| | Mike,
Without a rigorous treatment, I'd say the end result of moral actions is to protect one's individual happiness from being violated by another's initiation of force, i.e. the rational pursuit of happiness. Under this system one needs to be alive to be moral, of course, but it also includes the quality of life. I see this basic right as including the others (life and liberty) because without them one cannot rationally pursue one's own happiness. I include only sentient and sapient beings under this morality because I define happiness as something more substantial than carnal pleasure satisfaction. A nonsapient being could not achieve happiness in this sense and a nonsentient being could experience neither happiness nor carnal pleasure.
The first point one could raise against this would be the conflicts of interest; what makes one person happy may interfere with what makes another happy. Each person is responsible for his own happiness and the only obligation is a negative one: do not interfere through initiation of force with others' rational pursuit of happiness.
The second point that comes to mind is the mistaken idea that to protect one's happiness is to ensure it, i.e. moral obligations to ensure others' happiness. Perhaps person A's pursuit of happiness leads him to start a business. Does person B then have a moral obligation to purchase A's goods or services so that A will be happy? No. For B to refrain from doing so would not be an initiation of force so while it does not provide for A's happiness, it also does not interfere with it. Instead, A is responsible for his own happiness and must therefore provide goods or services that B wants/needs if A wants to pursue his own happiness.
Going back to the slavery example, would inaction be justifiable under my system? Not if you were a slave. Of course, there are more actions than outright rebellion, which would likely lead to death. Subterfuge is always an option. The other possibility is you being a slave owner. Are you actions justifiable? No, not in any way. They are a direct interference with the slave's rational pursuit of happiness. Beyond that, it depends on whether you can live with the violation of another's rational pursuit of happiness. There would be no moral obligation to help free slaves, but there could always be the desire to do so.
There is a point that Ed brings up: "grandma consumption -- for them -- could only bring a contradictory happiness." Suppose person A has the desire to not eat incurably mentally retarded person C who is a nonsapient being. Person B has a reservation at Hannibal's, the new place down the street that offers fresh people meat gathered from people such as C, and wants very much to try C-meat (a carnal pleasure at best). Since C is nonsapient and A and B can claim only desires and not rational pursuit of happiness, what is the moral course of action here? The likely course of action would be to prevent B from eating C, but it would, in my mind, be an emotion-based decision. Is my only recourse here to resign that such a decision is the only outcome under my system? Or perhaps an ad hoc rationalization such as the (unreasonable) potentiality argument?
Ed,
Would you extend those ideas to the irreversibly brain-damaged/mentally retarded? In other words, beings with only sentience. Why or why not?
Jordan,
Yes, living wills would simplify the situation greatly, but for sake of argument we'll assume that's not the case. Should a nonsapient human be treated as property then (if they have someone willing to claim them as such)?
Sarah
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