Hi Joe,

Thanks for the article.  Let me offer some comments on it, because it didn't resonate with me.  Perhaps I'm missing something.  You write:

Productiveness is the big virtue in my eyes. Obviously it is less important when artificially restricted to material wealth, which traditional Objectivist thought does. But when taking a wider view, productiveness is the virtue of taking action and achieving values.

I don't think this is a good definition of "productiveness."  Productiveness is not simply the virtue of taking action and achieving values.  It refers to a specific kind of action and a specific kind of value.  According to Rand, it's the "consciously chosen pursuit of a productive career."

How does one see productiveness as merely a part of rationality? Apparently, productivity relies on rationality to pursue wealth in life, and so is included as a kind of rationality. That connection is weak. Just because productivity requires rationality, does not make it an instance of rationality, nor a method of being rational.

I wouldn't characterize productiveness as "a part of rationality," although you could certainly say that being productive is rational.   I would say that the virtue of rationality is the source of the virtue of productiveness -- the source of man's others virtues.  It is the means by which one recognizes and identifies them as virtues.

For other virtues, you can see those virtues as means to achieve the end of rationality. Honesty, integrity, and independence are virtues that make rationality possible. They are an aspect of being rational, as actions taken for these virtues are actions taken to be rational.

It's not that the other virtues are a means of achieving the end of rationality, but rather that rationality is the means of identifying them as virtues.  It is not the other virtues that make rationality possible, but rationality that makes the other virtues possible.

But for productivity, the relationship is reversed. Rationality is a means of being productive. Rationality is a form of productiveness. The relationships are exactly opposite.

I wouldn't say that rationality is a means or a form of productiveness.  A means or a form of being productive is a particular career or profession like farming, construction or engineering.

And all of this seems to imply a mind-body dichotomy. It treats rationality as the underlying goal of the virtues, instead of the pursuit of values or life in general.

I don't follow you.  Rationality is not the underlying goal of the virtues, nor is it simply the pursuit of values or of life in general.  It's the means by which one recognizes and identifies the other virtues like honesty, productiveness, pride, etc.

I would address the rest of your article in a similar way, Joe.  Sorry to say, but I think you are misunderstanding the relationship between the virtue of rationality and the other virtues. 

In a way, I'm surprised that no one else has commented on your article. 

Quote from Ayn Rand: "Man has a single basic choice: to think or not, and that is the gauge of his virtue. Moral perfection is an unbreached rationality..."

And then there's: "These three values imply and require all of man’s virtues, and all his virtues pertain to the relation of existence and consciousness: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride."

And: "Rationality is man’s basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues."

The first quote outright declares rationality the standard of moral perfection, and the gauge of his virtue.  That quote is enough to point out a probable mind-body dichotomy.  The second quote declares that all virtues are focused on the relationship between consciousness and existence, which is rationality by another name.  And the third quote goes further by identify rationality as the basic virtue and source of all the others.

You can also read the longer description of rationality in the Ayn Rand Lexicon.  Let me quote extensively:

The virtue of Rationality means the recognition and acceptance of reason as one’s only source of knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide to action. It means one’s total commitment to a state of full, conscious awareness, to the maintenance of a full mental focus in all issues, in all choices, in all of one’s waking hours. It means a commitment to the fullest perception of reality within one’s power and to the constant, active expansion of one’s perception, i.e., of one’s knowledge. It means a commitment to the reality of one’s own existence, i.e., to the principle that all of one’s goals, values and actions take place in reality and, therefore, that one must never place any value or consideration whatsoever above one’s perception of reality. It means a commitment to the principle that all of one’s convictions, values, goals, desires and actions must be based on, derived from, chosen and validated by a process of thought—as precise and scrupulous a process of thought, directed by as ruthlessly strict an application of logic, as one’s fullest capacity permits. It means one’s acceptance of the responsibility of forming one’s own judgments and of living by the work of one’s own mind (which is the virtue of Independence). It means that one must never sacrifice one’s convictions to the opinions or wishes of others (which is the virtue of Integrity)—that one must never attempt to fake reality in any manner (which is the virtue of Honesty)—that one must never seek or grant the unearned and undeserved, neither in matter nor in spirit (which is the virtue of Justice).

Note that in the definition of rationality, she includes definitions for Independence, Integrity, Honesty, and Justice.  This is not suggesting that rationality is connected to these virtues simply by using reason to identify them.  This is saying that these virtues are a part of rationality.  Rationality is the big inclusive virtue, the standard of moral perfection, the gauge of moral virtue, the primary virtue, etc.  And these other virtues are specific aspects of rationality, more focused on specific areas, but still a kind of rationality.  Of course productiveness is missing, as is pride.  Those two do stick out.

And these quotes aren't alone.  Both Leonard Peikoff and Tara Smith take this premise and make it even clearer.  Orthodox Objectivism repeatedly upholds rationality as the primary virtue, the source of virtues, the gauge of virtue, the standard of moral perfection, etc., etc.  And even in longer descriptions of what the virtues mean, there is a focus on identification of reality, instead of on actually achieving values (the alleged purpose of virtues).

Of course, Objectivists also explicitly reject a mind-body dichotomy.  That doesn't mean they don't unintentionally accept it.  Or unintentionally accept an extreme bias towards the mind.  So when unbreached rationality is equated with moral perfection, you have to wonder why pursuing or achieving values is not included.  There is occasional lip service to actually acting on these identifications and using it to pursue values, but that's almost always an afterthought.  The primary focus is on thinking, identifying, and judging.

On the topic of productiveness,  I agree that Rand defined productiveness narrowly to "a pursuit of a productive career".  Even in Galt's speech, she ties productiveness to "work".  I agree that this is how she defines it, although I disagree with it.   I prefer to use the more widely accepted view of productiveness which views any successful achievement of value as being productive ("I had a productive day in the garden", "That conversation ended up being productive").  This should be a real virtue.  One that actually cares about achieving values instead of simply identifying them.  And it is with that meaning that I declare that productiveness should be the primary virtue, and that rationality is a means to that more important virtue.

Bill says: "Rationality is not the underlying goal of the virtues, nor is it simply the pursuit of values or of life in general.  It's the means by which one recognizes and identifies the other virtues like honesty, productiveness, pride, etc."

I disagree, with only a fraction of the evidence listed above.  But even here, rationality as a source doesn't make sense.  Rationality is a virtue.  Reason would be the means of identifying these virtues, not rationality.  However, saying rationality is the source of virtues does make sense if we see the other virtues as an aspect of rationality.

This sort of topic will usually end in arguing over what other people have said and what we think they meant.  I don't think we disagree on what Objectivism should be saying.  Even if Rand defined these with a bias towards mind over body, we wouldn't have to accept that as more fundamental than the fact that life is the moral standard and virtues are supposed to be a method of achieving values.  Of course, I've met many people calling themselves Objectivists who fully accept this mind-body dichotomy and view the virtues as being limited to only the mind.  These people focus on moral perfection, and that's only achievable when degrees don't matter.  And in value pursuit, degrees matter all the time.

But the purpose of this article is not to argue with those people, but to point out that they aren't coming out of nowhere.  The source material is riddled with the mind-body dichotomy, particularly in the discussions of virtues.  Recognizing this has benefits.  We can understand what assumptions were accepted that led to those errors/issues.  Once identified, we can more clearly argue against them, as well as seeing any other conclusions that unfortunately rest on the same assumptions.  And of course, with clarity we can propose an alternative that doesn't have these problems.  Then we can have a view of virtues that is truly aimed at life as the standard.

Thanks Bill.  Let me try to add a little clarity.

In this context, the mind-body dichotomy is a view of virtue being something you do in your head.  Yes, you're supposed to translate that to practice at some point, but the measure of moral virtue is all in the head.  This becomes clear when self-described Objectivists argue about moral perfection.  Moral perfection requires yes/no type of judgment.  Did you evade?  No.  Did you lie to yourself? No.  Did you subvert your own reasoning to follow someone else's conclusion blindly?  No.  Good...you're morally perfect.  But there's a reason why it stays in the mind.  When you put things into practice, it's no long so clear.  I can perfectly view you as a friend, and someone else as a threat.  But when I act on it, I may not treat you as well as you deserve, or I may not treat them as poorly as I could. 

But that is just trying to describe the intention behind keeping it in the mind, to add some clarity.  Really, the question is whether the virtue is measured in what you think, or in what you do.  If life were really the standard, virtue would be measured in terms of the values you achieve.  But with rationality as the primary virtue, virtue is measured in how you think.  And so is vice.  The greatest evil in objectivism is not murder or suicide.  It's evasion.

There is a second aspect to it, though.  Once the idea of virtue being in your head is accepted, the definition of each virtue becomes focuses primarily on what goes on in your head.  Justice becomes about recognizing good vs. evil.  Independence focuses on independence of judgment.  Honesty gets focused on intellectual honesty, or being honest with yourself.  Etc.  Each is understood as a kind of rationality.  Each is focused on properly identifying reality.  Each is focused on the mental component, and putting it into action is almost an afterthought.

For instance, I've argued that one of the key parts of independence as a virtue is in the ability to act on your judgment.  If you are in a situation where you are financially dependent on someone else, then you may be stuck accepting their judgment in practice, even if you don't accept it in your mind.  But there's nothing virtuous about knowing someone is wrong, but being stuck acting on their judgment anyway.  The focus on the mind ignores the need to put these into practice.

A virtue system that rejected this mind-body split would put an emphasis on productiveness (in the wider sense that I use it), with rationality as absolutely required for that.  Together, they would be "rational value pursuit".  But both legs are required to achieve virtue.  Reason without action would not be virtuous, and neither would action without reason.  Only the integration of the two would work.

And the other virtues would mirror this by incorporating action and reason.  Honesty would not be just about being honest with yourself. It would a focus on the real in general. It would be communicating honestly to others, living in a way that values truth over deception, etc.  Independence would include the intellectual independence, but would be coupled with the need to act on your own judgment and not just secretly disagree.  Justice would be focused on treating good people in your life well, and bad people poorly. It would focus on acting in a way to discourage evil actions, and encouraging good actions.

Michael Marotta wrote, The problem that I have with the above is the key passage quoted by Bill Dwyer: “Productive work” does not mean the unfocused performance of the motions of some job. It means the consciously chosen pursuit of a productive career, in any line of rational endeavor, great or modest, on any level of ability." Rand commits the fundamental error of defining word by using the word: productive work is consciously chosen productive career.

I don't think this is an error, if we bear in mind the full context of Rand's statement, viz:  “Productive work” does not mean the unfocused performance of the motions of some job. It means the consciously chosen pursuit of a productive career, in any line of rational endeavor, great or modest, on any level of ability. It is not the degree of a man’s ability nor the scale of his work that is ethically relevant here, but the fullest and most purposeful use of his mind."

In this statement, Rand is not seeking to provide a precise definition of the phrase "productive work," but rather a fleshed out explanation of what she means by the concept. According to her, productive work is not just any job however mindless and repetitive that one might perform, but the choice of a productive career that entails "the fullest and most purposeful use of one's mind."  In other words, Rand is saying that by "productive work," she's referring to a challenging career, not just to any job at which one earns money.  To be sure, if one were seeking to craft a definition of "productive work," it wouldn't suffice to define it as "being productive."  

Just to be clear, Rand does provide a definition:  "Productive work is the process by which man's consciousness controls his existence, a constant process of acquiring knowledge and shaping matter to fit one's purpose, of translating an idea into physical form." (For the New Intellectual, p. 130)

She then spins rationality into it. What is an irrational endeavor? How would she view high-wire performers or race car drivers? She enjoyed the humor of Professor Irwin Corey. Apparently, she considered comedy a rational endeavor and therefore a productive career.

I'd say that she would include entertainment as a productive career.  So a comedy act, a high-wire performance in a circus, race car driving for paying spectators, and professional athletics would all qualify as professional entertainment for which people pay money.  What then would she consider an "irrational endeavor"?  Probably, work that involves fraud and deception or the production and sale of narcotics to drug addicts, although I never heard her address specifically those issues, aside from stating that drugs should be legal.

Joe, thanks for clarifying.  I now understand the point you were making, although I don't think it accurately represents the Objectivist position on moral responsibility.

It is true that, according to Objectivism, you are morally responsible for your mental choices -- for choosing to think.  But you're also responsible for your actions insofar as they follow from your thinking or non-thinking.  As Nathaniel Branden wrote in the January 1964 issue of The Objectivist Newsletter:

"In the Objectivist theory of volition, a man is responsible for his actions, not because his actions are directly subject to his free will, but because they proceed from his values and premises, which in turn proceed from his thinking or non-thinking.  His actions are free because they are under the control of a faculty that is free -- i.e., that functions volitionally."

In other words, how you act is as important as how you think.  You ought to act a certain way, because you ought to think a certain way -- in both cases, rationally and responsibly.

You wrote, In this context, the mind-body dichotomy is a view of virtue being something you do in your head.  Yes, you're supposed to translate that to practice at some point, but the measure of moral virtue is all in the head.  

It's not all in your head.  It originates in your head, but it involves your action.

This becomes clear when self-described Objectivists argue about moral perfection.  Moral perfection requires yes/no type of judgment.  Did you evade?  No.  Did you lie to yourself? No.  Did you subvert your own reasoning to follow someone else's conclusion blindly?  No.  Good...you're morally perfect.  But there's a reason why it stays in the mind.  When you put things into practice, it's no long so clear.  I can perfectly view you as a friend, and someone else as a threat.  But when I act on it, I may not treat you as well as you deserve, or I may not treat them as poorly as I could. 

The question here is whether I've treated you poorly due to an error of knowledge or an error of morality.  For example, suppose I were to hit a child who darts unexpectedly in front of my car, not allowing me time to stop, versus hitting her because I'm driving recklessly and not paying attention.  In the first case, I did a very bad thing materially, hitting an innocent child, but no one would say that I am morally responsible for hitting her and am therefore liable for my action.  In the second case, I did a very bad thing morally, and am liable for my action.  What is the difference?  My mental actions -- my choice to pay attention to my driving, on the one hand, and not to pay attention to it, on the other.  In both cases, my actions are materially bad, but only in the second case, are they morally bad.  Would anyone say that recognizing this distinction is to be guilty of a mind-body dichotomy?!

There is a second aspect to it, though.  Once the idea of virtue being in your head is accepted, the definition of each virtue becomes focuses primarily on what goes on in your head.  Justice becomes about recognizing good vs. evil.  Independence focuses on independence of judgment.  Honesty gets focused on intellectual honesty, or being honest with yourself.  Etc.  Each is understood as a kind of rationality.  Each is focused on properly identifying reality.  Each is focused on the mental component, and putting it into action is almost an afterthought.

I wouldn't say that it's almost an afterthought.  Clearly, it makes a difference what you do, which is why its important how you think.

For instance, I've argued that one of the key parts of independence as a virtue is in the ability to act on your judgment.  If you are in a situation where you are financially dependent on someone else, then you may be stuck accepting their judgment in practice, even if you don't accept it in your mind.  But there's nothing virtuous about knowing someone is wrong, but being stuck acting on their judgment anyway.  The focus on the mind ignores the need to put these into practice.

If you're in a position where you can't put your thoughts into practice, the fact that you would put them into practice if you could is immaterial.  It really doesn't bear on the issue we're discussing.  It makes no sense to say that you're "acting on their judgment," if you're unable to do otherwise. 

A virtue system that rejected this mind-body split would put an emphasis on productiveness (in the wider sense that I use it), with rationality as absolutely required for that.  Together, they would be "rational value pursuit".  But both legs are required to achieve virtue.  Reason without action would not be virtuous, and neither would action without reason.  Only the integration of the two would work.

Again, this mischaracterizes the Objectivist position.  Of course, reason without action would not be virtuous, but it wouldn't be "reason" if it weren't acted upon.  The purpose of thought is action.  Rational action follows from rational thought.  There is no mind-body split in Objectivism in the sense that you're describing it.

And the other virtues would mirror this by incorporating action and reason.  Honesty would not be just about being honest with yourself. It would a focus on the real in general. It would be communicating honestly to others, living in a way that values truth over deception, etc.  Independence would include the intellectual independence, but would be coupled with the need to act on your own judgment and not just secretly disagree.  Justice would be focused on treating good people in your life well, and bad people poorly. It would focus on acting in a way to discourage evil actions, and encouraging good actions.

Yes, it would.  Rand never said that honesty is just about being honest with yourself.  Here is how she describes it:

Honesty is the recognition of the fact that the unreal is unreal and can have no value, that neither love nor fame nor cash is a value if obtained by fraud—that an attempt to gain a value by deceiving the mind of others is an act of raising your victims to a position higher than reality, where you become a pawn of their blindness, a slave of their non-thinking and their evasions, while their intelligence, their rationality, their perceptiveness become the enemies you have to dread and flee—that you do not care to live as a dependent, least of all a dependent on the stupidity of others, or as a fool whose source of values is the fools he succeeds in fooling—that honesty is not a social duty, not a sacrifice for the sake of others, but the most profoundly selfish virtue man can practice: his refusal to sacrifice the reality of his own existence to the deluded consciousness of others. (Ayn Rand Lexicon, online: http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/honesty.html)

Joe, I appreciate your willingness to discuss this issue as you have, but as you can see, I disagree that the Objectivist view of virtue is as you've characterized it.  I don't see that it entails any kind of a mind-body dichotomy.

Virtues are means, not ends.  Saying rationality is the fundamental virtue means it is the fundamental means.  It is the means to other virtues, not the purpose of other virtues, and not a general category that includes all other virtues.

Ayn Rand has made clear that rationality includes acting on ones rational conclusions, not just reaching them.

Steve, 

I was responding to the original article by Joseph Rowlands that started this thread.  Sorry I didn't make that clearer.