| | As Aristotle observed in the Metaphysics, the whole is more than the sum of its parts:
"In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause . . ." (Metaphysics, Book 8, Chapter 4, 1045a).
In his book, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, Binswanger argues for what might be considered a form of reductionism, but one which recognizes a distinction between the properties of the whole and of the parts which compose it:
"[I]magine we are presented with two hemispherical pieces of wood, each having a sticky substance on its flat side. Alone, neither hemisphere can roll; when joined to form a sphere, the whole can roll. Rolling is thus an emergent form of action completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Obviously, the whole formed by uniting the two hemispheres is, in a sense, 'greater than its parts' -- but it is just as obvious that this 'extra something' of the whole (its ability to roll) is not to be explained by the supervention of a 'principle of order' or 'entelechy.' There is no 'transcendence' of the natures of the parts or of the laws governing their behavior." (p. 22)
Of course, this view has nothing in common with a reductionism which says that an understanding of the parts is sufficient for an understanding of the whole.
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 12/06, 8:26pm)
|
|
