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I reject this view of morality, and it's view of principles as moral edicts or rules. I view principles as a kind of knowledge. It is a kind of wide-reaching generalization. A moral principle is the recognition of an important causal relationship that connects our actions to expected results. It's an awareness, not a requirement.

Thanks for a very thought-provoking post. I think that the worst example of this is when a person does something that harms them or their family, yet they take pride in it because they acted in a principled way. Often (hopefully) that sort of contradiction will smack the person hard enough to re-evaluate their philosophy. I am glad that the ideas on this site have always stressed that principles (and philosophy in general) are only of value if they are rooted in your quest for happiness. If you find philosophy is making your life less enjoyable, you're doing something wrong!

Post 1

Thursday, January 23, 2014 - 8:29pm

'Principle' is a work people use when they want to lend a philosophical-sounding justification to what they want to do. As such, it's a cover-story-- not philosophy.`

It also seems that 'principle' is a bunker term, or a statement that one makes when a decision is not up for discussion. It's as if 'principles themself were deeply personal--some sort of metaphysical toothbrush, as it were.

Kant, in his age, saw lots of principle-mongering, too. There were two powerful churches to contend with, as well as divine right of kings, princes, and anyone else who could nail a coat of arms on their door. All relied upon 'principle' to maintain power.

So in the Second Critique, Kant got real about this principle thing, thereby reducing all known principles to a singularity: can you will your principle as universal law? In other words, is it good for everyone, at all times?

Only this, said Kant, is beyond discussion (although subsequent philosophy challenged this, too!). The rest is a practical matter, up for discussion at all points, which is why The Senond is called "The Critique of Practical Reason".

By this he indicated that ethics are always discussable, given the only exception of the 'categorical imperative', as stated.

Therefore, to speak of 'principle' in a more positive sense as an 'awareness' is interesting. This would lend the word a meaning that would make sense--but again, it's not how the word is generally used, IMHO.

Perhaps 'awareness' indicates a rough guide-line, sort of like a diagram showing the movements of swimming. But staying afloat requires a bit more...the conversion of concept into practice.

Eva

(Edited by Matthews on 1/23, 8:33pm)

Post 2

Thursday, January 23, 2014 - 10:46pm

Eva,

You were discussing Kant:

...reducing all known principles to a singularity: can you will your principle as universal law? In other words, is it good for everyone, at all times?

I see an important observation here... that to be a principle it has to apply to all instances that meet some criteria, that lives within whatever the limiting context is. I'd say that Kant went too far (or wasn't being specific enough in his language) to say it must be good for all people at all times or not be a principle.

For example, Objectivism holds honesty as a valued moral principle, but it doesn't apply in a context where someone is threatening force. When a robber holds a gun to your head, you are not violating any loyalty to honesty as a moral principle when you tell him you left your money at home.

Context is king.
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Rand approaches moral principles on the epistemological level and in relation to the purpose:

A principle is “a fundamental, primary, or general truth, on which other truths depend.” Thus a principle is an abstraction which subsumes a great number of concretes. It is only by means of principles that one can set one’s long-range goals and evaluate the concrete alternatives of any given moment. It is only principles that enable a man to plan his future and to achieve it.
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Concrete problems cannot even be grasped, let alone judged or solved, without reference to abstract principles.
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You have no choice about the necessity to integrate your observations, your experiences, your knowledge into abstract ideas, i.e., into principles. Your only choice is whether these principles are true or false, whether they represent your conscious, rational convictions—or a grab-bag of notions snatched at random, whose sources, validity, context and consequences you do not know, notions which, more often than not, you would drop like a hot potato if you knew. . . .
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Only fundamental principles, rationally validated, clearly understood and voluntarily accepted, can create a desirable kind of unity among men.

Note that these agree with Joe's view of a proper moral principle "...as a kind of knowledge. It is a kind of wide-reaching generalization. A moral principle is the recognition of an important causal relationship that connections our actions to expected results. It's an awareness, not a requirement."

But Rand appears to be saying that the moral principle (knowledge) is a requirement in the rational sense. Just as observing the laws of physics is a requirement for the aircraft engineer.

Another parallel between Joe's article and Rand's view is where Joe discusses a concrete instance - a lie - being an example of a larger category of casual relationships - dishonesty. In seeing moral principles in this way, it is possible to create standards to measure the fitness of a concrete to the abstract principle, and to judge the degree.

Post 3

Friday, January 24, 2014 - 6:31am

Steve,

To add to your comment about honesty: I have Peikoff's book "Understanding Objectivism" although I have not finished it yet. I really liked his chapter on honesty. He talks about the difference between honesty, which he basically defines as never rejecting reality, versus never lying. Perhaps to some extent this is him substituting a new definition to make his philosophy more clear. However, I like how it works out. In this case, honesty still applies when someone is threatening force. When the Nazis come knocking at your door to look for your Jewish wife, it would be dishonest to tell show them where she's hiding; you are ignoring the reality of what will happen to your life and your happiness.

Post 4

Friday, January 24, 2014 - 8:19am

Steve,

Yes, 'principles' can be seen as rough deductive outlines that inform behavior.

(They are also a form of verbal behavior that refuses to discuss said deductive outlines, but let's forget about this particular and move on....).

Anyway, 'principles' seem to be an attempt to pass beyond Kahneman's 'heuristic', in which decisions are made based only upon short, rule- of- the- thumb assessments of the immediate.

As such, principles are extremenly interesting in terms of psychology. Hypothetically speaking, one might define the emergence of an individual by the auto-created principle he/she uses, ostensibly opposed to the received wisdom of 'everyone else' which, imho, guides the heuristic.

What this indicates, however, is that having 'principles' is not doing philosophy, which demands a sharper perspective. In other words, when is a principle not a principle? To what extent can we say that both unjustified beliefs and clearly thought -out

ideas are both 'principles'? Since (most) everybody claims to act on principles, how can it even be said that having principles is an adequate predictor of behavioral outcomes?

Again, if we judge 'principle' to be how humans behave in the form of making verbal utterances-- rather than the content of their thought-- we're in the realm of psychology.

I use Kant as an example because he seeks clarity. Of all the principles that people claim, would it not be more reasonable to use the word to describe an agreed-upon universal? Otherwise, an argument over 'principle' is just a fancy way of arguing over beliefs, which are infinite.

Kant does, indeed use his first-principle to define ethics. Lying is always un-ethical because it violates the categorical--do you want others to lie to you?

What's generally omitted from the understanding of Kant is his observation that ethics is only a part of our mental skill-set as how to navigate thru life. It's a 'category' of thought which has a defined immanence--necessary but not sufficient, as it were.

In other words, being 'ethical' and not lying in times of war is absurd. That this is true doesn't negate the definition of ethics --never lie!-- rather, it delimits it's place.

So no, in philosophy words cannot have imprecise meanings based upon ad hoc induction. For example to say that if one lies, therefore he/she is 'dishonest' is either a tautological re-phrase or a severe judgment of character lacking factual background.

The most that can be said is by Russell: if a person is shown to lie, he/she has a capacity called 'dishonesty", but don't we all!

Of course, Russell also insisted that daily expressions such as 'I acted upon principle' are not directly translatable into the philosophical lexicon. Again, its use begs far too many questions.

Eva

(Edited by Matthews on 1/24, 8:23am)

Post 5

Friday, January 24, 2014 - 9:33am

Well said, Dan.

Friday, January 24, 2014 - 9:42am

Eva,

...'principles' seem to be an attempt to pass beyond Kahneman's 'heuristic', in which decisions are made based only upon short, rule- of- the- thumb assessments of the immediate.

Kahneman's heuristic involves the weighing of outcomes, which in themselves are dependent upon the values held by the weighers. In any case, it is a statistical reflection of the learned cognitive practices.

I think what Rand is saying is that the purpose of a principle is to subsume essential causal characteristics abstracted from concretes to form an understanding that will hold true of all such concretes in the future. A law. And that this is so in science, where our understanding is held in the form of principles, but also in the field of morality where we form moral principles.
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As such, principles are extremenly interesting in terms of psychology. Hypothetically speaking, one might define the emergence of an individual by the auto-created principle he/she uses, ostensibly opposed to the received wisdom of 'everyone else' which, imho, guides the heuristic.

There are principles of simple mechanical causality, and the development of the child's cognitive skills needed to grasp that kind of principle was examined in some detail by Piaget. Kohlberg picked up on that to extend psychological development into the moral realm. There have been a lot of studies on the differentiation of self from other, and it would appear that individuation occurs in many different stages. Until a child has developed the ability to grasp moral principles in some fashion, they won't be able to work with them as individuals as opposed to taking in principles like a member of the borg would. We exhibit agency, but it would be more accurate to say that we can develop differing degrees of agency. I know some people who are in their sixties who still have areas of development that could use some individuation :-)
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Of all the principles that people claim, would it not be more reasonable to use the word to describe an agreed-upon universal? Otherwise, an argument over 'principle' is just a fancy way of arguing over beliefs, which are infinite.

Isn't that saying that for a thing to be principle it must be capable of being polled as held by a majority? That would render all principles as collectively subjective, and relative - devoid of objective connection to the world. If the majority of a given society thought it was okay to put Jews in concentration camps, then it is a positive moral principle to do so? I think that approach would simply catalog popular principles without ever building a science of morality where the principles best suited to man could be discovered. It would work to suit the purposes of an academic cataloger of moral principles found round the world and through time, but it wouldn't suit the purpose of choosing the best actions to achieve the best ends for man living on earth.

Post 7

Friday, January 24, 2014 - 3:52pm

Steve,

>>>Kahneman's heuristic ...is a statistical reflection of the learned cognitive practices.<<<<

Uhhh, no. The statistics are a variance from Bernouilli. The reason for the variance is that people normally use heuristics, not real thought, to assess a situation of chance, game, puzzle, etc...

>>>>principle subsume essential causal characteristics abstracted from concretes to form an understanding that will hold true of all such concretes in the future. A law<<<

If this is what you mean by 'principle', then fine. It does, however, seem to be different from that which we were discussing, which is fine, too.

But if a law, then why not say, 'Law'.?

>>>>principles ....Piaget.... Kohlberg

When Piaget was challenged that his claims of stages of child development lacked empirical verification, he said, "Alors, donc ('uhhh, wellll'), what ouee haf heeere are zee pricipals, not zee lawz".

I'm not familiar with Kohlberg, but if he's constructing his ideas on those of Piaget, he's as good as polar bear walking onto the ice sheet around Miami, Fla.

Yes, human agency is precisely why we cannot easily construct moral laws, errrr 'principals'.

To this end, Kant said that all we can say for laws is rely upon a sense of duty that bonds us 'categorically' to all other humans.

Act as if what you were doing applies to everyone else, ie 'universal'. Don't lie. Don't use others as ends.

This, I hasten to add, was, for Kant 'necessary' because it holds in all cases, but not sufficient. This is because ethics is, afetr all, practical, too.

Kant, as scientist, thought about the deontological aspect of ethics as sort of a project (Fall). There's a given coefficient true in all cases (gravity), but lots of drag coefficients to explain how leaves fall from trees, how curve balls arrive low and outside, etc...

Eva

Post 8

Friday, January 24, 2014 - 10:50pm

Eva,

I get worn out trying to discuss these things with you.

You hop all about. You contradict what I say rather than ask what I meant, or try to make sense of what I'm saying. You drop names that have to be contended with as if I knew all of what was said and meant by all of those people. You dismiss Piaget out of hand - all of what he thought, and then Kohlberg without even knowing what he said.

It doesn't feel as much like we are discussing ideas, as contending in a joust where the ideas don't matter only a win - and I get no pleasure in that.

I don't feel like you are giving what I've written enough thought to make it worth my having written it. Could you put my argument in other words, without references to what others have said, say in your own words?

I'm worn out.

Post 9

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 7:56am

Steve:

Hypothetical.

Is it always possible, in the depths of active deconstruction, fully immersed, to actually realize that ones-self has been deconstructed? Or, while fully immersed in the process, would ones-self cling to the offered reconstruction set-pieces, and eagerly rebuild what the local authorities are inserting as their acceptable truth in thought? Is that a conscious realization, as in, "I like where this is going so I;ll ride along." Or is it something else? I sense there isn't an either/or answer to that. But to me, the unconscious victim is somewhat more honest in their regurgitation of reconstructed instruction than the conscious participant. Perhaps, just me in that assessment.

The reformation of Durkheim's "S"ociety and/or Marx's State in a free nation requires the successful deconstruction and reconstruction of its constituent parts. That isn't a particularly controversial idea, although in a free nation, it is a particularly revolutionary idea, especially if the agenda is to destroy the enemy of forced collectivism, 'freedom.' So while immersed in the now century old process, would the 'parts' necessarily consciously notice the deconstruction/reconstruction aimed at them?

Do they even notice that they all spout the same "Schmegfield thought....while Bloomfarb inferred" set pieces?

Well, yes, they no doubt did.

So, free of the set piece crutches, what do -the parts- think? Are they capable, in their own words, of expressing their own thoughts?

And yet, how can they express what they've been deconstructed into believing they can't actually do? The ability to actually express ones thoughts implies the existence of a free will that many of them have been taught to believe might not even actually exist; all that is possible is to defer to what Schemgfield once said and what Bloomfarb once inferred..." The deconstruction of the parts requires kicking out the legs from under them and leaving them hanging defenseless in an existence they've just barely begun to comprehend. Their reconstruction consists mainly of saving them from their resulting existential terror by convincing them that 'education' is the ability to rotely regurgitate the set pieces, as reassuring islands of solid ground in a roiling sea of what the fuck.

For some, eyes glaze over when that happens(the regurgitation of the set pieces); what is interesting is, what do -they- think, in their own words, which seldom seem to come without the setpiece crutches. And, for me, this applies equally to the thumping of AS and Rand and John Galt 3:16; so little of that goes on here, because folks have read and often reread and reread what has long been cast in stone. But the same applies to others long dead. When such references are used as short hand, they are incredibly useful. But when they are used as short cuts, not so much. What is most interesting, to me, is the malleable today and tomorrow, and what is pure joy is, seeing those discussed using new words and sentences and thoughts..

Is this just what happens when scrambling for authority-- leglifting one's argument with the weight of the setpieces? At the other end of life, there is felt less need to look for those crutches, at least.

...

Take Joe's article "On Principle." Number of times he thumped AS or Ayn Rand or quoted John Galt3:16: 0,0, and 0. Completely original thoughts, expressed in his own words. And yet, entirely appropriate for the context, this site. Not a single rote regurgitation of 'Bloomfeld said ...while Schmegfield inferred..."

And to that point: from his article above:

The lie, no matter the degree, shows that you are willing to distort the truth to get what you want, and you are willing to sacrifice the other person for that benefit. The sacrifice is created by providing them with false information that they could end up acting upon.

So dishonesty is important no matter the degree. The negative consequences are expected to occur, although their degree may be proportional to the degree of the lie. But it also says something about the character of the person who told the lie. You can learn that you shouldn't trust him. And while it's easy to say that you didn't like about anything big, a perfectly legitimate response is to say that you were willing to lie for so little!

Add to that, your observation about context, and how context can invert the ethics of the lie and 'getting what you want.' I perked up at that, because for me, that defines 'politics' at its core: getting what we want from others. The inversion occurs because there is no moral equivalence between what a rapist wants and what his victim wants, although to each, they are both others.

Principles are also important, in my view, as the requisite foundation for forming free associations. Through the brilliance of the 1st Amendment(both parts), our right to freely express ourselves is not only guaranteed in writing, but as a seldom appreciated corollary, is also encouraged. It is the means by which we identify our principles to each other, as the basis for our free associations, plural. We are encouraged to freely identify ourselves, friend from fool -- no matter how each of us defines friend, no matter how each of us defines fool.

regards,

Fred

Post 10

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 8:30am

Steve,

You write very clearly; there's no doubt as to what you mean.

Perhaps, then, you're falsely assuming that there's a win/lose situation present in every open disagreement:

* I diasgree with Piaget's work. In terms of evidence, it's as groundless as Freud.

* I would assume to disagree with Kohlberg (whom I don't know) to the extent that his work is based upon Piaget.

* 'Principle' seems to be a word of convenience that means what the speaker wants it to mean at the time he/she says it.

* Science uses the term 'law' to distinguish itself from the humanities' use of 'principle'.

Eva

Post 11

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 9:06am

Fred,

Marx wanted revolution, or the reorganization of society based upon the abolition of private economic property.

Durkheim did not. Moreover, Durkheim went on to say, famousl;y, that there will be no revolution in an industrial society because the constituent parts are organically interlinked.

And yes, according to Durkheim, the 'parts' are very aware of any sort of re-structuring. That's why, according to him, politics so frequently revolves around the interests of said parts.

My point here is that if everyone is equally aware of the nature of part-representation thru the political process, change in the right direction is best accomplished thru a dialogue process that sends up as few red flags as possible. For example, in practice , at least, libertarians emphasize the collective benefit of lower taxes to enable growth...

Marx said that this was nonsense, and that the part-driven interests (class) were far too deep. Of course, I disagree.

For one, Durkheim's model of what constitutes a 'class' is correctly far more fluid with respect to both time, place,and personal dymamics. And because people likewise understand the flux of social-economic relationships, they are naturally inclined to negotiate via an established political process...barring desperate acts based upon misery, of course.

So what's crucial is the establishment of the right legal/institutuonal framework for discussuion & debate. To this end, your citation of the First Amendment is crucial.

Yet, to focus upon the establishment of laws as framework of process: 'principle' seems to be more of an afterthought than an inspiration. In the sense of James, it's the rabbit that experienced fear because he ran from the fox.

So it's only a nice thought for thinking to say that we're guided by 'principle'. After, all, one can devise a good law such as freedom of speech out of common-sense necessity, as did Spinoza, by the way.

He, in fact-- as always!--devised the best thought-experiment to drive home his point: would you rather have a good law that's principle-free, that's based upon sheer necessity, or no law at all, yet much talk about 'principles'?

Eva

Post 12

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 9:07am

Fred,

...the unconscious victim is somewhat more honest in their regurgitation of reconstructed instruction than the conscious participant.

Psychiatrist Milton Erickson was famous for his hypnosis, and one technique he had was simple confusion. By speaking in a way that sounded like it should be understandable (thus motivating the client with a gentle expectation to understand), while leaving the client with not quite enough content to actually grasp but with a very friendly, non-threatening demeanor, the client found himself confused.

And one thing about the state of confusion is that you are rarely more open to new information!

Post 13

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 9:35am

Eva,

I diasgree with Piaget's work. In terms of evidence, it's as groundless as Freud.

Are you saying that there can be no truth, or no intellectual merit or value to a theory or belief without the strict scientific process of a hypothesis that is supported by experimentation? Aren't there such things as reasoned observations, intelligent conjecture, modeled representations?

Freud started us thinking about the difference between conscious and subconscious motivation. I can't imagine doing clinical therapy without that base. Freud's (Sigmund and then Anna's) descriptions of defense mechanisms still have a great many truths and make clinical work possible.

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'Principle' seems to be a word of convenience that means what the speaker wants it to mean at the time he/she says it.

But the same is true of 'law' - psuedosciences abound. The social sciences are full of 'laws'.

If you toss out 'principle,' you also toss out morality. And, I believe you toss out all reasoning on all things. There are principles we observe in reasoning. There are princples we use in sentence construction. There are principles of behavior. Because there are people who take up opposing positions, each declaring their 'principle' to be the right one, doesn't mean that 'principle' itself is a faulty concept.

Post 14

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 9:51am

Eva,

On Spinoza's thought experiment:

...would you rather have a good law that's principle-free, that's based upon sheer necessity, or no law at all, yet much talk about 'principles'?

The phrase "good law" implies moral principles without which the word
'good' is meaningless. Stolen concept fallacy writ large.

Post 15

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 10:21am

Steve,

Yeah, Spinoza was a real concept-stealer.

He likewise believed that laws were to be judged by outcome, not by a priori goodnesses. In other words, for him 'goodness = benefical outcome.

Eva

Post 16

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 10:43am

Steve,

If you claim, like Piaget, that there are 'stages' of development, you need proof to back it up.

OTH, early Freud was very clear in cautioning that his conscious/subconscious model was nothing more than an extended metaphor: since we don't really know how the brain works, for practical reasons, this is all we can say'.

Late Freud did, indeed, encounter serious difficulties regarding credibility of claims. Claiming dreams as a method of access the subconscious was faked in terms of data...as well, of course. as amounting to a huge, irrefutable tautology.

Most extraordinary was Freud's 'repressed memory'. Here, he assigned an extraordinary power to an admittedly ad-hoc rebus, basing everything on heresay and various complaints from patients as to having forgotten such- and -such.

So as far as clinical work goes, I beg to differ. For some, Freud's cs/subcs is used as a rough model, but only in default of better science. Others completely reject him.

There's an open argument within the profession as to which 'maybe some' or 'absolutely not' is best. I'm value-neutral, for the moment, but better just say no if I want to work with mom.

Then again, there are psycho-analytical clinics, totally distinct, mush like chiropractics.

Lastly, yes, you made my point re 'principles': when is having contradictory principles about everything not really having a 'principle at all? So as for grammar, it's far better to just talk of 'rules'.

Eva

Post 17

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 11:25am

Control by historical assignment and voluntary reassignment

Control by who ever most recently took it despite previous historical assignee's wish

A la game theory, the former is better in pure for producers and the latter's existence at least in some margin is better for preditors and parasites.

Not as obvious as many ideas... but definitely deducible.

Post 18

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 11:52am

Eva,

If you claim, like Piaget, that there are 'stages' of development, you need proof to back it up.

I see this form of argument too often and find it too convienient. If you disagree with something, just demand that the opponent prove their position, as if there could be no valid suppositions, models, theories or thoughts unless they have formal proof. Nonsense.

In this case, to call something a 'stage' is to imply that it is a model - a map, a theory. A stage is like a theory - it isn't a physical entity. It's life is only in the mind. As is the concept 'mind' - there are those who because they can't hold a 'mind' in their hand, or find it under a microscope, THROW IT OUT! Talk about an absurd position! In their 'mind' there is no 'mind.'

I can dichotomize any process or action (like getting out of the chair I'm sitting in) into stages. The questions that make sense are about the relationships between the components in the stages, the usefulness of the model, the accuracy of the descriptions of the components, etc.

Someone could go through your past posts and quote any of your assertions and demand proof. But that's simply not a productive or useful way to examine ideas. Much better just to pick up the idea and discuss its relation to other ideas.

It is true that we need to replace pseudoscience with real science, and faith with reason, and call for logic in all assertions... but that is a far cry from saying that without some formal empirical study of a thing, it is to be treated as false or worthless. Reason is far broader than the trends of modern academia would imply.

Post 19

Saturday, January 25, 2014 - 1:43pm