’re agreed that there is a buried premise regarding the desirability of rationality.

Brendan, you're being disingenuous. In your original argument, you stated:

Taking, for sake of argument, the claim that man is defined by his rationality, we would have this type of argument: man is by nature a rational being; therefore he ought to be rational. As it is, the conclusion simply doesn’t follow. What is missing is the notion of rationality as desirable.

If you recall, I replied that this is not how Rand would argue. She would not simply define man as a rational animal and deduce from that that he ought to be rational.

The fact that Rand’s ethical propositions are conditional, or the fact that she does philosophy in her own unique way, does not absolve her of the requirement for consistency of premises.

Yes, Rand does philosophy "in her own unique way"--the way it should be done! Nor does this imply, contrary to your gratuitous suggestion, that there is any inconsistency in her premises? The fact that she is not "rationalistic"--the fact that she does not ignore the real world but is careful to ground her ideas in concrete reality--does not mean that she is not logical or consistent in her thinking.

It’s true that Rand’s method displays little familiarity with formal logic as a whole. Shame, really. Syllogisms are an excellent way of checking the validity and soundness of arguments.

On the contrary, Rand has recommended to her students two excellent books on logic, one by H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, and the other by Lionel Ruby, Logic: An Introduction. Just because she didn't lay out every element of her philosophy in the form of step-by-step syllogisms doesn't mean that she wasn't familiar with formal logic or didn't consider it important! Yes, syllogisms are an excellent way of checking the validity and soundness of an argument, and if one is unsure of one's reasoning, it is a good idea to use them. Rand would agree with you wholeheartedly.

Well, this has all been very entertaining, but unlike you chaps freezing your butts off in the northern hemisphere, in these parts we’re enjoying the golden weather. So it’s off to summer camp for me. Nice talking to you Bill. Happy Festive Season!

Happy holidays to you too, Brendan. Actually, here in Northern California, the weather has been warmer than usual--in the '60's during the day--although we're in our rainy season now.

- Bill

Post 35

Sunday, December 25, 2005 - 8:42am

"Self-inflicted"?? Ooh! Ed pays Brendan a compliment, and Brendan says, I don't deserve the compliment, because any wounds you sustained were due to your own incompetence and neglect--thereby proving that Ed was right, after all. ;-) By the way, Brendan, if you're a marshmallow, does that mean that you don't object to being roasted?

:-)

Post 36

Sunday, December 25, 2005 - 9:35am

Mr. Bill Dwyer,

Your SENSE OF HUMOR IQ is about 200!

Post 37

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 11:32am

Right Mike. Bill's SOH IQ is off the charts!

Bill, you're a real stand-up guy. It's good to know folks like you exist. It's great to interact with folks like you. I think that you have a great sense of life (and I'm not just saying all this because you stood up to an old intellectual bully of mine). Anyway, I've said enough now, and I don't want to risk sounding insincere (ie. sounding like a sycophant).

Ed

Post 38

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 4:48pm

I agree that Bill Dwyer's sense of humor is quite good, and it's quite a bit better than his supposed IQ would lead one to expect. My own IQ measures out quite a bit higher than his, but there have been numerous times when Bill has argued rings around me, as has my wife, Becky, whose IQ measures in the 120-130 range.

I think Bill and Becky would agree with me, however, that what matters is not so much how much IQ you have, but what you do with the IQ you do have. Kind of like the tortoise and the hare. (Which is actually quite apropos, since higher IQ is supposedly correlated with higher mental processing speed.) And we all know who won the race, and why. :-)

For that matter, I don't know anyone in the Objectivist movement who has written a more impressive essay than Bill's "The Contradiction of 'The Contradiction of Determinism'," which appeared in The Personalist back in the early 1970s, when John Hospers was the editor. It stunned me when I read it, and it changed my whole perspective on Objectivism and the free will/determinism issue. And I have yet to read a convincing refutation of his essay. For whatever reason, most people simply cannot even come to grips with his argument.

Not only is Bill capable of deep philosophical reasoning, but he is also a man of great patience and care in trying to explain unclear points, especially to newcomers to Objectivism, who need such consideration the most. We are all the richer for his sharing his intellectual and personal gifts with us, whatever the IQ level that propels them. :-)

I usually sign off with just my initials, but this time I proudly acknowledge myself as:

Bill Dwyer's friend and admirer,
Roger Bissell

Post 39

Wednesday, December 28, 2005 - 12:33am