| | There is no deductive argument that would establish the existence of human volition and that determinism is false, any more than there is to prove that a particular apple left on the tree in late Fall moves nearer the Earth.
Any premise used to prove it would necessarily have to be more fundamental than the assertion "I observe via introspection and experience that I possess volition." But there is no more fundamental premise on the subject than that. All knowledge begins with the observation of what exists.
It's an observation made from first hand experience. Just as I can't prove by deductive argument that a given unsupported apple near the surface of the Earth moves closer to it, I can't prove that volition exists by deductive argument.
All deductive arguments, then, to show that free will exist can do no more than merely show that determinism is false — which is entertaining, but unnecessary.
Such arguments are not needed because explaining what volition is, and 'pointing' to it, is sufficient to establish both (that volition exists and that, therefore, determinism is false).
Consider a person (me) with his leg attached to an electrical stimulus — a set of wires and a battery of sufficient voltage and current, etc. Someone closes the switch and the leg twitches.
Now think of the same twitch, but caused by a person (me again) initiating the action by thinking "I'm going to twitch my leg muscle now," then doing it.
The first, clearly, is not an instance of free will. The person didn't initiate the action, but merely responded in a way determined by the nature of electricity, his muscle proteins, etc.
The second, I submit, is an instance of volition or free will. How do I know this? Introspectively. I chose to initiate the action and I control, to a degree, the actions of my leg muscles within the constraints of what leg muscles can do when willed to act.
That I had a motive for this action, even a very compelling one (to provide an illustrative example) is irrelevant. I am conscious of my leg, have knowledge from experience of what it can do under conscious control, and set myself the task of twitching my leg. Then I carried out that task by an act of will.
Among all the antecedent factors leading to my leg twitch this is the one that should be highlighted: I willed it. I could have refrained from doing so.
To deny this observed fact is just that, to deny an observed fact. To assert that some underlying cause over which I have no control is present is to argue that some cause of which I may or may not be aware is the controlling factor.
But I observe that I control the action.
When one develops a sophisticated argument to show that a simple observation doesn't exist the appropriate course of action is to correct or discard the argument, not the observation. Observation is the final court of appeal in the trial of knowledge.
Is this begging the question? No, no more than observing an apple fall is begging the question whether apples can fall to the Earth. That the Earth is massive and apples are as well, and therefore gravity causes them to move along a line joining their centers in a manner described by Einstein's equation, is further elucidation of the observation, not a denial of it.
But there is a key difference between the apple-Earth example and my twitching my leg. Neither the apple nor Earth are conscious — and in particular, self-conscious — as humans are.
Neither the apple, nor Earth, initiate the action in the same manner that I do when twitching my leg. The apple doesn't give itself an order to release its stem from the tree. (At least, not in the same manner that I do.) I give myself an order to twitch my leg, and it does. We both may seek an end (what it might be in the case of the apple, if any, I don't know), but I willed the action, the apple does not.
(Aside: Naturally, if the nerves, etc that make possible such actions are defective, I won't be able to twitch my leg. Damage enough parts of the system and eventually volition would, indeed, be destroyed. But we're talking here about humans with intact brains, leg muscles, etc.)
The determinist responds that something — values, genetics, social training... it varies with the flavor of determinism — causes me to twitch my leg, something over which I ultimately have no control. Since all causes, the argument goes, are necessary, owing to the Law of Causality, my leg twitching is just as determined as the apple's fall. The 'value determinist' simply substitutes his favorite cause — the agent's values.
Whether or not all human action is purposeful, motivated by seeking a goal, clearly some is. It isn't necessary to establish the universal in order to make the value determinist's argument work. If some are, then at least in those instances human action is determined, in the sense that the agent could not do otherwise given all antecedent factors.
Perhaps, but here we arrive at a key question: what are those antecedent factors?
There is one — in my example — that the determinist overlooks: my will. I initiated the action. I said to myself: "twitch your leg" and I did. That I had a motive is, I repeat, irrelevant.
How do I know it is irrelevant?
Because, I observe through introspection and experience that I do in fact possess the power to regulate certain actions. In some cases, such as my example, those actions are gross bodily movement. In others, they're more subtle — such as tailoring a good argument.
But in both areas — thought and action — I am the controlling antecedent factor. That is, my will allows me — within the constraints of neurology, etc — to initiate these actions, or to forego doing so. Far from making thought or action random or causeless, it is exactly my will — a power which is a part of my identity, and therefore which sees expression in action — which is the cause of my leg twitch.
That there are intermediate factors — electrical signals sent along nerves to muscle fibers, etc — provides a more detailed explanation, but doesn't erase the relevant cause. Nor is it important that there are 'final' causes — the goal sought of providing an example. My will exists. That goals exist which motivate me to twitch my leg (or produce this post) only shows that my will doesn't operate in a causeless vacuum. But that assertion would be a straw man. I haven't asserted that it does.
Observe that this is not a deductive argument whose conclusion is: "I possess volition." or "determinism is false." It is a detailed discourse about an observation. By induction, I generalize discrete instances of actually exerting my will to the generalization "I possess free will," and further to that of "I presume that other humans, so similar to me in so many other respects, possess this power, too."
To argue against this position it's necessary to deny what I observe just as clearly and evidently as I observe the apple fall.
That would require either showing that all such alleged observations are illusory, i.e. that the senses, memory, etc are invalid, and therefore not observations at all, or that my will is illusory, i.e. that there are in fact factors that necessitate that I'll twitch my leg, such as my valuing doing so.
But then, in either case, determinism (in one form, "valuing doing so") puts human muscle control into the category of the leg that is wired up, it simply moves the wiring to the inside of the body (and makes the 'closer of the switch' the goal sought).
But this relies on an extended argument that, once again, is less fundamental than the simple observation: I willed it.
(Note: Of course, it requires considerable conceptualization to express "I willed it," just as it does to express "the apple fell." But to observe the fact requires none.)
There is one possible, reasonable, objection to the foregoing: it grants volition too widely. It opens the door for very simple organisms to possess it. Perhaps. That's a matter for biologists. Volition, like other biological powers, comes in degrees. In the case of humans, we distinguish this power by a special phrase "free will" because, with the possible exceptions of some primates, or perhaps other species, we exercise this power self-consciously. But the power itself exists along a continuum.
All determinist arguments ultimately put the control of leg twitching, thought generation, etc outside the conscious control of the person who twitches, thinks, etc. But it is an introspectively verifiable observed fact that I have this power, whatever motives or encouragements I might have to use it
The determinist fails to understand or fully appreciate the uniquely Aristotelian approach to knowledge: all knowledge starts with observation, and that what the observed things do is simply an expression in action of their identity.
It is the identity of humans to possess this power to regulate (some of) their thoughts and actions by self-conscious intention. That is known by observation. That observation is not in conflict with causality in any form. To the contrary, it is an instance of it.
(Edited by Jeff Perren on 12/30, 7:20pm)
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