 | Crimes Against Logic: Exposing the Bogus Arguments of Politicians, Priests, Journalists, and Other Serial Offenders by Jamie Whyte. (McGraw-Hill 2004, 157 pages.)
Jamie Whyte was a lecturer in philosophy at Cambridge University. His articles about truth have appeared in Analysis and the British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. In formal terms, Whyte is an objectivist, a strict rational-empiricist whose logically consistent statements explain experiential facts. This book is his attack on some of the people who fail to meet either standard. The main thrust is on failures of right reason such as inconsistency, equivocation and begging the question. He also reveals false claims, principally phony statistics. Despite the thinness of the book, the writing is compact. Each well-crafted example dissects and explains a common transgression against truth. Some of his targets are generally respected and nominally respectable: newspapers, professors, scientists and government officials whose statements fill the mass media. Other examples are invented. Jack and Jill argue libertarianism versus socialism; and they disagree about President Bush’s motives for the invasion of Iraq. Regardless of the delivery mechanism, the result is always a direct hit.
Normally, the above review would be sufficient. However, here on RoR we commit all of these “crimes against logic.” Therefore, this powerful little book deserves a detailed summary. Even so, a précis will inevitably miss some points that each reader will find cogent. I borrowed this book from my university library and read it through twice, making seven pages of notes to write this review. The book is that good. Whyte calls this work “a troubleshooting guide” similar to the owner’s manual of a car or computer. “It is aimed at everyday users and consumers of reasoning…” It certainly meets that measure.
The first crime that Whyte investigates is the claim that you have a right to your opinion. No such right exists. Whyte points out that this assertion is founded on an ambiguity. You do have a political right to an opinion. However, that is not to be confused with the epistemic right to an opinion. The epistemic right to an opinion, says Whyte, is similar to the right to boast. Just as you first must achieve something worthy of boasting, so, too, is the “right” to an opinion earned by correctly identifying facts and then explaining them rationally. When someone retreats by claiming that they have a “right” their opinion, they are actually admitting that they are wrong, or at the very least, they can present no reasons and facts to support their assertions.
Whyte believes that rights (such as the very putative “right” to an opinion) are defined by duties. He is very clear that he does not mean the kind of welfare state “rights” to government support that come with a supposed duty to good social behavior. He means that your right to life imposes on me a duty not to harm you. On that basis, what possible duty could someone’s alleged right to an opinion impose on you? Do you have to listen to them? No. Do you have to respect their opinion? No. Do you have to refrain from disagreeing with them? Certainly not. Whyte points out that while crossing the street with a friend, if your companion is of the opinion that there are no cars coming and you know otherwise, most people would gladly accept an argument to change their minds. He then extrapolates to the widest possible contexts. If someone really is interested in the truth, then they will not object to being presented with relevant facts and a consistent explanation for them. However, for most people, in most contexts, the claim that they have a right to their opinion is only a signal that pursuing the matter would embarrass them and so you should please not be so rude.
Of particular interest to capital-O Objectivists and quite relevant here on RoR is the examination of the Motive Fallacy. Basically, one’s motives for an assertion are totally irrelevant. Whyte examines this error from other perspectives in the chapter called “Shut Up!” President Bush might have the basest or the highest motives for the invasion of Iraq. Neither case has any bearing on the effectiveness of the war. Good causes have been fought for the wrong reasons, and vice versa. What counts is the truth: empirical facts about the war and logically constructed explanations for them.
In the chapter “Prejudice in Fancy Dress” Whyte demolishes Pascal’s Wager and several other examples including Faith and Mystery. The subhead “But Still” examines calls for the acceptance of ignorance. This is actually a variant of the non-existent right to an opinion. Yes, the facts are on your side. Yes, your argument is logical. But still I prefer my prejudices.
The chapter “Shut Up!” scrutinizes several ways that those losing an argument seek to cut off debate by silencing their opponent. Well-known facts are boring. That a claim can be countered with a boring fact in no way mitigates the strength of the contrary assertion. That a boring fact has been marshaled is especially strong, as it points to a clear violation by the party demanding that the other shut up. Under the subhead “Shut Up, You Sound Like Hitler” Whyte calls mass murder “something of a lottery.” He tells of being in a Lenin Bar in Auckland, “decorated with red stars and black and white images of the great Communist leader.” Hitler bars, he notes, seem to be in short supply. Tying a person’s assertions to Hitler’s would be valid only if everything Hitler believed were false. Whyte notes that few people dispute the fact Berlin lies in Germany, even though Hitler believed it. This is not mere wordplay. Whyte points out the difficulty in proposing selective genetic engineering when someone claims that this is what Hitler wanted. The politics of Nazi racial theory had nothing to do with modern DNA research and when discussing genetic engineering, it is critical to stick to the facts.
In the chapter on “Empty Words” Whyte goes into some depth on the use and abuse of sneer quotes. His example focuses on post-modernist philosopher Imré Lakatos. When you say that my “facts” are in dispute, it is clear from the quotes that you do not believe my claims to be facts. Whyte says that in discussing the work of physicist A. A. Michelson, Lakotos’s excessive use of sneer quotes reveals that he believes knowledge to be impossible because facts are non-existent. This is not unique to one philosopher. Whyte calls the abuse of quotes a hallmark of post-modernist academic writing.
Implied Generalizations slip into discussions – and usually slip by unchallenged. Whyte offers a bald example. When a Christian says that homosexuality should be illegal because it is condemned in the Bible, that is an implied generalization because the Bible condemns many things, including the use of cotton-polyester blends. Backing off from making illegal the use of mixed fabrics (also working on the Sabbath and eating shellfish) then leads to an inconsistency. Whyte also offers a mundane example in Tony Blair’s active campaigning against fox hunting while insisting that other forms of hunting (including fishing) would never be proscribed by his government. Why not? The implied generalization is that cruel sports are wrong. The resultant inconsistency is that some are acceptable after all.
The chapter “Begging the Question” is subtle and deep. Most of this book was fun to read and I had little difficulty relating to the material. Whyte is a good writer. His topic is compelling. His examples are from everyday experience. However, I read “Begging the Question” three times through and made close notes all along. It paid off well. Whyte sets up a debate in which libertarian Jack calls for an end to regulations. Socialist Jill claims that this would lead to mass poverty. In fact, Jill is begging the question. Jack’s position is that property rights are absolute. Rather than accepting the premise, Jill needs to address it by first showing that property rights are not absolute. Whyte then offers a longer discussion on tolerance. When a Christian fundamentalist asserts that abortion is murder, the response is not, “If you believe that, then do not have an abortion, but neither should you interfere with the rights of others to have them.” Substitute the word “murder” for “abortion” and you can see that the plea for tolerance only begs the question: Is abortion murder or not? Whyte then excoriates the Western politicians who claim to have respect for Islam while seeking to end sharia law and the oppression of women in Islamic states. What could such respect entail, if not the admission that Allah demands sharia law? If you have no respect for Islam (Judaism; Christianity) because Allah (Yahweh; God) does not exist, then say so. Otherwise, you are begging the question.
Whyte warns against false statistics with a few cogent examples from highly authoritative sources. Supposedly, 35% of British children live in poverty. Supposedly, 2% of young women suffer from anorexia nervosa and 20% of them die. In the first case, Whyte digs behind the theories. In the second, he exposes what should be an obvious blunder.
You will find discussions of weasel words, hurrah words, morality fever, coincidences and more in this work. You will also find examples of those sins and the others described in this review and still others as well in the banter, repartee, debate and discussion here on RoR. If you read this book and benefit from it, your own work may well improve and you certainly should be able to see the errors in other people’s posts. One reason that we participate here is to keep each other honest. As Whyte points out, when you are crossing the street in the false belief that there are no cars coming, you don’t mind being contradicted. Intransigent devotion to the truth is always in your best interest.
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Crimes Against Logic: Exposing the Bogus Arguments of Politicians, Priests, Journalists, and Other Serial Offenders by Jamie Whyte
