| | Stephen Kinsella has written an article entitled "Against
Intellectual Property", some of which criticizes Rand and Rothbard's
theories on patents and copyrights.
from-
http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/15_2/15_2_1.pdf
"Author X, for example, can prohibit a third party, Y from inscribing a
certain pattern of words on Y's own blank pages with Y's own ink. That is,
by merely authoring an original expression of ideas, by merely thinking of
and recording some original pattern of information, or by finding a new way
to use his own property, the IP creator instantly, magically becomes partial
owner of others' property. He has some say over how third parties can use
their property. IP rights change the status quo by redistributing property
from individuals of one class ( tangible property owners) to individuals of
another (authors and inventors). Prima facia, therefore, IP law trespasses
against or 'takes' the property of tangible property owners, by transferring
partial ownership to authors and inventors. It is invasion and
redistribution of property that must be justified in order for IP rights to
be valid."
"Some IP libertarian advocates, such as Rand, hold that creation is the
source of property rights. This confuses that nature and reasons for
property rights, which lie in the undeniable fact of scarcity...given
scarcity and the correspondent possibility of conflict in the use of
resources, conflicts are avoided and peace and cooperation are achieved by
allocating property rights to such resources...for this reason, unowned
resources come to be owned...by their first possessor."
"Consider the forging of a sword. If I own some raw metal, then I own the
same metal after I have shaped it into a sword. I do not need to rely on
the fact of creation to own the sword, but only on my ownership of the
factors used to make the sword. And I do not need creation to come to own
the factors, since I can homestead them by simply mining them from the
ground and thereby becoming the first possessor. On the other hand, if I
fashion a sword using your metal, I do not own the resulting sword. In
fact, I may owe you damages for trespass or conversion. Creation,
therefore, is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish
ownership...first occupation, not creation of labor, is both necessary and
sufficient for the homesteading of unowned resources...further, there is no
need to maintain the strange view that one owns one's labor in order to own
things one first occupies. Labor is a type of action, and action is not
ownable; rather, it is the way that some tangible things act in the world."
"Proponents of IP must also advocate a new homesteading rule to supplement,
if not replace, the first-possessor homesteading rule...this new fangled
homesteading technique is so powerful that it gives the creator rights in
third parties' already owned tangle property. For example, by inventing a
new technique for digging a well, the inventor can prevent all others in the
world from digging wells in this manner, even on their own property....the
first (cave) man to build a house, according to IP advocates, would have a
right to prevent others from building houses on their own land, or to charge
them a fee if they do build houses...clearly this rule flies in the face of
the first-user homesteading rule, arbitrarily and groundlessly overriding
the very homesteading rule that is the foundation of all property rights."
"I am entitled to do what I want with my property, my car, my paper, my
processor...I do not have to first find in my property a
right-to-use-in-a-certain-way, for all ways of using it, except those that
cause invasions of others' property borders, are already encompassed with
the general right to use my property."
"Rand and other natural-rights IP proponents seem to adopt a mixed natural
rights-utilitarian rationale in holding that the person who invests time and
effort must be rewarded or benefit from this effort...in addition, the
natural-right IP approach implies that something is property if it can be of
value. But as Hoppe has trenchantly shown, one cannot have a property in
the value of one's property, but only in its physical integrity. Thus,
because ideas are not scarce resources in the sense that physical conflict
over their use is possible, they are not the proper subject of property
rights designed to avoid such conflicts."
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