Has life always existed?

Hi, Regi.

You wrote: >>According to the BBH [the "Big Bang" hypothesis"], not only did life not exist, but matter as we know it did not exist either; but, something must have existed, because Objectivist flatly (and correctly) reject existence coming ex nihilo.<<

Like all prior cosmological models, the Big Bang gets creakier and creakier the more we observe of the universe. To keep it going we now have supra-light speed inflation (or alternatively variable light speed) and the need for the mysterious anti-gravitational dark energy accounting for most of the make-up of the universe. (Sounds a lot like that nineteenth-century "ether" that just had to exist as medium for electro-magnetic radition.)

However, if there is anything to string theory, the Big Bang model might be replaced by the Big Slam which posits that our universe (or "brane" in Big Slam parlance) undergoes a continuous cycle of growth and decay as it collides with other branes. Under this hypothesis, our universe is always changing, but it always was and always will be.

The Big Slam also explains the clumpiness of our universe (i.e., matter is not evenly spread out, but comes in clumps like galaxies and stars and planets), which the Big Bang really doesn't. After all, if everything started from the expansion of a singularity and the laws of physics are perfectly consistent, then how did any two pieces of matter ever overcome the uniform pull of gravity to attract each other and form the first clump of stuff?

Regards,
Bill a.k.a. Citizen Rat

Post 21

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 - 4:22pm

Nate,

Glad these discussion are valuable. They are to me too.

You said:

However, you mention elsewhere that life cannot violate physical causality.

That's right.

But if we accept that physical causality is deterministic, it would seem that the only way not to violate the physical laws would be to conform to them exactly.

That's true for the physical, but life itself is not physical, it is a process. As I already mentioned, that process, as a process, has no physical attributes. "Life does not have mass, a pH factor, a temperature, an electromagnetic state, or any other physical property or characteristic."

What I said specifically, elsewhere is, "The life process is not 'free of physical causality,' in the sense that it can violate it. All of the physical aspects of an organism must conform to the requirements of their physical nature. In fact, if the physical aspects did not exactly conform to the laws of physics, the life process could not successfully use those physical aspects of the organism to sustain itself. The life process depends on the physical laws of causality not being violated."

What that means is the process depends on all of the physical aspects of the organism to act reliably. In fact, if the physical aspects are defective, the life process has difficulty performing its function--we refer to such conditions of an organism as "being sick." This is one example of how the life process cannot violate physical laws, it cannot cause something broken to behave as though it were not.

But the life process itself does not have to conform to any physical laws because no physical law pertains to the self-sustained process, because it has not physical attributes to which they could pertain. There is no physical law that pertains to how something is consciously perceived, or how the life process reacts to it. It is the nature of the life that determines that, not physical laws.

So I ask, in what sense is life free from physical causality, and yet obeys it concurrently. Can you give me an example?

I think I have answered this, but to make it explicit: life is free from physical causality because, in itself, as a self-sustained process, it has no physical attributes to which the physical laws pertain. It does not itself "obey" the laws of physics, but depends on the physical aspects of the organism it is the process of to be reliable and cannot cause the physical aspects of the organism to behave in any way that violates the laws of physics.

Regi

Post 22

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 - 4:58pm

Hi Regi
>I think we are actually in agreement...

The more I read you, the more I think this is the case.

>The problem of determinism does not arise if cause is viewed as embodied in the nature of existents rather than events, a mistake I think Popper makes.

I may have misunderstood you anyway; it appeared that you were talking about determinism of the Laplace style, with every future event "inherent" in and predictable from every past event, and vice versa. But I think you are actually talking about propensities, or possibilities, rather than certainties and I think I could agree with this. The mistake was probably mine: Popper actually doesn't take a very hard line on this question; quite sensibly, because there is not a very hard one to take at this point in our understanding! But he rejects radical determinism of all stripes, along with radical indeterminism.

>(Rand) definitely conflated the physical and material (existence), which is the usual view.

Yes. I think this is because she is (rightly) suspicious of appeals to the supernatural suggested by a non-physical status. Many scientists feel the same way, and end up unwittingly in a strong determinism. But ultimately this is a blunder; I think an emotional reaction rather than a rational one.

Glad you can see my point about Rand's comment in the iOE. I rather think it is a critical one, as it has clear implications for the mind/brain controversy.

- Daniel

Post 23

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 - 7:01pm

G.

Thanks for your comments. I think we now have a full spectrum of views on this thread from the extreme physicalist (yours) to the mystical (definitely not mine).

I have a couple of comments now, but your post deserves more, which I intend to provide.

You said: This is why the "mind-body" dichotomy is absolutely flawed; though the nature of mental and fysical processes possesses perhaps a greater degree of distinction than that between moving a limb and moving one's tongue, all of these involve fysical processes and would be impossible absent these processes. Thus, to establish mutually exclusive sferes for "mental" and "fysical" activities is, as Ayn Rand rightly realized, unjustified.

Ayn Rand never used the expression, "mind-body dichotomy," as far as I know. The expression she used frequently was, "soul-body dichotomy," which she was fervently opposed to.

The, "dichotomy," she was opposed to was not the fact that the "soul" (by which she meant human consciousness) and "body" are two different things, but that they are wrongly thought to be in opposition to one another. For example:

"They have cut man in two, setting one half against the other. They have taught him that his body and his consciousness are two enemies engaged in deadly conflict, two antagonists of opposite natures, contradictory claims, incompatible needs, that to benefit one is to injure the other..." ["Galt's Speech", For the New Intellectual, Page 138.]

But Ayn Rand recognized the physical (material organism) and consciousness were not the same thing.

"You are an indivisible entity of matter and consciousness. Renounce your consciousness and you become a brute. Renounce your body and you become a fake." ["Galt's Speech", For the New Intellectual, Page 142.]

Of course if conscious were only physical matter as you maintain, we would not be entities of matter and conscious, we would simply be entities of matter.

"The day when [one] grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has�and this is his birth as a human being." ["Galt's Speech", For the New Intellectual, Page 156.]

You must believe Rand was mistaken here, since you believe matter does have volition, sometimes, since volition is an aspect of consciousness (the faculty of conscious choice) and you answered Mr. Barnes' question about whether you regard consciousness as purely physical, "with a resounding, 'Yes!'"

(More to come. Thanks again!)

Regi

Post 24

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 - 7:21pm

Hi Bill,

Very interesting post.

However, if there is anything to string theory, the Big Bang model might be replaced by the Big Slam which posits that our universe (or "brane" in Big Slam parlance) undergoes a continuous cycle of growth and decay as it collides with other branes. Under this hypothesis, our universe is always changing, but it always was and always will be.

Strings, (mem)branes, not for me. I'm working on a theory of blobs which will replace the Big Bang, and Big Slam, with the Big Belch.

After all, if everything started from the expansion of a singularity and the laws of physics are perfectly consistent, then how did any two pieces of matter ever overcome the uniform pull of gravity to attract each other and form the first clump of stuff?

Well, explosions are notoriously messy, I suppose.

Seriously, one of the problems with philosophy today is the mistake of attempting to answer philosophical questions with the discoveries of science. It usually involves the reification of abstract concepts which are then treated as facts of material existence at the perceptual level. A very bad mistake.

Thanks!

Regi

Post 25

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 - 7:24pm

Good grief! Daniel, how can I argue with you if you agree to everything.

Thanks for the nice and interesting comments.

Regi

Post 26

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 - 8:06pm

Hi Regi,

You summarize that

... life is free from physical causality because, in itself, as a self-sustained process, it has no physical attributes to which the physical laws pertain. It does not itself "obey" the laws of physics, but depends on the physical aspects of the organism it is the process of to be reliable and cannot cause the physical aspects of the organism to behave in any way that violates the laws of physics.

So it is a combination of the life process and the properties of the material of which the organism is composed which determines how the organism acts?

More specifically, the life process has only one imperative, which is to preserve itself. However, since it is an action upon matter, it cannot use any means necessary to do this, but must act within the bounds of laws which govern the behavior of matter.

My next question is more of an issue of clarification: which aspects of the material which the life process acts upon is the life process allowed to influence? May the life process move a particle of matter in a certain direction that it was not moving before? I suppose the life process may not decompose the matter upon which it acts into its constituent particles in order to pass through a solid object, violating the strong force, or dissolves the mass of its particles, allowing the organism to fly (convenient as these things would be :) ).

If, in fact, this is an accurate gauge of what the life process can and cannot do, what is the difference between the unmotivated movement of a particle and the disbanding of the strong force and gravity?

Nate

Post 27

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 4:54am

Regi wrote:
>Good grief! Daniel, how can I argue with you if you agree to everything?

I will try harder to be disagreeable in future...;-)

- Daniel

Post 28

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 7:31am

Hi Nate,

I think your understanding of my summary is correct. It is not the way I would have worded it, so down the road, if there is a question about what I meant, I will refer to may own summary.

The question you characterized as, "more of an issue of clarification," is actually one of the most significant of ontological questions.

... which aspects of the material which the life process acts upon is the life process allowed to influence? May the life process move a particle of matter in a certain direction that it was not moving before? I suppose the life process may not decompose the matter upon which it acts into its constituent particles in order to pass through a solid object, violating the strong force, or dissolves the mass of its particles, allowing the organism to fly (convenient as these things would be :) ).

Yes, that would be convenient, but, as my grandmother always said, "if wishes were horses, beggars would ride." I'm afraid we're stuck with reality as it is, and so is the life process.

The question you are asking is the perennial question of philosophy about volition, "how does a conscious choice affect what the physical organism does?" The question incorrectly implies that volition in some way overrides the physically determined behavior of the material aspects of the organism. The answer is in the nature of life itself.

Until now there is one aspect of the nature of life and organisms always implied but which I have not made explicit. The implied difficulty with consciousness being able to "change" what matter does is the result of viewing the physical aspects of an organism and the life of the organism is separate and distinct things. They are different things, but not separate things.

It is at this point my computer analogy introduced here, #84 and expanded somewhat here #88, breaks down. The analogy is useful for illustrating how life (the program) is dependent on the physical organism (the computer) but not determined by the laws of physics itself. But the unique aspect of the life process and physical organism is that an organism ceases to be an organism without the life process, while a computer is still a computer, whether there is a program running on it or not.

An organism is not just a piece of complex matter with a process running on or in it. An organism is an integration of material substance and a process that maintains it as an organism. All that an organism does, as an organism, it does because it is living. The life process, as a process of the organism, is a purely physical process, obeying all the laws of physics, and requires the physical organism to function. One of the requirements of the life process (determined by its nature) is it must maintain the integrity of the physical organism it is the life of.

It is this integrated nature of an organism that makes the behavior of an organism unique. As a physical entity, it is still subject to the laws of physics. A fish being pushed around by the currents and eddies in a stream is a purely physical reaction. That same fish swimming against the current exhibits living behavior. The behavior itself is a physical action, but it is not the physical nature of the organism that initiates or makes possible that behavior, but the life process. If it were not for that process the fish would not be a living organism capable of that unique behavior we call living behavior, such as swimming.

I would like to go on and explain more how this lays the groundwork for understanding the nature of consciousness and volition, but you can probably see where this logically leads in any case, and this post is already too long.

This should, at least, answer the specific question you asked.

"It's your deal."

Regi

Post 29

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 12:58pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes wrote: I do not see how this avoids at very least a strong determinism. For example, the integrated sum of the physical elements of a clock still ends up telling you the time predictably. The problem seems to occur when you introduce the idea of "self-directing", which, as far as I can see has little direct relationship to "integrated sums" of physical components.

But avoid a strong determinism this indeed can. The clock, however complex, requires an external agency to set it in motion initially (and to bring it about). Life requires no such external stimulus. It originated from deterministic interactions of particles, but, once it came about, it assumed qualities beyond those sheerly deterministic interactions. Mr. Firehammer made the apt point that life cannot violate the laws of fysics. This would only follow in the case where life were based entirely on the fysical world and the interactions of its components. The lower-order organisms are indeed more deterministic than not, as their genome prescribes a given course of action which they attempt follow regardless of changing circumstances (as they are usually well adapted to one environment or a very narrow range thereof). However, 45000 years ago, just as life once arose out of non-life, so did volition evolve (via a fortunate genetic mutation) in entities whose ancestors did not exhibit it. The result was the human consciousness. According to my model, the responses, thoughts, and movements of a human organism are all results of chemical/electrical interactions, however, the consciousness is a delocalized component of the organism which can direct these interactions to occur, triggering, for example, certain thoughts, just as it can trigger the transformation of a slab of rock into a statue. The consciousness is not found in any one place; it exists in the entirety of the brain, in the spinal cord, in the neurons that transmit signals throughout the body-- all of these are fysical, and all of these interact together in a brings about a unified perception of the external world on the part of the resultant human being. This integrated entity is capable of controlling its own functions and wielding, within the bounds of the laws of fysics, the elements of the external world.

Mr. Barnes then pointed out the following: Hold on, Mr Stolyarov. What do you mean by "fysical *at least in part*"? If everything is purely "fysical" as you resoundingly confirm, what could the other "part" possibly be?

Very well, I need to clarify my meaning. A more apt term to describe it would be "everything is fysical to a certain degree," that is, everything that exists has a fysical existence. This existence can be relatively small and inconspicuous, such as a single action potential across a neuron, or it can be immense, such as a skyscraper or a planet. I had meant to state that a skyscraper subsumes a greater quantity of fysical matter than does the action potential. Yet there is nothing otherworldly or "ethereal" about either existent. The "fysical existence" of an entity is quantifiable in terms of matter; it can also be evaluated by other criteria, in terms of complexity of interaction, etc.

Mr. Barnes then asks: So you would say that concepts are purely physical too?
A concept is a quality with the specific measurements omitted, so as to be applicable to a given range of existents. Yet, the concept "green" does represent light of a certain wavelength, the concept "freedom" represents certain activities that are unimpeded by others (i.e. a very complex integrated sum of the interactions, or lack thereof, of many volitionally conscious entities, that specifically comes about only in the state known as "freedom"). The concept needs not have specific measurements attached to be linked inextricably with the fysical world; its usage is, in any given instance, bound to some measurements, but the range of these can vary.

Therefore, a concept refers to fysical existents. But even the very act of thinking of it involves fysical interactions within the brain, so, there, it has a fysical existence, too.

I would challenge you to give me any legitimate abstraction and have me explain how it can be explained entirely in terms of the fysical reality.

Mr. Barnes asks a final question: Or do you mean to say concepts *are* simply a sum or product - albeit an extremely complex one - of certain electrical and chemical activities of the human brain?

I mean to say that the concept is an integrated sum of both the processes that the human mind uses to attain them and the actual qualities of existents they denote. This is the link between external reality and the validity of human perception thereof. As Rand wrote in IOE, and Peikoff reiterated in OPAR, it is a deadly dichotomy to perceive concepts as purely external or purely internal constructs. The fact is, they are integrations furnished by the (fysical) mind of the perceiver, but nevertheless describe actual (fysical) fenomena that often occur outside his mind (though nothing prevents him from using concepts to describe the functions of his own mind, either).

More is to come.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 30

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 1:25pm

Greetings again.

Citizen Rat mentioned the shortcomings of the Miller-Urey experiment in recreating precisely the conditions present on the early Earth. I have indeed encountered similar analyses in the past, and a substantial portion of evolutionary biology post-1953 has been concerned with the precise circumstances under which life actually formed, which may well be different from and more complex than the Miller-Urey model suggests.

Nevertheless, the findings of the experiment were invaluable as a key to understanding that life can indeed arise from non-life and undermining vitalism decisively. Moreover, the endeavor showed that even a very simple set of conditions can facilitate the genesis of organic molecules, which was an immensely promising confirmation for evolution theorists that life could have come about without an intelligent creator entity involved.

I will address Mr. Firehammer's post when I have my Rand books beside me, as I would like to look at the passages he referenced and cite additional parts to support my case.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 31

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 2:18pm

Hi, Regi.

You remarked: >>Seriously, one of the problems with philosophy today is the mistake of attempting to answer philosophical questions with the discoveries of science. It usually involves the reification of abstract concepts which are then treated as facts of material existence at the perceptual level. A very bad mistake.<<

This is true. People often forget, or don't understand, that a device like the Big Bang to describe the history of the universe is not so much a model of what happened as it is an allusion. It is a simplification that allows scientists to conveniently organize and relate an extremely complex set of observations. That is all that it is, and it's useful so long as adherence to this allusion does not contradict observation, which now seems to be happening with all the oddball things that have to be bolted onto the Big Bang model to keep it working.

People, however, do get attached to their models. Similarly, Renaissance scholars kept adding epicycles within epicycles to the Ptolemaic model of the solar system to keep it consistent with observation. And it worked when it came to producing astonomical almanacs. However, the Ptolemaic model eventually had to give way because only by constant modification could it accord with observation. Today people are quite content with the Copernican model of the solar system, largely unaware that the Keplerian model (Kepler replaced Copernicus's circular orbits with elliptical ones) is the better one.

People like concretes. So, they do get attached to their reification of ideas, if only because that is how they learned to organize complex sets of facts -- which is no small thing. How bad of mistake this is? I don't know. If you are using a model as shorthand for completing a quick-and-dirty task, aware of the fact that it will not account for the fullness of what you may later need to deal with -- well, we all use shortcuts.

But when it comes to a larger issue, such as not realizing that philosophy must cast a much wider net than science in the quest for the truth -- that is a serious mistake. Which is why I have been taking Objectivist metaphysics to task for what I perceive as scientism, or the restriction of valid knowledge to that which can be quantified, tested, and falsified.

Regards,
Bill a.k.a. Citizen Rat

Post 32

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 2:23pm

Mr Stolyarov wrote:
>But avoid a strong determinism this indeed can. The clock, however complex, >requires an external agency to set it in motion initially (and to bring it about). Life requires no such external stimulus. It originated from deterministic interactions of particles, but, once it came about, it assumed qualities beyond those sheerly deterministic interactions.

We agree on this, I believe. However:

>Mr. Firehammer made the apt point that life cannot violate the laws of fysics.

In this point a clearer distinction needs to be made. While the *physical body* of the organism must obey the laws of physics, *consciousness* cannot obey the laws of physics( ie: must be non-physical); or, if it does obey them, then we must admit the strong deterministic hypothesis is correct.

There are no two ways about it.

>This would only follow in the case where life were based entirely on the fysical world and the interactions of its components. The lower-order organisms are indeed more deterministic than not, as their genome prescribes a given course of action which they attempt follow regardless of changing circumstances (as they are usually well adapted to one environment or a very narrow range thereof). However, 45000 years ago, just as life once arose out of non-life, so did volition evolve (via� a�fortunate genetic mutation) in entities whose ancestors did not exhibit it. The result was�the human consciousness.�

This is, I think, not a bad theory, and not far in principle from what I think too. Though I would change the emphasis slightly from "based entirely on the physical world" to "originating entirely from the physical world"

>According to my model, the�responses, thoughts, and movements of a human organism are all results of chemical/electrical�interactions,�however, the consciousness is a delocalized component of the organism which can�direct these interactions to occur, triggering, for example, certain thoughts, just as it can trigger the transformation of a slab of rock into a statue. The consciousness is not found in any one place; it exists in the entirety of the brain, in the spinal cord, in the neurons that transmit signals throughout the body-- all of these are fysical, and all of these interact together in a brings about a unified perception of the external world on the part of the resultant human being. This integrated entity is capable of controlling its own functions and wielding, within the bounds of the laws of fysics, the elements of the external world.

OK. Here's where I think things come unstuck. What I tried to demonstrate with the clock analogy is that the mere "integration" of physical elements is not sufficient to escape physical determinism. You replied, correctly, that it requires an "outside agency" in order to construct it, and set the clock in motion, and this is precisely my point (I would take this point even further, and say it requires an "outside agency" to even understand what the clock is saying) .

It appears far too much is invested in this word "intregation". When I integrate 2 and 2 I get 4. A clock is the sum of its integrated the physical elements. The act of integration adds nothing according the strict physicalist perspective. Now you may reply in turn that, unlike the clock, life is a "special" integration of physical elements that is somehow more than the sum of it parts. To which I would agree, but then gently point out that by saying this you have not solved the mystery at all, *but only moved it back a step*, as we must now debate as to why some particular integrations of physical elements (water, carbon, calcium, various metals etc etc etc) are alive, and the clock is not. (Of course, the hardcore physicalists must ultimately hold that we all are just as dead as the clock - only much more elaborately so!!)

I think it is far easier to give up all that and simply admit that consciousness exists, and that while it is clearly dependent upon physical structures, it is *non-physical* itself . I think that's what you're reaching towards anyway, it's just you've got yourself a little turned around inside the terminology (which is admittedly vague anyway). The passage below demonstrates this again, where you replace the idea of everything being physical "in part" with the idea that everything is physical "to a certain degree":

>Mr. Barnes then pointed out the following: Hold on, Mr Stolyarov. What do you mean by "fysical *at least in part*"? If everything is purely "fysical" as you resoundingly confirm, what could the other "part" possibly be?
>Very well, I need to clarify my meaning. A more apt term to describe it would be "everything is fysical to a certain degree," that is, everything that exists has a fysical existence.

I must confess the difference between these two positions escapes me. The only thing it does clarify, however, is just how hard it is to maintain the physicalist position when you really start to examine it!

>A concept is�a quality with the specific measurements omitted, so as to be applicable to a�given range of�existents.�

I'll return to this part of the topic shortly, as this post is long enough for now!

- Daniel

Post 33

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 2:40pm

Hello, Mr. Stolyarov.

You stated regarding the Miller-Urey experiment: >>Nevertheless, the findings of the experiment were invaluable as a key to understanding that life can indeed arise from non-life and undermining vitalism decisively.<<

I must quibble again, because all the experiment showed was that some of the amino acids necessary to the simplest organisms could form from non-organic materials. The fact remains that fifty years later we still do not have any clear idea of how life arose from non-life. We are having problems getting from amino acids to RNA and again making the leap from RNA to DNA.

But it is a fascinating mystery, and I am not pointing these problems out as an argument against the proposition that life evolved from non-life (or as Regi might put it, life in another form). However, the obstacles science is facing to prove this happened are serious and leave room for a sufficiently sophisticated vitalism or intelligent design theories. So, I think it is best to recognize the present deficiencies of science in this area, if science is to retain its credibility as the best means to solving this mystery of how life arose on this planet.

Regards,
Bill a.k.a. Citizen Rat

Post 34

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 7:32pm

Greetings,

I shall now respond to Mr. Firehammer's post with evidence of my own.

On p. 138 of The New Intellectual, Rand writes:
"A body without a soul is a corpse; a soul without a body is a ghost."

This is no way contradicts the earlier statements cited by Mr. Firehammer, but it further emfasizes the inextricability of consciousness from the fysical organism, and vice versa. There is no way to separate consciousness from the body, so why assume that it is made of a different, "ethereal" fabric, when science is beginning to unlock the secrets of brain functions and their interactions with the body?

When Rand referred to "matter" having no volition, I think she was using intellectual shorthand for "inanimate matter." This was a direct reference to the preconceptual savage's animistic notion that inanimate matter is infused with demon-like "spirits." Surely, she could not have meant that living things have no volition, simply because they, too, are composed of matter. My brain has quite a volition (and it probably weighs a lot, too!).

Mr. Firehammer stated: "Ayn Rand never used the expression, "mind-body dichotomy," as far as I know. The expression she used frequently was, "soul-body dichotomy," which she was fervently opposed to."

Peikoff, in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, addresses the "mind-body dichotomy" by that name numerous times. With regard to the proponents of that dichotomy, he characterizes their mindset: "... my dream vs. the actual which thwarts it; or the inner vs. the outer; or value vs. fact; or the moral vs. the practical. The broadest name of the dichotomy is the 'spiritual realm vs. the 'material' realm." (p. 29)

"The theory of a mind-body conflict, which has corrupted every branch and issue of [filosofy], does have its root in a real conflict, but of a special kind. Its root is a breach between some men's consciousnesss and existence..." (p. 29)- a mild breach would be claiming that consciousness exhibits no fysical existence in itself.

Peikoff addresses the origins of the theory-practice dichotomy in the mind-body dichotomy: "The theory-practice dichotomy is itself a theory; its source is a breach between concepts and percepts. Given such a breach, thought comes to be viewed as pertaining to one world (the world of Platonic Forms, or of Kantian '[fenomena],' or of linguistic constructs), while action is viewed as pertaining to the opposite world (the world of concretes, or of things-in-themselves, or of empirical data)." (p. 148)- Once again a split between the material and the "ideal" is permitted in those who wield the theory-practice dichotomy.

"The axioms of [filosofy], however, cannot be sundered. There is no consciousness without existence and no knowledge of existence without consciousness." (p. 149)- Once again, the inextricable link.

Moreover, Peikoff claims that, though explaining consciousness materially is not necessary in its filosofical understanding per se, it does not exclude free will or the nature of consciousness. "Even if someday, consciousness were explained scientifically as a product of [fysical] conditions, this would not alter any observed fact. It would not alter the fact that, given those conditions, the attributes and functions of consciousness are what they are. Nor would it alter the fact that in many respect these attributes and functions are unique; they are different from anything observed in unconscious entities. Nor would it alter the fact that one can discover the conditions of consciousness, as of anything else one seeks to know, only through the exercise of consciousness." (p. 35).

I will be on a business trip the next two days and will likely lack Internet access. Nevertheless, I will certainly write more afterward, and will await your responses.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

(Edited by G. Stolyarov II on 4/29, 7:34pm)

Post 35

Thursday, April 29, 2004 - 9:04pm

Mr Stolyarov quotes Peikoff:
"Even if someday, consciousness were explained scientifically as a product of [fysical] conditions, this would not alter any observed fact. It would not alter the fact that, given those conditions, the attributes and functions of consciousness are what they are. Nor would it alter the fact that in many respect these attributes and functions are unique; they are different from anything observed in unconscious entities. Nor would it alter the fact that one can discover the conditions of consciousness, as of anything else one seeks to know, only through the exercise of consciousness." (p. 35).

Funnily enough, Peikoff seems to have forgotten the whole point here: which is that those very conditions, attributes, and functions of consciousness - and indeed its very exercise itself - will, from that "someday" forth, no longer be able to be considered even to the slightest extent as being "free".

- Daniel

Post 36

Friday, April 30, 2004 - 9:03am

Daniel:

Funnily enough, Peikoff seems to have forgotten the whole point here: which is that those very conditions, attributes, and functions of consciousness - and indeed its very exercise itself - will, from that "someday" forth, no longer be able to be considered even to the slightest extent as being "free".

Why?

Post 37

Friday, April 30, 2004 - 9:56am

Bill,

Thanks for your interesting comments on reification, etc.

We are mostly agreed on these points, at least.

Along that line, I posted this on another thread, I believe:

One of the earliest examples of this [reification] is the notion of a field. The concept originally developed as a way of describing observed phenomena of magnetic and electromagnetic effects (a current is induced in a wire when it moves through a magnetic field), but is now extended to all physical phenomena.

As a way of picturing the math, a field is an excellent concept. But a field is... only a model. But the concept has been reified (hypostatized), and is generally treated in physics as though fields were material existents, like some kind of amorphous substance that permeates everything. Matter is now viewed as nothing more than perturbations in the "field" of the "space-time continuum."

Science now presents these reifications of concepts which only describe the nature of observed phenomena as the, "really real world," relegating the entities of existence they are meant to describe, the galaxies, stars, planets, people, rocks, and, to use Ayn Rand's example, "lipsticks," to a kind of illusion produced by the "fields" of physics. This view of science has reached a level of mysticism that would make any Hindu or Muslim proud.

Regi

Post 38

Friday, April 30, 2004 - 10:20am

Mr. Stolyarov,
and Nate, Daniel, Michael, Bill,

Thanks, G. for the interesting and detailed response. Except for the fact that our language is different and I attempt to explain some of these concepts that you simply state are true, I do not think we are as far apart as it may seem. I am going to answer you, and conclude what I have to say about the nature of life by referring you to Post 21 and Post 28on this thread, originally addressed to Nate; and, I include below an extract from an as yet unpublished work on Ontology.

[Note: I make a distinction between the meaning of material and physical, meaning by material all that exists independently of anyone's knowledge or consciousness and is the metaphysically given, and meaning by physical that subset of material existence we are directly conscious of (see, feel, hear, smell, and taste) and which is the subject of the physical sciences.]

Cause, Determinism, and Life

If the material universe is to be knowable it must conform to some set of principles (laws) that are universal (apply to everything) and eternal (all the time), and those laws and principles must be discoverable and understandable. But, if the nature of material existence conforms to principles which cannot be violated, everything is determined by those laws or principles. If the human mind is only an aspect of material existence, it is determined (that is, its function) by the same laws or principles that govern all material existents and events, and our supposed ideas or thoughts or knowledge are only naturally occurring events with no more meaning than a dead tree falling or a burp.

This has been a great problem in philosophy and has lead to some great errors. One of the greatest errors is the assumption that the conclusion is correct, that thoughts, knowledge, and even choice are all only physically natural occurring events, with no real meaning. All our supposed knowledge and "free choice," is an illusion. This is essentially the position of behaviorism, for example.

This is a gross logical fallacy, denying the implicit premise it rests on. It says, in essence, "it is possible to know if real knowledge is possible," and contradictory concludes, "real knowledge is not possible." Of course, if real knowledge were not possible, it would be impossible to really know it. Objectivists call this an example of the fallacy of the stolen concept. The question is not if knowledge and volition are possible in a determined physical world, but how they are possible. That they are possible we already know or we would not be able to ask the question.

The supposed dilemma between determinism and volition is a misunderstanding of the nature of life. All causes and all affects are determined by the nature of the entities acting. If life, consciousness, and volition arose from the behavior of physical matter, volition would not be possible; but life is a distinct attribute of material existence.

All physical entities have, for example, the qualities, position, motion, and acceleration. Motion is defined as a, "change in position," and and acceleration is defined as a, "change in motion," (either its direction or rate). If we consider only positional qualities and attempt to produce motion by arranging the position of entities, no matter how complex the arrangement, motion will never arise. To have motion requires another level of, "differentiation," called "change." In the same way, if we consider only motional qualities and attempt to produce acceleration by arranging the positions and motions of entities, no matter how complex the arrangement, no acceleration will ever arise. To produce acceleration we again have to introduce another level of differentiation, again, change.

In the same sense that accelerating entities have all the qualities of position and motion, but no arrangement of position or motion can produce acceleration and no acceleration violates any qualities of position or motion, life has all the qualities of physical material existents and does not violate any of those qualities, but no arrangement of physical extents or substances can produce life.

Life is unique differentiation of material existence with its own qualities and attributes. In examining living organisms, all we can learn about them by direct observation is their physical nature. Since life and its qualities do not "arise" from, nor are produced by, the physical laws, but is a unique "differentiation," of material existence, life itself cannot be directly observed. Our knowledge of life comes from two other sources, our observation of living entities and our own introspection.

We know a great deal about the physical nature of living entities (organisms) from the study of them directly. For example, we know there are specific biochemical structures required for an organism to be living (the existence of which do not automatically produce life, however). The physical structure and chemical (especially the genetic) makeup of an organism determines the physical limits and requirements of that organism and the life of that organism must be manifested within those limits.

So, the physical nature of organisms define the limits and requirements, but also provide the means for the life process. The, "physical plant," is like the instrument or tool on which life plays. It must play on something and that something provides the means for the life to fulfill itself.

But life is not separate from the organism, it is an aspect of it. It is an aspect of a physical entity, but not a physical aspect. Life is that unique process of the entity that differentiates it from a non-living entity and causes the entity to be an organism, and both the purpose and result of the process is the continuation of the organism as a living organism. Life is the "differentiation" that distinguishes living organisms from "dead" physical matter.

The ontological answer is, while all the behavior of all physical (non-living) entities is determined entirely by the laws of physics, the behavior of living, conscious, and volitional beings is determined by their nature, which as physical entities, cannot violate any law of physics, but as living entities is not limited or determined by those physical laws. That behavior which is strictly "living" behavior is not determined by the laws of physics, but the laws that govern the nature of life itself; that behavior which is, "conscious," is not determined by the laws of physics or life, but the laws that govern the nature of consciousness itself; and, that behavior which is volitional is not determined by the laws of physics or life or consciousness, but by the laws that govern the nature of volition itself.

Regi

(Edited by Reginald Firehammer on 5/01, 5:45pm)

Post 39

Friday, April 30, 2004 - 11:51am