Virtue Jurisprudence

I'm wondering whether Objectivist ethics is more consistent with a virtue jurisprudence rather than merely a rights-based jurisprudence. I know Objectivists are rather locked into thinking it's "rights or fights," but I'm hoping they can at least consider virtue jurisprudence. As Aristotle said, it's the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

Speaking of Aristotle, he was the original advocate for virtue jurisprudence. He never talked about rights, so far as I know. In his view, the proper purpose of the law was to cultivate virtue. This conflicts with Rand's view, which is that law's proper purpose is to protect individual rights.

Cultivating virtue differs from protecting rights. They are not just flipsides to the same coin. Sometimes protecting rights results in less cultivation of virtue. For example, I'd argue that an individual is not more virtuous when we protect her or his rights to be racist, sexist, cowardly, irrational, cruel, etc. And I think a fair argument can be made that we're not more virtuous by standing idly by to watch such unvirtuous (though rights abiding) behavior.

Now to the crux of the argument. It seems Objectivist ethics might favor virtue jurisprudence. The purpose of an Objectivist ethics is the Objectivist’s own life/happiness. Virtue is supposed to be the means by which to effectuate that end. Virtue jurisprudence directly accomodates and fosters an Objectivist ethics by cultivating the ethical means: Virtue. Rights-based jurisprudence, in contrast, greatly allows for unvirtuous, thus anti-life/happiness (i.e., unethical) behavior. Rights-based jurisprudence cultivates virtue and life-/happiness-affirming behavior only incidentally. I think rights-based jurisprudence is largely based on the idea that rights means freedom means life/happiness. Again, this equation conflicts with Objectivist ethics, which says virtue -- as opposed to rights and freedom -- means life/happiness. And just in case, virtue is not a flipside to rights or freedom either, nor is freedom or rights necessary for virtue. Slaves can be virtuous. I can argue this in more detail if need be.

Finally, a big sticking point in accepting virtue jurisprudence might be that it doesn't priortize (note: but nor does it necessarily abandon) the non-initiation-of-force principle. In the clearest case, if someone is doing something greatly and obviously unvirtuous, then the virtue jurist will call for intervention, even though such intervention might initiate force against the person, thus violating the person's rights (that is, rights as acknowledged by the rights-based jurist). This is because the virtue jurist finds it unvirtuous to uphold such great and obviously unvirtuous behavior, regardless of whether that behavior is rights abiding. And to be sure, the law can't always uphold virtuous behavior and rights. (See my 3rd paragraph of this post).

BIG DISCLAIMER: I am not a virtue jurist. I currently favor a rights-based jurisprudence. I would prefer it if discussers wouldn't so quickly take sides in this thread. Instead, I invite discussers to explore this topic with me, calmly, cordially, and thoughtfully.

Jordan

Post 1

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 6:17am

I am not sure that the concept of "rights" even existed in Aristotle's time. I believe that "rights" are a medieval concept that grew out of the obligations of knights to protect their serfs of serfs to feed their protectors. In parallel with that ran several CENTURIES of argument between church and state over who had the right to appoint bishops. That is why "rights" do not appear in Aristotle.

Much of Aristotle and much of Greek philosophy in general is normative, not positive. Despite how we view The Dialogues of Plato, etc., the Greeks did not interest themselves so much in speculative moral philosophy. The goal of philosophy is to discover facts, not to posit notions. Aristotle looked at how people act and what consequences come from those actions and he recommended certain known actions that lead to personal happiness.

His Politics reflects that. The best government for the city, he said, is through the middle class. (Delon apa oti kai e koinonia h politike apiste e dia ton meson: Clear, however, evidently [it is that] the parternership (union) of the city [is] best through the middle [class]. -- my translation of Sec ix.8. Book IV, Politics.) That is what you would call "virtue based." We would demand to know how we could be protected as individuals from encroachments by the majority of middle class voters. Aristotle did not even perceive the problem.

There is some hint of this today in jurisprudence. When I read of it, I knew how Rand would have denounced it. The war crimes tribunals investigating Bosnia consisted of jurists from several nations. The quote I read from one them said that the international nature of the problem and the tribunal demanded that they get above objective law of states and consider the widest principles of humanity -- (or something like that). I saw what she meant (it was a she), but I also saw Ayn Rand rolling over in her grave. I think that there might be some validity in that.

Considering how poorly most people understand "rights" they can hardly do worse as juries considering "virtues."

The problem is, that many people here on SOLO consider it unvirtuous to consider sexual liaisons with others under some arbitrary "teen" age delimiter. Carrying out such liaisons might indeed violate the rights of the minor involved -- and if both parties are minors, Objectivism is up on the rocks trying to untangle Dagny and Frisco in the woods -- but again, many leading thinkers on SOLO would consider the ownership of such literature -- or holding such thoughts in one's head -- unvirtuous. They might be right. If so, do you want to be prosecuted for your library -- or your thoughts?

Are you suggesting that we could codify virtues -- as opposed to our codification of rights?

Care to give it a shot?

Post 2

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 3:17pm

Michael - you write, "I believe that "rights" are a medieval concept that grew out of the obligations of knights to protect their serfs of serfs to feed their protectors."

Actually, they are older than that - the idea of basing jurispudence on rights is indeed derived from a system of mutual obligations, but it is first seen, and in a much more sophisticated form than of Medieval Europe, in the Talmudic jurispudence of the Jews of Hellenistic Judea and Mesopotamia. It even included a primitive separation of "church and state:" there were rights and obligations of "man to man," which men were entitled to enforce, and of "man to God," presumably enforced only by God himself without human intervention.

Maimonides adapted the Talmudic rules to Medieval Spain. Then Aquinas read Maimonides, and then we have the medieval codes that you refer to.

Post 3

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 6:41pm

Hey Marotta,

...do you want to be prosecuted for your library -- or your thoughts?

Nah. Looks like you're worried that the law will enforce as virtues, behaviors that aren't. That's the same problem as the law enforcing as rights, liberties that aren't.

Are you suggesting that we could codify virtues -- as opposed to our codification of rights?

Care to give it a shot?

Nah. Just exploring the basics for now.

Jordan

Post 4

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 9:29pm

Jordan,

What would the legal structure look like in virtue jurisprudence?

With rights-based jurisprudence, you have an objective basis for freedom of action. Rights pertain to freedom of action, with no guarantee that you will earn the object, only that you action is "free", i.e. uncoerced. One may pursue happiness, but that does not guarantee one will achieve it. As you can see, with the principle of non-coercion, you can objectively define one human's relation to another in a social context. A legal code is not established to enforce particular actions or choices, but rather to protect actions or choices against physical force.

If this barrier of non-coercion against others is not strictly observed, it could be obliterated depending on how one defines virtues, thereby infringing upon one's freedom of action (which includes one's freedom to be virtuous).

As a matter fact, certain virtues are often used as excuses to transgress upon the rights of individuals. For instance, some politicians claim that some people will be irresponsible or irrational with their money (and some people are); therefore, they say, let a "responsible elite--i.e. those same politicians--provide for the people's future. That's used as a justification for programs like Social Security. Or, some extol the virtue of charity and use this to create welfare entitlements.

Futhermore, acting virtuously does not guarantee that you will earn the property. What individual rights do is guarantee that you own the property if you have earned it. In other words, there is no "right" to property simply by acting virtuously.

Best Regards,
Michael

Post 5

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 9:10am

Hi Moeller,

I'm far from an expert on virtue jurisprudence, so this post will be almost entirely guesswork on my part and should not be taken as indicative of the theory.

As you can see, with the principle of non-coercion, you can objectively define one human's relation to another in a social context.

Of course. In a virtue-based system, the law would uphold virtues instead of merely rights, and would reprimand, or at least not condone, unvirtuous behaviors rather than rights violations.

As a matter fact, certain virtues are often used as excuses to transgress upon the rights of individuals.

So are certain "rights." This is the same worry Marotta had. Just as the law can enforce the wrong "rights" (i.e., those which violate the NIOF principle), so too could it enforce the wrong "virtues" (i.e., those which are contrary to an individual's life/happiness). It's a problem either way.

Futhermore, acting virtuously does not guarantee that you will earn the property. What individual rights do is guarantee that you own the property if you have earned it. In other words, there is no "right" to property simply by acting virtuously.

Of course. If it is virtuous to own that which you produce, or if it is virtuous to exclude others from using what you own or produce, then the law will enforce those virtues. You could say you have a "right" -- by which I mean, very generically, a liberty with which others may not legally interfere -- to your property, but that "right" would stem from its accordance with virtue rather than with the NIOF principle.

To see how this would play out, consider this example: Objectivists hold that racism is unethical, that it'd be unethical -- i.e., unvirtuous -- to refuse to rent a hotel room to, say, a black person. The rights-based jurist will say, too bad. The hotel owners may behave as unvirtuously and unethically as they want, so long as they uphold the NIOF principle. We can have a world of scoundrels, so long as those scoundrels stay within their NIOF-abiding rights. The virtue jurist will say, screw this. We are highly convinced that racism, at least in this case, is nonsense and should not be enforced. The virtue jurist would then do pretty much what is today's status quo: forbid such discrimination in such a case.

That should give you a glimpse of what my guess of what the legal structure of a virtue-based system would look like.

Jordan

Post 6

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 11:07am

Hi Jordan,

Ah, yes, I'm glad you included the example. In the example you give, the racist hotel owner is having his property rights legally interfered with (which would go against your explicit definition here). There is no "right" to a hotel room except the room which the owner provides through his own free-will. So, instead of respecting his property rights and his freedom of action (which includes the right to act irrationally), the law becomes a tool that infringes upon one's freedom of action. The government is telling him who he can and can't rent his room to--they are assuming control of his property.

The real philosophical problem in a case like this is that one is trying to force somebody to be good, which is a contradiction in terms. Values presuppose choice, and force (via legal means here) negates choice. To paraphrase one of my favorite AR quotes: forcing somebody to accept values is like trying to provide a person with a beautiful art gallery at the price of cutting out his eyes.

And one need not worry either, reality extracts its price from the racist hotel owner via the loss of business.

Regards,
Michael

Post 7

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 12:53pm

Moeller,

*So, instead of respecting his property rights and his freedom of action (which includes the right to act irrationally), the law becomes a tool that infringes upon one's freedom of action. The government is telling him who he can and can't rent his room to--they are assuming control of his property.

Yup. The virtue-based law would limit the hotel owners’ freedom of action. But the virtue jurist would argue that a rights-based system limits the owners’ actions, too. In a rights-based system, the hotel owners lack the freedom of action to, say, welch on a deal (even if welching would be the virtuous thing to do).

*The real philosophical problem in a case like this is that one is trying to force somebody to be good, which is a contradiction in terms. Values presuppose choice, and force (via legal means here) negates choice. To paraphrase one of my favorite AR quotes: forcing somebody to accept values is like trying to provide a person with a beautiful art gallery at the price of cutting out his eyes.

I actually tried to flesh out a problem with this in http://solohq.com/Forum/Dissent/0035.shtml . I conjectured that if the law negates choice, hence value, then the law negates and acts contrary to ethics. This would hold regardless of the law's basis.

That aside, consider the question: Can something be good for an individual even if the individual chooses against it? I think, according to Objectivism, that the better answer is yes. General examples: Productivity is good for an individual even if the individual always chooses always to be a mooch, thief, or bum. Rationality is good for an individual even if the individual always chooses to be irrational or whim-worshipping. Self-Esteem is good for an individual even if the individual always chooses to be self-abasing.

Now consider: Can something be good for an individual if someone else forces the individual to accept the thing? That is, is forcing people ever good for them. I sort of discussed this question in this http://solohq.com/Forum/Dissent/0036.shtml , where I discussed a study showing that people are sometimes happier with fewer options. I think Dwyer finally suggested that fewer options can’t make a person happier if the person doesn't himself/herself voluntarily narrow the options. I didn’t say it then, but I don’t think this is the case. I think Objectivism might be a bit inconsistent on this point, but I think, according to Objectivism, that the better answer to the above question is also yes.

I accept that forcing people is often contrary to their life/happiness, but not always. Sure popping out someone's eyes (where's the virtue in that?) for them to have a pretty art gallery is not the best way to effectuate an individual's life happiness. But what about seat belt laws (which uphold the virtue of safety), no smoking laws (which uphold the virtue of health and consideration), anti-discrimination laws (which uphold the virtue of rationality), anti-cruelty to animal laws (which uphold the virtue of benevolence)? All these laws force an individual. Do they better effectuate an individual’s life/happiness? Because they cultivate virtue moreso than would a rights-based system, I think the answer is yes. [EDIT: if the answer is no, then I think the Objectivist view that 'virtue best fosters value' is wrong.] (Note: I should start calling “rights-based system” the “NIOF-based system,” just to be clear). I think the virtue jurist would say that if people aren't being virtuous (thus not best achieving their ethical end) on their own, then the law may step in to help cultivate the underproduced virtue.

Jordan

PS I don't mean for it to look like I'm taking sides here. I'm still in the NIOF ballpark. I just want to flesh out the virtue jurist side for purposes of exploration.

(Edited by Jordan on 11/07, 12:57pm)

Post 8

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 1:46pm

This is from the Constitution of Confederatio Helvetica:
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sz00000_.html
Article 5 Rule of Law
(1) The law is the basis for and limitation of state activity.
(2) State activity must be in the public interest and proportional.
(3) State institutions and private entities must act in good faith.
(4) Federation and Cantons respect international law.

Note Art 5. Sec 3.

(Not at 5.1. is half bad...)

Does 5.3. not sound like "virtue jurisprudence"?)

Post 9

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 3:37pm

I'm not seeing it.

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 3:45pm

Michael,

"Good faith" is a legal term - it is there to forbid "stretching" the law, using loopholes, using unintended interpretations of the law or misleading presentations of facts, etc. It has nothing to do with "virtue jurispudence."

Post 11

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 8:21pm

Jordan,

From one law student to another, I understand your "exploration".

You write:

The virtue-based law would limit the hotel owners’ freedom of action. But the virtue jurist would argue that a rights-based system limits the owners’ actions, too. In a rights-based system, the hotel owners lack the freedom of action to, say, welch on a deal (even if welching would be the virtuous thing to do).

Not quite, it depends on what your definition of freedom is. If by "welch on a deal" you mean fraud, then you have to recognize that there is no "freedom" to defraud somebody, just as there is no "freedom" to murder somebody. In these cases, the "freedom of action" that one is claiming for oneself is simultaneously restricting the "freedom of action" of another. A legal system built in this manner would have the impossible task of enforcing *conflicting rights*--i.e. the system would be non-objective.

But what about seat belt laws (which uphold the virtue of safety), no smoking laws (which uphold the virtue of health and consideration), anti-discrimination laws (which uphold the virtue of rationality), anti-cruelty to animal laws (which uphold the virtue of benevolence)? All these laws force an individual. Do they better effectuate an individual’s life/happiness? Because they cultivate virtue moreso than would a rights-based system, I think the answer is yes.

You have to remember that laws govern the individual in a social context in order to protect one's freedom to act. So, if somebody smokes or doesn't wear the seat belt, there is no victim except himself. By enforcing these laws, the government becomes paternalistic and dictates to him what actions he can and cannot take. So is the purpose of government to protect the freedom of action or to protect one from the consequences of one's actions? Do you want the government to be in the business of telling you what actions are good for you or do you want to decide for yourself? To the extent the government enforces what is "good for you" is the extent to which it becomes a dictatorship.

This moves away from virtue in that now responsibility for actions is taken out of the hands of individuals and is placed at the foot of government. Judgment of what is good/bad is no longer the responsibility of each individual, but subjected to collective judgment.

Furthermore, the laws have to apply uniformly, thus also restricting the freedom of action of those who do act morally and thereby the system does NOT promote virtue. If the laws are instead selectively applied, then you live under the rule of subjective law. This also paralyzes freedom of action because one needs to act (in order to live), but does not know whether or not he will be prosecuted for a given action.

Best Regards,
Michael

Post 12

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 10:11am

Moeller,

I hope the following sufficiently addresses your comments.

Fraud. First, since you brought up fraud... Objectivists argue that it's unvirtuous to defraud somebody, so the virtue jurist will likely enforce against fraud, not because fraud violates the NIOF principle, but because it is antithetical to an individual's life/happiness.

Conflicting rights. Next, a virtue-based system needn't suffer from impossibly conflicting "rights" (i.e., liberties with which others may not legally interfere) either. Virtues, like rights, are hierarchical. Should two virtues appear to conflict, the greater one would prevail. No irresolvable conflict need arise.

So is the purpose of government to protect the freedom of action or to protect one from the consequences of one's actions?

Purpose. The answer is neither, if we're in a virtue-based system. The purpose would be to foster virtues under the (Objectivist) assumption that virtues, not merely NIOF, best effectuate an individual's life/happiness. If some behavior in some context doesn't best effectuate an individual's life/happiness, then the virtue jurist shouldn't enforce it. Put another way, if racist behaviors (discrimination), unhealthy behaviors (smoking), unsafe behaviors (going w/o seat belt), and malevolent behaviors (torturing animals) in some context best effectuate an individual's life/happiness, then the virtue jurist shouldn't restrict those behaviors.

Locus of determining virtue. Also, I don't think virtue jurists would have to place the question of what is virtuous solely in the hands of the government (which would make the system totalitarian, I think, and not necessarily a dictatorship, but that's just trivia). They needn't toss the general assumption that the individual is best situated to determine which behaviors best effectuate the individual's life/happiness. But they wouldn't accept that assumption across the board either. In Objectivism, the verdict is in -- that certain behaviors in most (if not all) contexts for most (if not all) individuals are antithetical to the individual's life/happiness. Those behaviors are called vices (and my crap memory doesn't recall whether Objectivism has explicitly named some vices). Question: How does it run contrary to Objectivist ethics for the law to restrict vices? Vices are supposed to be unethical, so it seems almost tautological that restricting them is necessarily pro-ethics.

Standard for the law determining virtue. Of course, the law doesn't have to restrict every vice under the sun, nor promote every virtue. Some vices are too puny to mess with. Some virtues are so successful on their own that the law needn't step in. But if the law chooses to step in, it need not do so simply to accord with collective judgment. It could do so by virtue (heh!) of objective evidence. That is, if there's objective evidence demonstrating how a behavior runs contrary to and individual's life/happiness, then the law may restrict it; if there's objective evidence that a behavior promotes an individual's life/happiness, then the law may protect it. (Note: the law wouldn't have to enforce or restrict. It would just have the authority to do so.)

The virtue jurist's affect on me and the moral. Anyway, if it's objectively virtuous to, say, not racially discriminate or torture animals, then it's hard for me to get upset when the law restricts such behaviors, at least as it does now in the US. I don't mind the restriction because it doesn't hinder an individual's life/happiness, including my own Objectivists should agree with me here in that they agree that racism and animal torture objectively don't effectuate an individual's life/happiness. Put another way, if we're acting morally anyway, then the laws that restrict immoral behavior hardly concern us.

Concluding Remarks. The big fear, as you and Marotta point out, is the same fear we have in a rights-based system, namely, that the law will promote the wrong "virtues" and restrict the wrong "vices." Because "getting the law correct" is a problem in both systems, this shouldn't give us reason to chuck either of them.

Jordan

PS Where are you attending law school? I'm curious. Of course, to protect your identity, you're welcome to keep your answer as general as you like.

(Edited by Jordan on 11/08, 10:38am)

Post 13

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 12:08pm

Hi Jordan,

I will make some quick points, in part because of time constraints, and in part because I think I addressed your concerns. Otherwise, I'm afraid I won't be able to provide you with the answers you are looking for.

They needn't toss the general assumption that the individual is best situated to determine which behaviors best effectuate the individual's life/happiness. But they wouldn't accept that assumption across the board either.

It seems like you want to *selectively apply* the law, which creates subjective and arbitrary laws. It boils down to: either you think the individual is best fit to determine what is good for him, or the government is the final arbiter (of what is good for the individual). If you chose the latter, don't you see that you are placing what is good for an individual in the hands of collective judgment? Your suggestion of using "objective evidence" doesn't help because you are still subjecting individuals to collective judgment of what constitutes that person's happiness--a man is an end in himself, not some means to promote an ideal of virtue.

Some of the most egregious examples of injustice in history occur because an individual's actions are judged as "immoral" by collective judgment. Just read *We the Living* to see what happens when individual choice is subjugated to collective judgment.

I don't understand the purpose of such a system. If a person acts immorally, he pays the price in reality. He cannot escape the consequences of his actions. Why do you need the government to force him to act morally? (Which would also create a ~duty~ on the part of those who are virtuous by constantly looking after the immoral.) Why would you want such a system? As long as you are free to act according to your value judgments, and another's immoral behavior does not infringe upon your ~rights~, how would it affect you? Wouldn't you grant others the same respect for their free-will as you would claim for yourself?

My beef isn't that you cannot "get virtues correct" or "promote the correct virtues". Yes, virtues can be objectively defined just like "rights" (and the primary ones are explicitly laid out and defined in Objectivism). Again, the problem is that one cannot force somebody to be good. Man is not given innate values, he has to use his reasoning mind and make choices among alternatives. By forcing him, you are denying him the exercise of his free-will--you are denying him the means with which to discover the good. A moral code is not forced or imposed on somebody.

Best Regards,
Michael

PS. I go to Suffolk University Law School in Boston.

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/08, 1:36pm)

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/08, 1:37pm)

Post 14

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 2:15pm

You are till pushing this from a tribal mindset - virtues are acts of achieving values, and as such, are by their nature individualistic, such that only to the speciific individual is there to be judgment as to the viability of the pursued virtue, and as long, therefore, as there is non -initiation of use of force, no reason to proscribe - no matter how others perceive

Otherwise, it becomes the classic individualism versus tribalism - which is the yardstick to use.

Post 15

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 3:35pm

Hi Moeller,

I do appreciate your comments.

It seems like you want to *selectively apply* the law, which creates subjective and arbitrary laws. It boils down to: either you think the individual is best fit to determine what is good for him, or the government is the final arbiter (of what is good for the individual). If you chose the latter, don't you see that you are placing what is good for an individual in the hands of collective judgment? Your suggestion of using "objective evidence" doesn't help because you are still subjecting individuals to collective judgment of what constitutes that person's happiness--a man is an end in himself, not some means to promote an ideal of virtue.

Virtue jurists would say they uphold that the idea that an individual is an end in himself or herself. They just reject that upholding the NIOF principle best promotes that idea. I don't see how letting the law objectively determine virtue is any more subjective or arbitrary than letting the law objectively determine rights. We could just as easily argue that either the individual is best fit to determine his rights, or the law is.

Some of the most egregious examples of injustice in history occur because an individual's actions are judged as "immoral" by collective judgment.

For sure. But the virtue jurist will argue that such "immorality" was based on a non-objective (and usually theocratic) system.

Why do you need the government to force him to act morally?

Now that I think of it, virtue jurists might be more practically concerned with forbidding vices rather than mandating virtues. Either way, the reason the law would want to be concerned with this is that we don't want a bunch of unvirtuous (i.e., immoral) behavior in our jurisdiction. Perhaps we wouldn't care so much about the unvirtuous behavior if its consequences were limited to the individual, but often, immoral behavior affects others -- is antithetical to another individual's life-happiness.

NIOF protects lots of unvirtuous behavior, and lots of unvirtuous behavior negatively affects us even though it doesn't violate the NIOF. To use the example I keep coming back to -- I could be discriminated against and that would quite clearly negatively affect me,

Wouldn't you grant others the same respect for their free-will as you would claim for yourself?

I guess the virtue jurists would grant others the same respect for virtue (or disrespect for vice?) that they would claim for themselves.

Again, the problem is that one cannot force somebody to be good. Man is not given innate values, he has to use his reasoning mind and make choices among alternatives. By forcing him, you are denying him the exercise of his free-will--you are denying him the means with which to discover the good. A moral code is not forced or imposed on somebody.

The "good," according to Objectivism, is that which furthers an individual's life/happiness. Sure, forcing an individual might negate the individual's ability to discover alternatives and to choose the alternative he or she thinks will produce the best good. But I don't think it follows that negating discovery and choice of alternatives subsequently negates the good. As I tried to argue in previous posts, according to Objectivism, that which is good for an individual doesn't depend on whether the individual discovers or chooses it. Reason, purpose, and self-esteem are still good for an individual, even if the individual chooses against those values. (However, maybe there's an argument that discovering and choosing are virtuous acts, and so ought to be protected under the law.)

I agree that we can't force a person to agree with what's virtuous, that is, to agree with what will best effectuate the person's life/happiness. But we can certainly force the virtuous behavior (or at least force the individual away from vices), and the virtue jurist will argue, tautologically I think, that forcing such behavior will make the individual better off.

Anyway, I know you're pressed for time. It's okay if you want to stop investigating this with me. If you want to give final remarks, I will agree not to try and rebut them. (It's hard to know when to stop on these discussion boards.)

Thanks for telling me your law school.

Best,
Jordan

P.S. Self corrections: In an earlier post I misnamed the cardinal Objectivist virtues. They are rationality, productiveness, and pride. I know I named "self-esteem," but Objectivists consider that a value, not a virtue.

Post 16

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 3:47pm

Robert,

If only the individual can judge which acts are virtuous, then Rand overstepped her bounds when she identified rationality, productiveness, and pride as virtues. So far as I can tell, according to Rand, these behaviors are virtuous even if the individual doesn't think they are. Arguing that only the individual can determine what is virtuous to him or her is classic subjectivism, and it negates everybody else's ability to determine whether that person has acted virtuously.

Jordan

Post 17

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 4:12pm

You misconstrue - indeed those are, by the nature of being human, virtues... but the understanding of that, and the applying of that, remains with the individual, not the tribe...

Post 18

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 4:29pm

Um...unless the "tribe" - by which I guess you derisively mean "government" - does it. Why ought the choice of whether to behave virtuously always necessarily be the individual's? After all, we don't leave it to the individual to choose when to uphold the NIOF principle.

Jordan

Post 19

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 10:51am