In an answer to the question: "Why be moral?", T. Smith introduces 3 historical schools of thought, of which Contractarianism (p. 28-37) is one. Contractarians believe that you should look to cause-and-effect models of behavior, the instrumental values aimed at your "self-interest" -- and then agree (make contracts) to do, or not do, certain things in your morality:
Its core thesis is that obligation is a product of human agreement. ... Essentially, you should be moral because you have agreed to be moral.
In speaking of the type of social contract that Contractarians champion, she alludes to the non-intuitive (to Objectivists!) hazards of using generic "self-interest" as a standard of moral judgment:
Regardless of the details, Contractarians agree on the principal rationale driving such a contract. People voluntarily place restrictions around themselves only because they believe that they will be better off as a result. ... It makes sense to agree to restrictions in order to enhance one's own well-being.
Self-interest allegedly motivates people's initial agreement to the contract as well as their subsequent compliance with it. It is only because keeping one's agreement can further one's interest and breaking it can hurt it that agreement creates obligation. ... obligation arises from fear of evil consequence. ... it is fear of death that inclines men to peace.
In speaking of the ironic subjectivity in using generic "self-interest" as a standard she says:
Moreover, Contractarianism carries a democratic air that many find congenial. Rather than providing self-sufficient grounds for moral obligation, it defers to what people want. Contractarian morality is not "imposed" from without; a person is obligated only if he has agreed to be. The implicit message that no one has to do anything that he doesn't want to (or hasn't agreed to) suits a taste for autonomy.
In alluding to the limitations of basing moral obligations on their generic "instrumental-value" she says:
Contractarianism bridges the is-ought gap by deriving morality from what people want. You ought to be moral (comply with the contract), it advises, because that will give you what you seek.
On its lack of 'universalizability' she says:
A further difficulty is that Contractarianism has no means of obligating those who have not signed on to the contract. ... affording no basis for criticizing those who did not agree to the contract and who do not respect its terms.
She paraphrases the (hypothetical contract) rebuttal offered by Contractarianists:
... maintaining that morality arises not from an agreement actually made but from a hypothetical contract that it would be rational for people to agree to. ... One is obligated because this is what rationality demands.
After showing how Ronald Dworkin demolished this rebuttal (because "hypothetical" and "binding contract" form an anti-concept when integrated), she concludes:
Fortifying Contractarianism by importing extra-Contractarian elements by which to establish obligation reveals that mutual agreement is not the ultimate foundation of moral obligation.
The upshot is that Contractarianism cannot originate moral obligation while remaining truly Contractarian.
On the limitations of Contractarianism's moral inability to deal well with the "Free Rider" problem she says:
Notice that in addressing the free-rider objection, Contractarianism does not dispute the idea that a person might better serve his interest by departing from moral rules because of the nature of interest or because of the more specific nature of the immoral actions. Contractarianism does not invoke an objective standard of human well-being to claim that it is ill-served by immorality; it does not contend that only disciplined adherence to a particular code of actions could enhance a person's well-being.
On Contractarianism's similarity to Hobbe's wrong view of humans she says:
Hobbes' second argument, that a person should not risk alienating potential allies by cheating, similarly treats interest as best realized when a person is free to do whatever he likes. Once a person is released from concern for others, his interest could be easily had. The council to abide by the moral contract, despite this, suggests that sacrificing the gains that a person could reap from immorality is simply a safer bet. The ideal scenario, however, would be one in which regular defiance of morality goes undetected.
On the limitations of Contractarianism being too contextual, too concrete-bound, and only about social cause-effect (instrumental value) relationships she says:
Contractarianism's treatment of moral authority is too superficial. This is because it is too social, fixated with others' attitudes and actions. ... it is the prospect of transgressions being found out by others that advises strict adherence to the contract. Absent other people, evidently, the concept of morality would not arise.
For the Contractarians, society defines morality; what a group of people wants determine's morality's prescriptions. By assuming that whatever people agree to is the basis for moral obligation, however, Contractarianism fails to recognize the more primitive, natural need for acting in certain ways and not others. By supposing that morality is an optional arrangement, contingent only on the desires of a group of individuals, it fails to identify the full stakes of our actions. ... Their wants are the sole arbiter of what morality demands.
She concludes that Contractarianism -- by being rooted in what conditions folks would like to see, rather than in what it is that folks really need as humans -- fails to fulfill the function of morality:
One could believe that social consensus is enough to chart morality only if one held that nothing deeper in reality, outside of people's preferences, was at stake. ... the roots of moral obligation are not "whatever bargain we happen to strike, to achieve whatever condition we happen to like," but the unalterable facts of human needs.
... Being so inconstant, Contractarianism fails to deliver a moral code that fulfills the function of morality.
Ed
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