RoR: Forum

Bill,

I believe you do hold that:

(a) This sentence is false.

does have cognitive content,

(2) Do you not agree with me that the word "This" is equivocal unless one smuggles in an assumption as to which proposition "This" is referring to?

Could one not validly respond to (a) with the retort: "Which sentence are you saying is false?"

I do not deny that the sentence is arbitrary, again, I believe that it has no cognitive ~import~ and only gets cognitive import if one smuggles in the (necessarily arbitrary) assumption that it "This" refers to (a). I don't disagree with Peikoff's criticism of the arbitrary. I just think that one must address the equivocation here. Also, I believe that there is a difference between statements lacking "cognitive content" (since we do understand their meanings, how they could be falsified) and statements having ~import~ i.e., having necessary implications.

----

Yes, enjoyed our sparring on OWL when I was at school. The pic is of my favorite nephew. I don't have a jpg of self to submit but will eventually do so. Please address question above labelled (2)

Ted

Ceci n'est pas une phrase

Post 41

Wednesday, September 6, 2006 - 11:22pm

Ted, you wrote,

I believe you do hold that:

(a) This sentence is false.

does have cognitive content,

(2) Do you not agree with me that the word "This" is equivocal unless one smuggles in an assumption as to which proposition "This" is referring to?

Oh, absolutely!

Could one not validly respond to (a) with the retort: "Which sentence are you saying is false?"

Yes. But suppose the person says, "This sentence itself" or "The sentence I am now uttering," so that it is clear he is referring to the same sentence. Once he does that, he has resolved the ambiguity. But then we have a different problem, namely, that the sentence is paradoxical -- because if it's true, then it's false, and if it's false, then it's true -- in which case, we need to resolve the paradox. Pointing out that the sentence is equivocal, if the referent of the pronoun "this" is left unspecified, doesn't address that paradox. The paradox arises not because the sentence is equivocal, but because it is self-referential. If he said, "The sentence I am now uttering is false," the subject of the sentence would no longer be equivocal, because the sentence would then be clearly self-referential. But it would still be paradoxical, so how do you resolve the paradox? By pointing out that the only way the sentence can be meaningful is by referring to a sentence other than itself. Therefore, insofar as it refers only to itself, it is meaningless and therefore neither true nor false.

I do not deny that the sentence is arbitrary, again, I believe that it has no cognitive ~import~ and only gets cognitive import if one smuggles in the (necessarily arbitrary) assumption that "This" refers to (a). I don't disagree with Peikoff's criticism of the arbitrary. I just think that one must address the equivocation here. Also, I believe that there is a difference between statements lacking "cognitive content" (since we do understand their meanings, how they could be falsified) and statements having ~import~ i.e., having necessary implications.

I agree, but if a statement lacks cognitive content, then how could we understand its meaning? If it lacks cognitive content, then there is no meaning there to be understood. The meaning of a statement is what it refers to -- its referent. The sentence, "The sentence I am now uttering is false" is a statement that refers only to itself. In referring only to itself, it is referring to...its reference to...its reference to...its reference to...blank out. No matter how far you extend this process, there is no meaningful referent to which the sentence ultimately refers.

When you say, "The statement I am now uttering...," the statement you are referring to has yet to be completed, so it doesn't yet exist to be referred to, which means that the reference itself is meaningless. That is why no statement can refer only to itself -- because the reference to the statement must occur before the statement exists to be referred to. This does not, however, mean that there cannot be self-referential statements; only that no statement can refer only to itself, which was Binswanger's point. If we take the statement, "All sentences contain a subject and a verb," that statement is self-referential; however, it is still meaningful, because, in referring to all statements of a certain kind, it refers not only to those in the past and present but also to those in the future (which is an explanation that I owe to my friend Roger Bissell). So, unlike the statement, "This sentence contains a subject and a verb, the statement, "All sentences contain a subject and a verb," doesn't have to be completed in order to refer to itself, because its referent includes future sentences that have yet to be (completely) expressed.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 9/07, 12:57am)

Post 42

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 2:21am

False about what?

In one sentence, the proper retort to the utterer of the "paradox would be, "This sentence is false about what?

Assume again that you agree, will respond at length later.

Thanks,

Ted

Post 43

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 10:34am

False about what?

In one sentence, the proper retort to the utterer of the "paradox would be, "This sentence is false about what?

Assume again that you agree, will respond at length later.

Good question, Ted! I guess the person uttering the sentence would have to say, "False about being false," because that's what the sentence asserts: It asserts that "The sentence I am now uttering is false." So that sentence would have to false about being false. Hence, the paradox: If it's false about being false, then it's true; and if it's true about being false, then it's false. Of course, the question then arises: If it's false about being false, what is it being false about? To which the answer must be: It's false about being false about being false, etc. So, it's the same point: ultimately, there is no referent.

- Bill

Post 44

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 1:43pm

In a Jar by the Door,

Bill

And not only "false about what," but also "false about being false about what," and "false about being false about being false about what," and "false about being false about being false about being false about what," and "false about being false about being false about being false about being false about what," and "false about being false about being false about being false about being false about being false about what," and ...

My main point here was again to show that either one must smuggle in self reference implicitly and arbitrarily, or one must resort to infinite regress in trying to make the hidden premise explicit. My problem with Peikoff's analysis as I remember it is that he never addressed the problem with equivocation, thus opening himself up to your "Two Scott's" demonstration that there is some nebulous cognitive content.

Do you believe that my concept of cognitive import is helpful?

I must also admit that after reading P.'s O,tPoAR, (which I subtitled by hand "Rand's Last Laugh") I think she may have been playing a practical joke on us all by appointing him as her intellectual heir. (Which he keeps in a jar by the door, who is it for?) I will admit that my opinion of him may be incorrect if his esoteric ARIan midrash is more original than his publicly available works. But given that I doubt I'd be allowed past the court of the gentiles, I may never know.

Ted Keer, NYC, 7 Sep, 2006
(Edited by Ted Keer
on 9/07, 1:45pm)

Post 45

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 4:38pm

She only made him executor to the estate, never having called him any 'intellectual heir' - he, himself, however, has come to call himself her 'intellectual heir'.....

Post 46

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 5:19pm

Baby You're a Rich Man...

Robert, I will take it on your authority that he's only the executor. But I do seem to remember reading (? in the Objectivist) That she had considered NB her IH. It was my understanding that LP took his place.

In any case, it was watching the episode "King Log" of I, Claudius that made me think his elevation was the last revenge of an intellectual disillusioned by sycophancy.

I only joined the church after she was dead. I've never met LP, but was personally and gratuitously insulted by someone who did not know me, and whom LP allowed to edit her works. I only care about the philosophical output of AR, LP, NB and the rest. Given the evidence of which I am aware, I find all parties self-serving in their statements. I think her decision to put an open-ended silver subscription card in someone's mouth was a grave error. In hindsight I'd have advocated requiring that her papers be made available (at least after some period) and that her royalties be put towards buying copies of her works for libraries. As I said, I wish I would see more from LP, but am not willing to sign a contract to do so.

Ted

Post 47

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 6:44pm

At risk of diverting the thread -- but because this uncontested claim continues to aggravate me -- I must insert this:

You're mistaken, Ted, about Peikoff being designated as Rand's "intellectual heir."

For years, I have had a standing public challenge to anyone making such a claim to point to a single place where Rand ever declared Peikoff her "intellectual heir."

No takers.

Ever.

So what did Rand say about him?

She endorsed his original course on Objectivism as a consistent presentation of her philosophy. (Just as she had Nathaniel Branden's "Basic Principles" course.)

She glowingly endorsed The Ominous Parallels.

She named Peikoff, in her will, the heir to her estate -- i.e., to her property, which obviously included her intellectual property, such as her writings and lectures, and to any commercial value they might have.

But neither in those places nor anywhere else did she designate him her "intellectual heir" -- not in those words or in any others that amounted to: "I officially authorize this man to speak to the public for me, in my absence or after my death, about what Objectivism is or isn't. Consider him my philosophical representative."

It never happened. And for a woman as meticulous as Rand, had she intended it to happen, she would have jolly well made that status quite clear.

The mythical "intellectual heir" title is one Peikoff apparently first arrogated to himself, and that lie is still perpetuated by ARI on its website (see the FAQ question, "Who is Leonard Peikoff?"). The self-serving nature of this claim should be obvious: It elevates Peikoff's pronouncements about Objectivism to "official" status, and it also allows ARI to claim a vicarious, quasi-annointed status, by virtue of its close association with Peikoff.

It is all complete b. s., however.

Those who argue otherwise are invited again, for the umpteenth time, to cite any Rand statement, written or spoken, in defense of Peikoff's "intellectual heir" claim.

In fact, the only known comments by Rand relevant to this issue -- and to her views concerning "representatives" of her views -- came in the aftermath of her 1968 split with her former (and only) designated "intellectual heir," Nathaniel Branden. From "To Whom It May Concern," The Objectivist, May 1968:

...I never wanted and do not now want to be the leader of a "movement." I do approve of a philosophical or intellectual movement, in the sense of a growing trend among a number of independent individuals sharing the same ideas. But an organized movement is a different matter.

And in "A Statement of Policy" in the following, June 1968, issue:

I regard the spread of Objectivism through today's culture as an intellectual movement--i.e., a trend among independent individuals who share the same ideas--but not as an organized movement...I want, therefore, to make it emphatically clear that Objectivism is not an organized movement and is not to be regarded as such by anyone...I shall not establish or endorse any type of school or organization purporting to represent or be a spokesman for Objectivism. I shall repudiate...any project of that kind or any organization not authorized by me.

Such authorization never came.

To the best of my knowledge of Rand's statements and writings -- and that knowledge is quite extensive -- she never amended those statements. (Which, if you think about it, has interesting implications for the existence of ARI.) After severing her relations with Nathaniel Branden -- and, I believe, having learned an important lesson -- she never again designated any "intellectual heir," philosophical spokesman, or ideological representative, either.

The motives of those who now proclaim (or who insinuate) such a status were best dissected by Rand herself in her post-Split statement of June 1968.

I now return this momentarily hijacked thread to its previous subject matter.

Post 48

Thursday, September 7, 2006 - 7:38pm

The only experience more pleasurable than being proven right is being proven wrong.

Thanks for the detour Bob, its been far too long.

Ted Keer NYC

Post 49

Friday, September 8, 2006 - 8:03am

Robert,

I want to make a small addition to your hijack. I have read people express doubt on the claim that Peikoff arrogated the title to himself, insinuating that this is something only proclaimed by his admirers, not by himself.

Here is a statement from the horse's mouth in "Fact and Value" by Leonard Peikoff published on the ARI website.

Now I wish to make a request to any unadmitted anti-Objectivists reading this piece, a request that I make as Ayn Rand's intellectual and legal heir.

People say this because he said it.

(Sorry for extending this, Bill. Now back to Schwartz...)

Michael

Post 50

Friday, September 8, 2006 - 9:30am

Ted, you asked,

Do you believe that my concept of cognitive import is helpful?

Well, I think I agree with you that there is a difference between between statements lacking "cognitive content" and statements having ~import~ i.e., having necessary implications. But could you give me an example of each, so I can be sure? :-)

- Bill

Post 51

Saturday, September 9, 2006 - 9:19pm

Comes with Available Nonsense!

Bill,

It's not easy to generate nonsense spontaneously!

"The present King of France is bald." would have content, but no actual import, since its subject does not exist, so the proposition has no referent. It most definitely has a meaning. If it didn't, one couldn't deny its truth. It might be seen as having import only in an arbitrary argument in a formal sense as a logical exercise.

Contradictions or equivocations would have no import per se.

"[It is] New and Improved!"
would be equivocal, as are many advertising claims. New compared to what?

"[It] Comes with available sunroof!"
means that it doesn't come with a sunroof. There is import here, but this is just one of my pet peeves.

"Go jump in a lake!"
has cognitive content but no logical import per se. It has certain implications, but again, those are hidden premises.
No proposition without content could have import, but a statement without import might have content.

Ted Keer

Post 52

Sunday, September 10, 2006 - 1:04pm

Ted, you wrote,

"The present King of France is bald." would have content, but no actual import, since its subject does not exist, so the proposition has no referent. It most definitely has a meaning. If it didn't, one couldn't deny its truth. It might be seen as having import only in an arbitrary argument in a formal sense as a logical exercise.

Wouldn't "The present King of France is bald" have import? At the very least, the proposition would imply that the present King of France has no hair. Granted, there is no present king of France, but one could still say that, as an imaginary person, the present king of France has no hair. Perhaps, that's what you meant by import in a formal sense. You say that the proposition "The present King of France is bald" has no import "since its subject does not exist," but the subject of the proposition, "A centaur is a mythical figure" does not exist, yet it has import, because it implies that a centaur isn't real. In fact, wouldn't any proposition having cognitive content have an import of some kind?

Contradictions or equivocations would have no import per se.

Contradictions have import insofar as they imply what they state. The proposition "A is non-A" implies that A is not what it is. The fallacy of equivocation pertains not to propositions but to arguments, in which there is no implication, because the middle term is not used consistently throughout the argument. If a sentence is ambiguous, then it can refer to either of two different propositions, both of which have import, because a proposition, by definition, is a meaningful statement.

"[It is] New and Improved!"
would be equivocal, as are many advertising claims. New compared to what?

New compared to an older model. For example, I could buy a new car that is basically of the same quality as last year's model and therefore not an improvement, or I could buy a new car that is an improvement over last years model, because, e.g., it gets more miles to the gallon.

"[It] Comes with available sunroof!"
means that it doesn't come with a sunroof. There is import here, but this is just one of my pet peeves.

"Comes with available sunroof" means that the sunroof is available in case you want it.

"Go jump in a lake!"
has cognitive content but no logical import per se. It has certain implications, but again, those are hidden premises.

"Go jump in a lake" means, "I want you to go away and stop bothering me." I think that statement definitely has logical import. You say that it has no logical import per se. I don't know what you mean by "per se." As it stands, the proposition has logical import.

No proposition without content could have import, but a statement without import might have content.

I don't think so. Every statement with cognitive content (i.e., every meaningful proposition) has an import of some kind.

- Bill

Post 53

Sunday, September 10, 2006 - 5:14pm