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I'm not sure about the repeatable measurements. I need to do more thinking in this area. I know that working up an initial theory may have nothing in it that is a repeatable measurement, but that initial theorizing is integral to the scientific process.
Didn't it take a number of years before anyone was able to come up with ways to measure some of Einstein's theories of relativity? Yet what he was doing, all in his head, or the back of an envelope, was science.
The modern understanding of science is taken to be "...a systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe." The key word there is "testable"... at some point it must be testable.
But the older understanding - the one Aristotle worked with was that "science refers to the body of reliable knowledge itself, of the type that can be logically and rationally explained."" That view requires the knowledge to be logical, rational, and reliable but not testable. (Quotes pulled from the Wikipedia article on 'Science')
"Aristotle maintained the sharp distinction between science and the practical knowledge of artisans, treating theoretical speculation as the highest type of human activity... Aristotle's influential emphasis was upon the "theoretical" steps of deducing universal rules from raw data, and did not treat the gathering of experience and raw data as part of science itself." [Emphasis mine, from same Wikipedia article]
The move away from Aristotle towards a much more experimental science was good in that it incorporated the repeatable measurements - the tests of the theory. But I suspect that this was also the time where our grasp of the nature of causality, and identity were made fuzzier.
I liked this quote from that Wikipedia article, "...in his book Consilience, EO Wilson said 'The human condition is the most important frontier of the natural sciences.' " I agree, and currently that frontier is very lawless :-)
I can see that none of these observations is very helpful in distinguishing science from philosophy, or any other bodies of knowledge, which is a reasonable goal. But I don't think that a requirement for experimentation is adequate, and I'm not sure about "repeatable measurements."
Quite a hodge-podge: Science, natural science, physical science, social sciences, hard sciences, soft sciences, empirical sciences, academic studies, experimental science, science as a body of knowledge, science as a method (scientific method), formal science, applied science, basic science, pseudo-science, junk science, fringe science, scientific misconduct, cargo-cult science...
"Major advances in formal science have often led to major advances in the empirical sciences. The formal sciences are essential in the formation of hypotheses, theories, and laws, both in discovering and describing how things work (natural sciences) and how people think and act (social sciences)." [ibid]
Right now, at my current state of ignorance, I'd say that science is made up of a few different types of basic processes, and the first starts with a theory and then moves on to the second which would be the repeatable measurements stage. I'm not sure that all theories in science can make it to that second stage (I'm thinking about some aspects of psychology).
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