RoR: Forum

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: But granting this destroys your basic claim: which is that *absolutely precise* (or absolutely complete) definitions are required before knowledge can progress.

Mr. Stolyarov: No, my claim, and Rand’s claim, is that concepts are open-ended and exist in the context of the information we presently have. This does not preclude the need for definitions, however, which are needed even to answer the question, “What is the context of our present information?” If we cannot clearly identify the context of our present information, we cannot pinpoint its limitations, and areas where further investigation would need to be done.

Mr. Barnes: … the word is a mere label for incomplete knowledge, and captures
no “essence” of any concept.

Mr. Stolyarov: I must absolutely disagree with this: no matter how incomplete our knowledge of a concept, we must still recognize qualities that are necessary to that concept and qualities that are possible, but not necessary. Even though we do not know everything about man, we do know the essence of his manness, i.e. rationality, and our concept and definition of man (a rational entity) encompass this. If we did not know “essences,” we could not have formed concepts in the first place!

It is possible to work with a concept without knowing everything, but not without knowing what is needed to work with a concept, i.e., that, which fundamentally, makes a thing what it is! Another task of filosofy is to separate necessary qualities of concepts from possible ones and thus define what, exactly, the necessary qualities of a given particular concept are.

Here is a real, devastating example of how a lack of immense precision in definitions can harm people on a massive scale:

(From Ayn Rand: “Antitrust: the Rule of Unreason,” The Voice of Reason, p. 255)

No one can give an exact definition of what constitutes “restraint of trade” or “intent to monopolize” or any of the other, similar “crimes.” No one can tell what the law forbids or permits one to do. The interpretation is left entirely up to the courts…

Thus a businessman has no way of knowing in advance whether the action he takes is legal or illegal, whether he is guilty or innocent. Yet he has to act; he has to ruin his business.

Retroactive law—which means: a law that punishes a man for an action which was not legally defined as a crime at the time he committed it—is a form of persecution practiced only in dictatorships and forbidden by every civilized legal code. It is not supposed to exist in the

United States

and it is not applied to anyone—except to businessmen. A case in which a man cannot know until he is convicted whether the action he took in the past was legal or illegal is certainly a case of retroactive law.

Here, imprecise definitions lead to slavery, tyranny, and chronic fear, which are passed under the banner of “fighting monopolies.” Yet, as Rand points out, even the very origin of antitrust is a result of conflating definitions. A private monopoly, created by the will of customers, and only maintained by consumer sovereignty, is given the same label as a coercive, state-imposed monopoly. If precision in definitions were not important, this would not have been a grievous moral infraction, and I am not sure that Popper would have recognized its harms. However, it is the power of life or death directed by government at all businesses. Antitrust laws have the effect of giving government a blank check on every businessman’s life and property, and eliminating whomever steps out of line.

The task of filosofy is to demolish false definitions and equivocations. It cannot effectively demolish false definitions until it presents true definitions of its own, to show by what standard the false definitions are false to begin with!

The Popperian might construct a decent automobile, but his thinking will not help him prevent its expropriation! Only the Randian/Aristotelian approach is capable of forestalling this!

[My thanks to Rodney Rawlings for recommending this line of argument.]

Mr. Barnes: In reply, playing the consistent Aristotelian, I quite legitimately demand additional definitions of each of those additional words before we can begin our debate - or at very least the nouns, verbs and adjectives, as I do not wish to be *too* pedantic...!

Mr. Stolyarov: I think you have missed my point: whenever the word entity appears in a definition, we can safely and rationally resort to Mr. Firehammer’s 3 corollaries, which implies recourse to the axioms. The filosofical hierarchy is finite, and so is the amount of steps needed before entity appears in some definition.
Please inform me of the specific things you want further definitions of: I will be glad to provide them. So far, there has been no infinite regress, as my chain of definitions has not gone on to infinity.

Mr. Barnes: Further, by the time we have moved from the single, relatively specific term “cube” under discussion, to the 3 additional corollaries, you will note we have now moved from discussing “something” (a cube) to, quite literally, “anything”!!

Mr. Stolyarov: No, we have merely affirmed that the particular entity (the cube) does in fact exhibit the characteristics that make it an entity. Once we have affirmed that something is an entity, what its qualities are, what its differentiating qualities from other entities are, and what its relationships to other entities are, what more needs be done?

Mr. Barnes: I don’t really see how. Platonism, for example is a theory designed to answer exactly the problems posed above. They certainly acknowledged them - they just didn't call them "ontological corollaries".

Mr. Stolyarov: Platonism speaks of mystical “ideals” that exist in another universe than the real entities that they are supposed to be ideals of! Thus, Platonism detaches a thing’s qualities from the thing itself, and is thus in direct opposition to Mr. Firehammer’s First Corollary, which states that an entity is the sum of its qualities.

Mr. Barnes: Regi has rephrased these problems to make it sound like they are *solutions*! This is particular type of philosophic insight is called “begging the question”....;-)

Mr. Stolyarov: Mr. Firehammer does indeed provide solutions to the problem: “What is an entity?” His answer is: “An entity is whatever meets these three criteria…” How this begs the question, I do not see.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Eden against the Colossus
The Prologue: http://www.geocities.com/rationalargumentator/eac_prologue.html

Chapter I: Protector's Summons: http://www.geocities.com/rational_argumentator/eac_chapter1.html

Post 61

Wednesday, July 28, 2004 - 2:04pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: Now, let me contrast this position with your position, which can be summarised as follows:
"Absolute certainty is possible about some things - therefore absolute certainty is possible about everything."

Do you think this is a logically sound position?

Mr. Stolyarov: I do not claim this: I cannot be absolutely certain about any fenomenon where human volition is involved: I can roughly predict how another man might behave (given my knowledge of his character), but nothing precludes him from choosing to behave anomalously.

But, wherever volition is not involved, it is quite possible to be certain of future events, provided we are aware of the knowable, deterministic laws that the involved non-volitional entities follow.

Moreover, it is quite possible to be certain about questions such as “What is A?” or “Where is B?” (i.e. questions about the nature of qualities of something). I know of no questions of this manner that are logically feasible, and for which certainty is impossible.

There is nothing in logic, observation, or experience that tells of the impossibility of knowing answers to any question about natures or qualities. Quite the contrary, uncertainties have been progressively dispelled with the development of real science (from there I omit modern cosmology, ecology, and Heisenbergian voodoo mathematics). It has been man’s experience that each uncertainty ceases to be after a certain amount of information is discovered and systematized. Thus, to your question, “Do you think this is even an *inductively* sound position?”, I answer with a resounding, “Yes!”

Of course, Popperian theory, consistently applied, rejects induction as a legitimate means of obtaining knowledge. You can never be certain about the knowledge you induce, right?

Mr. Barnes: “Let me ask you then: how many things do you think there are in the universe to know?”

Mr. Stolyarov: A lot, many of which we are not even aware of yet. But this is still a finite quantity, as no infinite simultaneous quantities exist! (See my thread: “Mistakes Concerning Infinity.”) Thus, it is quite possible for man to eventually be certain about all of these things! Of course, man can create other entities that he will want to know everything about, and he will eventually find out everything about them, too! Granted, this will occupy vast stretches of time, but there is nothing, given proper political and economic conditions, that will prevent this from eventually happening.

It is concrete-bound to think that simply because we are not yet certain of something, we will never be certain of it. Man’s knowledge advances fenomenally, and opens new worlds to human insight and understanding—to sit today in our armchairs and claim that this and that will never be possible is indeed to feign an omniscience that we do not have!

I am
G. Stolyarov II

(Edited by G. Stolyarov II on 8/03, 3:37pm)

Post 62

Wednesday, July 28, 2004 - 8:12pm

A brief response for now (trying to make a long story short!)

Mr Stolyarov writes:
>My claim, and Rand’s claim, is that concepts are open-ended and exist in the context of the information we presently have.

Fine. "Open-ended" is simply another term for "incomplete". So concepts (or our knowledge of them, which is what a definition is anyway) are incomplete, or approximate. And the information we presently have as a context is tiny compared to the immense information we do *not* have about the universe in which we live. Do you dispute either of these points?

Now words represent concepts, yes?

So: why on earth do you insist on defining words *completely*, with “immense precision” as you say, when you admit what these words represent is:
1) inherently *incomplete* itself!
and
2) based in the present knowledge context, where what we know is *immensely* outweighed by our ignorance? How is this "immense precision" to be achieved in this situation?

Answer: it cannot be. It is similarly obvious such an insistence can only turn into a fool's errand; and all the worse as it has fooled plenty of smart people too! It would be best, therefore, if we just admitted this is the case instead of pretending otherwise, and used our definitions *approximately* (or scientifically) just as I have described.

As I have said before: don't be fooled by the prima facie reasonableness of the Aristotelian method. It simply does not work as advertised! It is inherently timewasting, and doomed for the above reasons (and more) to trail off into ever increasing vaguery and waffle as its practioners "pretend to precise about what is actually vague".

Mr S cites the following example as an argument against the scientific (or nominalist) method of definition:

>A private monopoly, created by the will of customers, and only maintained by consumer sovereignty, is given the same label as a coercive, state-imposed monopoly.

But Mr S, all that has happened here is that you have not noticed there are *two* labels! - ” private monopoly” and “state monopoly”. Actually, the confusion you cite, and the cause of the "conflation", is entirely due to the attempt to define the “essence” of monopoly!!

- Daniel B

Post 63

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 12:24pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: Fine. "Open-ended" is simply another term for "incomplete".

Mr. Stolyarov: Not entirely. "Incomplete" and "inherently incomplete" are two absolutely different states. Just because we do not yet know everything about something, does not mean that we will not ever know it. Because, as experience demonstrates, we do know everything about certain things.

You are creating a false dichotomy here, between eternal ignorance and immediate omniscience. Neither is proper to describe the state of man's knowledge.

Mr. Barnes: So: why on earth do you insist on defining words *completely*, with “immense precision” as you say, when you admit what these words represent is:
1) inherently *incomplete* itself!

Mr. Stolyarov: I do not admit this at all. I say that a particular definition could be incomplete with reference to all the facts of reality, but it is entirely complete within the context of man's present knowledge. Sometimes, contextual certainty and absolute certainty are one and the same. However, contextual certainty is always attainable about anything. Man can always say, "Judging by what information I already have, I can state this and this about such and such an entity and/or fenomenon."

And, once again, definitions are needed to identify the context within which one can be certain, and which can serve as a launching pad for further exploration.

Mr. Barnes: 2) based in the present knowledge context, where what we know is *immensely* outweighed by our ignorance? How is this "immense precision" to be achieved in this situation?

Mr. Stolyarov: We still have a vast context to draw from, even if it is dwarfed by the territory we do not yet hold. We can attain as much precision as is possible within such a context, and no Aristotelian would disagree with this.

Let us pretend that I have a lavish mansion. This mansion still comprises an infinitesimal portion of existence. Does this mean that I should abandon it as well, because if I cannot live in a house that encompasses the entirety of existence, I cannot live at all?

Mr. Barnes: But Mr S, all that has happened here is that you have not noticed there are *two* labels! - ” private monopoly” and “state monopoly”.

Mr. Stolyarov: Statists ignore these "labels," i.e. definitions, (and don't you forget what they are!), and just call everything a "monopoly," then equivocate further, by legitimizing state monopolies by defining them, not as monopolies, but public works, while directing the full brunt of anti-monopoly laws against good, private monopolies! We may recognize that the two things are different, but the avoidance of precise formulations will create a "vague and approximate" impression of a monopoly as something big and bad. Then, the statists can proceed to label anything they want a monopoly and enslave innocent men merely because of all the rubbish they had packed into their definition and twisted every which way.

Mr. Barnes: Actually, the confusion you cite, and the cause of the "conflation", is entirely due to the attempt to define the “essence” of monopoly!!

Mr. Stolyarov: On the contrary, only by defining the essence of monopoly can we come to the conclusion that there is no inherent value judgment attached to "a commercial entity dominating the majority of the market for a particular product." It is by equivocating on said essence that the statists are able to pull of their dictatorial policies.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 64

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 1:28pm

Mr. Stolyarov writes:
>Not entirely. "Incomplete" and "inherently incomplete" are two absolutely different states. Just because we do not yet know everything about something, does not mean that we will not ever know it.

Mr Stolyarov, it is an either/or. Concepts are either "open-ended", or they are not. Which is it to be?

- Daniel B

Post 65

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 1:53pm

Since it was I who suggested this example to Mr. Stolyarov, I suppose I should take responsibility and try to help out a bit here. Because of my time constraints, I will have to content myself with discrete comments on selected points.

I would first like to observe that we are not mainly discussing Aristotle, and especially not his interpreters or abusers, but Ayn Rand. There are many, many differences, especially on this level where we are talking about definitions and essentials.

Daniel, you say that “open-ended” means “incomplete” and “approximate” in the context of the nature of concepts. You do not seem to have a basic understanding of what Rand means here, or indeed of what we are talking about. The clue to this is your phrase “our knowledge of concepts.” This tells me that you are conceiving of concepts as the metaphysical reality of classes of things, rather than what concepts really are: integrations of the classes of things on the basis of observed similarities and differences.

It seems to me that you are not maintaining a firm distinction between existence and consciousness, which according to Objectivism is crucial. Once one realizes that a concept is a tool of awareness, an “eye” on the world whose function is to process sensory/perceptual information, one realizes that it is useless unless it is in focus. To continue with the metaphor of sight, would you call my perception of the screen in front of me incomplete and approximate merely because I cannot see behind it simultaneously? Not unless you hold Platonist ideals of completeness and precision. All that we ask of our eyes is that they have no blind spots and that we have the ability to focus them according to their design.

Concepts are created by humans to stand for certain types of existents that we observe in reality, types that we specify by means of a definition. Definitions perform two tasks: integration with previously observed reality (the genus) and differentiation within it (the differentia). Thus, a meteorite would be defined as a meteor that has fallen to earth. How is this incomplete or approximate merely because we have not seen every meteorite that ever existed or will exist, or because we do not specify where it lands or how big it is?

So you see, for a concept, completeness or incompleteness is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied. Precision is scarcely more appropriate; since man creates concepts himself, there is never any problem with precision for a concept per se, if one does not demand omniscience.

However, there can be a problem if concepts are not formed properly (on the basis of observed facts) or their definitions no longer reflect current knowledge.

Daniel, you say that the confusion between coercive market-dominating firms and free market-dominating firms is due to an attempt “to define the ‘essence’ of monopoly.” First of all, if one wants to use the term at all, “essence” is epistemological; the essential qualities captured by a definition are merely a means of pointing out what class of existents the concept encompasses. Therefore the first task is not to look at “monopolies” and discover their essentials; it is to look at the relevant reality and see if there are similar things that one can integrate into a concept. At a very low level of cognition, one might observe all kinds of organizations or corporations that dominate their markets, and call them all “monopolies.” One might then observe bad things happening in society, notice that many of them could be viewed as flowing from monopoly power, and begin using the term “monopoly” in a pejorative way. This negative connotation would then become an integral part of the meaning of the concept (since a concept means the whole truth, and not just the epistemologically definitional truths).

However, this would be a very low level of cognition. One would have to ignore a great many facts of daily observation, and a great many facts pointed out by economists, to keep using the concept in this way. The facts indicate that state-run corporations and free-market ones are very different animals. Our higher level of knowledge today demands a new integration. No longer can we have a concept whose essential consists of “dominating the market,” or, if we do, we cannot continue to use it in the same way. For purposes of social and political analysis, it represents a definition by nonessentials. In the context of our wider knowledge, it no longer holds enough knowledge and tends to undermine our present understanding.

So, in the interests of cognitive clarity, it becomes mandatory to either abandon the concept of a monopoly entirely or to restrict it to the case of a state-maintained market dominance. In other words the answer is to be more careful about our definitions, and not rely on some such formula as “I already know what I mean”—which is just the problem.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 7/29, 2:04pm)

Post 66

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 2:15pm

Mr. Stolyarov writes:
>I think you have missed my point: whenever the word "entity" appears in a definition, we can safely and rationally resort to Mr. Firehammer’s 3 corollaries, which implies recourse to the axioms....So far, there has been no infinite regress, as my chain of definitions has not gone on to infinity.

Actually, you have missed *my* point! Of course you will block the regress by resorting to axioms. I have said so all along! The point is that you instantly lose the argument by doing so.

I'll restate the problem one more time as clearly as I can:

The Aristotelian/Objectivist theory of definitions says we add precision to arguments by precisely defining terms.

BUT:
1) An axiom cannot claim to add any precision at all, because the second term is *exactly the same as the first*. So as soon as you resort to an axiom, you automatically admit defeat for your method!

2) If you do add a new term, and avoid this problem, you arrive at an infinite regress, as each new term will require an additional definition! And an infinite regress cannot be said to add precision to anything!

So there you have it. Surely there can be no further confusion now?

- Daniel B

PS: In addition, I should point out again that in this example, following your method we have moved from discussing something reasonably specific (a cube) to discussing something extremely vague (an entity). Literally, from "something" to "any thing"! How this can claim to be adding "precision" is quite beyond me.

Post 67

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 2:23pm

Mr. Stolyarov:
>Mr. Firehammer does indeed provide solutions to the problem: “What is an entity?” His answer is: “An entity is whatever meets these three criteria…” How this begs the question, I do not see.

Imagine you are lost in a city. You ask a passerby "Where am I?". They reply: "You are somewhere". Would you regard this as an amazing advance in the history of navigation?

- Daniel B

Post 68

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 2:29pm

Rodney writes:
>So you see, for a concept, "completeness" or "incompleteness" is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied.

So you are simply saying a concept can be neither "complete", nor "incomplete".

Can you see what is wrong with this claim?

- Daniel B

Post 69

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 7:53pm

Daniel,

Since my name has been taken in vain in these threads, I hope you will not mind my intrusion.

I just want to say one thing about concepts. They are much simpler than you would suppose, and therefore, much more "powerful."

Suppose a child sees a bowl of fruit and asks, "may I have a banana?" but is offered an apple. The child, if patient, might say, "no thank you, I want a banana." The adult may pretend to misunderstand and say, "what do you mean, by banana?" The child points to one of the bananas in the fruit bowl and says, "I want one of those."

The child undoubtedly has no idea where bananas come from, or what kind of plant they grow on, or anything about their biological nature or structure. But the child knows what a banana is. It is one of those things he pointed to.

When he gets older, he will learn more about bananas, where they come from, what kind of plants they grow on, even that they are the source of some very important minerals and nutrients. This new knowledge about bananas does not alter the concept "banana" at all. The new knowledge is about the same thing the child's concept identified by the "definition," "one of those."

The "meaning" of a concept is only whatever it identifies, and nothing more. How much we know about what a concept identifies is irrelevant. The concept banana identifies the very same thing, whether it is the concept of a child or a botanist.

There is a sense in which the definition of a concept is irrelevant, so long as the person using the word for the concept it represents, knows exactly what existents (whether material or mental) the concept identifies. Definition is only significant when the referents of a concept are in question. Then the definition must be made very explicit to avoid ambiguity or confusion, but this is the exception, rather than the rule.

Rodney suggests you do not really understand the nature of concepts. I think you do, really, but tend to evade that knowledge in your discussions. What do you think?

Regi

Post 70

Friday, July 30, 2004 - 12:19pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: Mr Stolyarov, it is an either/or. Concepts are either "open-ended", or they are not. Which is it to be?

Mr. Stolyarov: As Mr. Rawlings and Mr. Firehammer have also suggested, this is a false dichotomy. A concept identifies a particular existent, that we can refer to whether or not we know everything about it. Before we even venture to study it, we have to know what it is we are studying! Thus, the creation of a concept to designate that existent is necessary.

Rand mentioned that some of our first definitions of concepts tend to be ostensive: we point to things and state, “This is what I mean when I say, ‘table.’” As our knowledge increases, we obtain increasingly precise definitions, that are absolutely relevant and useful given our present context of knowledge.

A concept is like a file folder that contains all our knowledge of an entity. Some file folders might accommodate more contents. Others have reached their full capacity. To say that every single file folder must be either filled or not filled, and that it is not possible to have some folders that are filled and others that are not, is a gross logical error. (This is the same error as is made when one says: “All men are essentially good,” or “All monopolies are essentially harmful.”)

Mr. Barnes: An axiom cannot claim to add any precision at all, because the second term is *exactly the same as the first*. So as soon as you resort to an axiom, you automatically admit defeat for your method!

Mr. Stolyarov: No, when we reach an axiom we merely assert that we have added as much precision as is possible in our context of knowledge, and that we have linked all our knowledge of a given entity to the most fundamental principles of existence.

Mr. Barnes: If you do add a new term, and avoid this problem, you arrive at an infinite regress, as each new term will require an additional definition!

Mr. Stolyarov: This is not a problem so long as you add a finite amount of new terms to represent an increase in your actual knowledge about the entity denoted by a concept. Once again, the dichotomy between “no new elaborations” and “infinite new elaborations” is a false one.

By the way, you have still not given me the particular terms that I must further discuss in my definition of “cube.”

Mr. Barnes: …following your method we have moved from discussing something reasonably specific (a cube) to discussing something extremely vague (an entity). Literally, from "something" to "any thing"! How this can claim to be adding "precision" is quite beyond me.

Mr. Stolyarov: Not so. We have stated that a cube is an entity with a particular nature. We have defined the nature, and now we must define “entity” in order to complete the definition.

This does not lessen precision, but adds it on all levels (the particular and the general).

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 71

Thursday, July 29, 2004 - 10:37pm

Regi writes:
>Rodney suggests you do not really understand the nature of concepts. I think you do, really, but tend to evade that knowledge in your discussions. What do you think?

Well, Regi, here's the thing: it *is* rather difficult to understand what Rodney is talking about when he insists the nature of concepts is as follows:

Rodney: "So you see, for a concept, "completeness" or "incompleteness" is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied."

But let me try anyway. To me, this can only mean one thing: that Rodney believes a concept can neither be *complete*, nor *incomplete*. Clearly then, if one is to understand a concept, *one must give up reason in order to do it*! Surely he cannot truly believe this? I have no doubt he is sincere, and is not trying to put one over on me. Really, I suspect this waffle about "completeness" and "incompleteness" being "inapplicable standards in the manner implied" and so forth serves only to mask Rodney's confusion not so much from the likes of me, but from *himself*. After all, as Ayn Rand said - and I agree - if one is unable to clearly and precisely formulate an idea in words, one does not truly have a grasp on that idea. This is quite obviously the case here, and only gets worse as he continues in the same vein about "precision" also not being "appropriate" when understanding concepts.(He doesn't seem to realise the hole he's digging himself with this either)

Thus, the issue appears to be that not so much that *I* don't know what Rodney is talking about, but that *Rodney* does not know what Rodney is talking about. I'm sorry to have to say this, as he seems a perfectly well-meaning fellow, and I don't wish to hurt his feelings, but there it is.

Regi, if you think that I am somehow "evading" by pointing all this out, I really do not see how. I believe the term you are really looking for is "confronting".

- Daniel B

Post 72

Friday, July 30, 2004 - 6:04pm

Daniel, the reason you fail to understand what I say is that your approach is scattershot. You do not read things in context. That is intellectually deadly. For example, in my sentence

So you see, for a concept, completeness or incompleteness is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied.

you perceive an outright contradiction (applying Aristotle’s rule of the excluded middle apparently!), and ask whether I can possibly really mean it, and that I am confused and do not know what I am talking about. You missed the relevance of the clause “in the manner implied.” This was a reference to my two previous paragraphs, where I pointed out that the implication of your view is that our definition of meteorite is incomplete because we have not seen every meteorite that ever existed or will exist, or because we do not specify where it lands or how big it is.

My response to that was to say that “completeness” in that sense is an irrational standard by which to judge a concept. The idea is inapplicable. Go to the definition of this word—definitions are important—you will see that it means unable to be applied, not appropriate, not fitting, not proper. Is it a contradiction to say of a chair that it is neither intellectually honest nor intellectually not honest? No—the standard is inapplicable. It is only applicable to humans.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 7/31, 5:44am)

Post 73

Saturday, July 31, 2004 - 12:41am

Daniel,

You may not be much concerned with the issue of whether or not you afford Rodney's points the intellectual respect which they merit (I find no problem understanding where Rodney is coming from - and I find in your unwelcoming tone a cantankerous failure to appreciate the generosity with which his honest attempts to develop a mutual understanding have been presented).

I must now alert you to the fact that - pending your response here - you are about to lose my respect as a thinker on this forum (if you should continue to evade this issue, which seems all too plain to deny). To repeat Rodney's point for careful clarification (just in case you are concerned about being respected - by me - as a thinker):

"This was a reference to my two previous paragraphs, where I pointed out that the implication of your view is that our definition of meteorite is incomplete because we have not seen every meteorite that ever existed or will exist, or because we do not specify where it lands or how big it is.

My response to that was to say that “completeness” in that sense is an irrational standard by which to judge a concept. The idea is inapplicable. Go to the definition of this word—definitions are important—you will see that it means unable to be applied, not appropriate, not fitting, not proper."

Daniel, I request that you publically admit that Rodney does indeed have a point regarding incompleteness being an irrelevant standard IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS DISCUSSION.

Of course, you are free to continue to attempt to merely portray his words as if they (in this context) violate the law of the excluded middle, and thereby exempt yourself from having to answer his points - as a shyster lawyer might choose to do. But I would simply like to alert you to the potential for judgment (by myself, and possibly by others) which such action will inescapably entail.

Ed

Post 74

Sunday, August 1, 2004 - 4:04am

Rodney wrote:

>Daniel, the reason you fail to understand what I say is that your
>approach is scattershot. You do not read things in context. That is intellectually deadly....My response to that was to say that “completeness” in that sense is an irrational standard by which to judge a concept. The idea is inapplicable.

Rodney, you may not think me a careful reader, but I think even I can tell the difference between what you first said, and what you are saying now.

You originally said that neither “completeness” *nor “incompleteness”* were applicable to concepts. You’re now saying, however, that only “completeness” of knowledge (or omniscience) cannot be applied as a standard, and indeed, your “every meteorite ever” example shows this very point - that *completeness* of knowledge is an impossible standard to reach, and that we cannot know everything.

Now I would certainly agree with you here, as would most people (except Mr S, who believes we will one day know everything). But by saying this, and by using this very example, you are simply applying the standard of *incompleteness* of knowledge - that we cannot know everything - to concepts (hence, obviously, the necessity for them to be “open-ended” as Mr Stolyarov claimed). Unfortunately, this is precisely the *other* standard you previously insisted cannot apply either!

So you are still very much stuck in the excluded middle, and as I have shown, the context of your example changes nothing, nor did it when I first read it.

Now the situation is clearcut, though I suppose there may be some purely verbal fudging attempted over the terms “completeness” and “incompleteness”. If this does happen, I suspect Rodney may have to do a little magical context-switching to make it fly - so, as above, we shall have to watch his hands carefully! I will say once again, however, I do not think he is doing it to deliberately deceive me. I do not think he is intellectually dishonest - rather, as I said before, I think he has simply confused himself with words. Easy enough to do.

Or, alternatively, he could simply withdraw his original remark, and admit that I was correct, and that he did not really know what he was saying with it.

- Daniel

Post 75

Sunday, August 1, 2004 - 5:41am

Daniel, look up the definition of “standard.” Exact definitions are crucial here.

When you judge a concept as incomplete, you are applying the standard of completeness. (Or, if you will, the standard of “completeness/incompleteness.” I was using the phrase as a unit, which should have been obvious.)

Such a standard is inapplicable because a concept is an “eye” on existence, not an attempt to gain omniscience. You are using “complete” to mean “omniscient,” which is metaphysically impossible.

Standards are devised after you know the nature of a type of thing, not before. When you judge a chair to be not intellectually honest, you are using the standard of honesty. You are not using a “standard of dishonesty.”

Post 76

Sunday, August 1, 2004 - 4:32am

Ed wrote:
>I must now alert you to the fact that - pending your response here - you are about to lose my respect as a thinker on this forum (if you should continue to evade this issue, which seems all too plain to deny)

Hi Ed.

See my post above. It's a little belated, been away for the weekend. Rodney seems to have changed his story now anyway. I think he's just got himself all turned around inside his argument, and said some stuff he hadn't really thought through. Whether he wants to stick with it or give it up is now up to him. Anyhoo, you may read it for yourself and decide whether what I'm saying is worthy of any respect or not.

>Of course, you are free to continue to attempt to merely portray his words ...as a shyster lawyer might choose to do.

Didn't Ayn Rand usually call them "*backwoods* shyster lawyers"?...(usually preceded by the words "... the psycho-epistemology of...")

Never mind...;-) As for my "cantankerousness" , I *do* tend to get ornery with people claiming that I "don't understand" their arguments, when actually their arguments are founded (knowing or unknowingly) on simple logical fallacies. Y'know - like that's *my* fault!? Then young Regi accuses me of "evading" by pointing this out - well, you're going to see my tetchy side. But at least I made it clear in both posts I felt Rodney was basically being honest - if rather foolish.

- Daniel

Post 77

Sunday, August 1, 2004 - 2:49pm

I have not changed my story at all, Daniel—but perhaps my meaning is clearer to you now? Are you satisfied with my “new story”? Do you now understand? If so, do you now agree?

If you now agree, that is my proof that you did indeed not understand. Stop squirming, Daniel, and admit that there is more to Objectivist epistemology than you had thought. You may regain some of the respect you have lost here.

Post 78

Sunday, August 1, 2004 - 7:08pm

Rodney writes:
>Daniel, look up the definition of “standard.” Exact definitions are crucial here.

I hereby supply readers with the following:

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=standard

Hopefully they will find something "crucial" here that is missing from the debate so far.

Rodney continues
>Such a standard is inapplicable because a concept is an “eye” on existence, not an attempt to gain omniscience. You are using “complete” to mean “omniscient,” which is metaphysically impossible.

Of course, this is not the case at all - in fact, it is your examples that unwittingly rely on it, as I have shown. Perhaps what you are trying to say is better summed up by Mr Stolyarov in Post 63 as follows:

>Mr S: I say that a particular definition could be >incomplete with reference to all the facts of reality...

Strangely, readers, Rodney did not berate Mr Stolyarov for "metafisical impossibility", "inappropriateness", "unfitness" etc for saying these things - only *me*! But we'll let Mr S conclude:

>...but it is entirely complete within the context of man's >present knowledge.

So it is assumed. This claim happens to be false. But before I show that is the case, let us give this the benefit of the doubt, and imagine that it is *true*. All this would amount to then, is that all concepts can be confidently guaranteed "complete", with the caveat that the knowledge on which they are based on *isn't* hidden in "the fine print" of the guarantee. This is rather like a shyster lawyer offering a money back guarantee that he will win every case - except the ones he loses! If this meaning of the word "complete" you think is preferable to the allegedly "omniscient" one, then I believe your method has not made it more precise, but, as predicted, has perverted it into meaninglessness.

However, it turns out the idea that Rodney and Mr S are parroting - that you need to appeal "omniscience" as a standard if you want to describe human knowledge as “incomplete” - is a false one anyway. For I can simply say that *I will know something tomorrow that I do not know today* – even if it is something as trivial as tomorrow’s weather , or as profound as a facet of mathematics or astronomy that I did not know before. Further, I will find out something *that is false tomorrow that I thought was true today*. In other words: human knowledge includes *knowledge of our ignorance* (along with *knowledge of our errors*) which is based on our experience. Thus I can say that present human knowledge is incomplete, and therefore concepts are incomplete, *based on the standard of experience*, which is (in your own terms at least) metaphysically unimpeachable.

So, concepts therefore can be quite validly said to be “incomplete” (or “open-ended”), whether your context is a)“god-like omniscience” or 2)“human-based experience”. Attempts to call them "complete in context" as Mr Stoylarov does, simply imposes a *meaningless* standard, as no concept can fail it - rather like an politically-correct school exam designed so that no-one can fail (and like that school exam, the effect is doubtless intended to be a purely *cosmetic* one)

Therefore, to return us to our original point:
Why do you and Mr S insist on "complete" and "precise" definitions (rather than "incomplete" and "inexact" definitions, as I propose) when such standards are either a)inapplicable to (as you claim) or b) not achieveable for (as I have shown) the concepts they are supposed to be describing?

- Daniel B

Post 79

Sunday, August 1, 2004 - 10:54pm